State v. Lyon

• Citation: 862 N.W.2d 391
• Decision Date: 17 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–1938.,13–1938.
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Benjamin Joseph LYON, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

862 N.W.2d 391

STATE of Iowa, Appellee

v.Benjamin Joseph LYON, Appellant.

No. 13–1938.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 17, 2015.

Brandon Brown of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble & Gentry, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Maurice Curry and Olu Salami, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

Opinion

APPEL, Justice.

In this case, we consider the validity of a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense. The police officer stopped Lyon's vehicle based upon a suspicion that Lyon was operating a vehicle without proper illumination in violation of Iowa Code section 321.388. Lyon claims the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop because the officer was too far from the vehicle to have more than a hunch that Lyon's license plate was improperly illuminated and because the headlights of the officer's vehicle interfered with his ability to observe whether a violation of law was occurring. Second, Lyon argues that after his arrest for driving while intoxicated, his rights under Iowa Code section 804.20 were violated because the officer failed to properly inform him of the purpose of a phone call under this Code provision.

We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed Lyon's conviction. We granted further review. We now vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

A. The Arrest. Polk County Sheriff's Deputy Jason Tart was on duty in Polk County at approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 31, 2013. At about that time, he stopped a vehicle driven by Benjamin Lyon based on his suspicion that the vehicle was operating without a properly illuminated rear license plate in violation of Iowa Code section 321.388 (2013).¹ After the stop and subsequent administration of three field sobriety tests, Deputy Tart arrested Lyon for driving while intoxicated.

At the station, Deputy Tart gave Lyon Miranda warnings and the implied-consent advisory required by Iowa Code section 321J.6. The defendant made three phone calls. After making the phone calls, Deputy Tart asked Lyon for a breath sample pursuant to the implied-consent law. Lyon refused. Ultimately, the State charged Lyon with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2.

B. Motion to Suppress. Lyon filed a motion to suppress alleging both statutory and constitutional violations.

His statutory grounds were founded on Iowa Code section 804.20. According to the motion, Lyon placed his statutorily allowed phone calls prior to any law enforcement request for a breath specimen. Thus, at the time he was permitted to make the phone calls, Lyon asserted he had no knowledge he was going to be asked to provide a breath sample. Because of this timing, Lyon claimed he was deprived of his opportunity to speak to a family member or lawyer about whether to submit to testing, which he asserted is the primary purpose under Iowa Code section 804.20 of allowing telephone calls during an OWI investigation/arrest. Further, the motion to suppress claimed the investigating officer violated Iowa Code section 804.20 when, after Lyon asked about the purpose of the calls, the officer sidestepped the question and provided an evasive answer contrary to our caselaw under the statute. Because the purposes of the statute were not fulfilled, Lyon argued that his failure to submit to the test must be suppressed.

Lyon also asserted constitutional violations in his motion to suppress. He claimed the stop was not based upon reasonable suspicion or probable cause under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The motion to suppress also cited article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, but did not present a separate argument under the state constitutional provision.

The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. The sole witness at the hearing was Deputy Tart. With respect to the circumstances giving rise to the stop of Lyon's vehicle, Deputy Tart testified that in the early morning hours of May 31, 2013, he was “probably doing stationary patrol, waiting for cars to drive by that had some sort of a violation.” He observed Lyon's vehicle and believed the license plate light was out. He followed Lyon's vehicle for some distance, making sure his headlights did not illuminate Lyon's license plate. Deputy Tart agreed that if you get within a hundred feet or so the headlights will illuminate the license plate because it contains reflective material. Based on his observation, Deputy Tart testified that he was “100 percent certain” his headlights did not illuminate Lyon's license plate.

Turning to the Iowa Code section 804.20 claim, Deputy Tart testified that Lyon had refused to take a preliminary breath test at the scene of the stop. Deputy Tart testified he gave Lyon an opportunity at the police station to make phone calls. According to Deputy Tart, Lyon left voice mail messages for two persons and spoke with his father. After Lyon made the phone calls, Deputy Tart asked Lyon for a breath specimen. Lyon refused.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the district court read its ruling into the record and denied Lyon's motion. The court first concluded Deputy Tart developed reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when he observed Lyon's vehicle turning from northbound on Main Street to eastbound on Second Avenue without an illuminated rear license plate. Additionally, the court held Deputy Tart had probable cause to initiate the stop after he followed Lyon's vehicle and verified the rear license plate light was out. The court further found Deputy Tart complied with the provisions of Iowa Code sections 804.20 and 321J.6.

A jury subsequently found Lyon guilty of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. After Lyon stipulated to the disposition of his underlying first offense for OWI, he was convicted of OWI, second offense. Lyon appealed. The court of appeals affirmed Lyon's conviction. For the reasons expressed below, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.

II. Standard of Review.

We review alleged violations of constitutional rights de novo. State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 1997). We make an independent evaluation of the totality of circumstances shown by the entire record. Id.

“[W]e review the defendant's challenge of the district court's interpretation of Iowa Code section 804.20 for correction of errors at law.” State v. Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464, 467 (Iowa 2015). We will affirm a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress when the court correctly applied the law and there is substantial evidence to support the court's fact-finding. State v. Hellstern, 856 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Iowa 2014).

III. Discussion of Lawfulness of Stop.

A. Iowa Code Section 321.388. In this case, law enforcement stopped Lyon's vehicle based upon the belief that it did not have a properly illuminated license plate. The relevant Code provision is

Iowa Code section 321.388, which provides in pertinent part, “Either the rear lamp or a separate lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate and render it clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear.”

B. Positions of the Parties.

1. Lyon. Lyon argues police “seized” him within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980) (noting that under the Fourth Amendment, a person is “seized” when, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave”); Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d at 100. He asserts that in order to engage in a roadside detention, the officer must have reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity [is] afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968) ; State v. Reisetter, 747 N.W.2d 792, 794–95 (Iowa Ct.App.2008).

From this familiar formulation, Lyon argues that, in this case, Deputy Tart lacked reasonable suspicion to make the stop. He asserts that when Deputy Tart was questioned about the stop at the hearing on Lyon's motion to suppress, the deputy testified the license plate was not visible, even outside fifty feet. Lyon asserts, however, that the fact Deputy Tart did not see illumination on the license plate from a distance outside fifty feet was irrelevant, as the statute requires only that the license plate be illuminated for legibility from a distance of fifty feet. According to Lyon, Deputy Tart further testified that when his vehicle was within one hundred feet or so of Lyon's vehicle, his own headlights illuminated the rear plates, making it impossible to tell whether the license plate was properly illuminated at that distance. As a result, Lyon argues there was no evidence to establish that Deputy Tart observed his license plate “in a non-illuminated state around or inside of fifty feet.”

In support of his argument, Lyon cites Reisetter, 747 N.W.2d at 794–95, in which the court of appeals held that an officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based upon Iowa Code section 321.388 when the officer was traveling at a distance of one hundred feet or more behind the vehicle. Lyon cites a passage in Reisetter in which the court of appeals stated that “[w]ithout the facts that would support reasonable suspicion ... the statutory requirement of fifty feet was being violated, an officer could claim at any distance [ ] that a license plate was not illuminated and therefore justify a stop.” Id. at 795. In order to have reasonable suspicion under the statute, the Reisetter court believed the officer must...