State v. Lytle
Decision Date | 27 December 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 76-143,76-143 |
Citation | 48 Ohio St.2d 391,2 O.O.3d 495,358 N.E.2d 623 |
Parties | , 2 O.O.3d 495 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. LYTLE, Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. When presenting an allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to a reviewing court, an appellant must initially show a substantial violation of an essential duty by that counsel.
2. For the purpose of proving a scheme, plan or system, in a prosecution for aggravated murder with specifications, it is error for the trial court to admit testimony concerning other crimes not inextricably related to the crime charged.
3. Error in the admission of other act testimony is harmless when there is no reasonable possibility that the testimony contributed to the accused's conviction. (Crim.R. 52(A); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18.)
4. Ohio's statutory framework for the imposition of capital punishment is a valid constitutional enactment of law and does not violate the Constitution of the United States or of the state of Ohio. (State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d 73, approved and followed.)
After work on Friday, August 23, 1974, Wallace R. Archibald and several of his co-workers at Wright Patterson Air Force Base drove to a restaurant in Dayton. There the group partook of food and drink in celebration of Archibald's birthday.
On that same day, appellant, Robert P. Lytle, and two companions, Charles E. White and David W. Arrasmith, traveled from Akron to Arrasmith's residence in Xenia. After a brief stay, the three men decided to drive to Dayton. On the way to Dayton the trio burglarized three homes. From one of the burglarized houses appellant stole a. 25 caliber Colt automatic pistol.
Later that same evening, after the birthday party was concluded and the burglaries had been committed, both Archibald and the three burglars entered the Baby Doll Lounge in Dayton. Subsequently, Archibald struck up an acquaintance with appellant. On a pretext, appellant enticed Archibald outside into appellant's car where appellant produced the .25 caliber pistol and robbed Archibald of $44. At this point White called Arrasmith out of the bar and the two, using Archibald's keys, attempted unsuccessfully to get into an automobile which Archibald said he owned. It is unclear whether Archibald had outwitted his assailants or was merely too intoxicated to properly identify his own vehicle. All four men then drove off in appellant's car, with Arrasmith at the wheel and appellant holding Archibald a prisoner at gunpoint.
Enroute out of Dayton, Arrasmith stopped the car several times and told Archibald to get out, but White refused to allow him to leave. As they drove along Archibald was told to hand over his watch. Thereafter, White struck Archibald on the back of the head with a baseball bat because White believed Archibald had tricked them back in the parking lot.
When they reached Simison Road in Greene County, Arrasmith was told to stop. Appellant and White forced Archibald out of his seat and accompanied him to the rear of the car, where Arrasmith followed them. Upon being informed that appellant and White intended to kill Archibald, Arrasmith returned to the car. As he was getting into the car, Arrasmith observed White hit Archibald on the back of the head with a baseball bat, and Archibald then fall to the ground. A short time later Arrasmith heard a single shot. Appellant and White then jumped back into the car and Arrasmith drove away. As they drove, White described the shooting to Arrasmith, relating how Archibald's blood had spurted into the air from the hold in his head, and joked that he, too, would have shot the victim but he 'didn't want to waste the bullet.'
The trio traveled back to Xenia, stopping once to dispose of the bat. After reaching Arrasmith's residence the group divided up the money. Appellant and White then departed, heading for the Perry County home of White's parents.
On September 9, 1974, appellant was arrested on a charge of suspicion of burglary. Thereafter, the police discovered the .25 caliber pistol under the seat of appellant's car. Appellant subsequently made a statement to the police wherein he admitted shooting the victim, but described the shooting as being triggered by his receiving a glancing blow by the bat after it struck Archilbald.
On September 13, 1974, Lytle was indicted for purposely causing the death of Wallace Archibald while committing kidnapping and aggravated robbery, and for the purpose of escaping detection and arrest for the above offenses. Trial was commenced before a jury on November 15, 1974. At that time the state presented Arrasmith as a principal witness. When the state concluded its case the defense rested. On November 25, 1974, the jury rendered its verdict, finding appellant guilty of aggravated murder and the three specifications thereto. After an investigation and a hearing, the court, finding no mitigating circumstances present, sentenced Robert Lytle to death.
The Court of Appeals overruled all of appellant's assignments of error and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The cause is now before this court as a matter of right.
Nicholas A. Carrera, Pros. Atty., and Stephen K. Haller, Xenia, for appellee.
Cox & Brandabur and James F. Cox, Xenia, for appellant.
In propositions of law Nos. 1, 2 and 3 appellant alleges he was denied a fair trial and substantial justice due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Appellant's claim should be viewed in the light of an unusual series of events which occurred prior to the date set for trial.
Lytle plead not guilty to all charges on October 2, 1974. On that date he was represented by attorney Larry B. Morris, who had been appointed on September 23, 1974. On October 18, 1974, Morris filed motions to suppress appellant's statements and certain physical evidence. On October 25, 1974, attorney Rodney D. Keish filed motions for a change of venue and a continuance on behalf of the appellant. At the hearing of these motions on October 29, 1974, Morris requested the court's permission to withdraw from the case. Permission was granted when appellant indicated that he preferred Keish as his counsel. Morris, who had spent in excess of 50 hours on the case at that time, agreed to comply with the court's order that he turn over the contents of his case file to Keish.
Summarizing the above, it is apparent that Keish began formal participation in the defense effort on October 25, 1974. From that date, Keish had 13 days before the juror selection process began, and 21 days before the state presented its evidence, to prepare his case. It will also be recalled that Keish had the benefit of more than 50 hours of work put in by his predecessor on the case.
Appellant's present counsel claims that Keish was inexperienced and points out certain actions and inactions which counsel now avers illustrate incompetency requiring a reversal. In particular, appellate counsel alleges the following to be errors committed by Keish:
(1) Counsel conveyed to appellant a false impression he could win, thus destroying any chance to plea bargain;
(2) Inadequate investigation by counsel, due primarily to the withdrawal of former counsel nine days prior to voir dire;
(3) Counsel did not have a proper grasp of the law, especially in regard to discovery procedure;
(4) Counsel rested without putting on any evidence; and
(5) The closing argument was incompetent because counsel argued defenses without first presenting evidence to support those defenses.
The phrase 'effective assistance of counsel' is a term of art. Courts are, generally, reluctant to enunciate specific prophyactic rules of conduct for defense counsel. Beginning with the polestar decision in Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, there has developed a plethora of case authority on the meaning of 'effective and substantial aid.' Powell, at page 53, 53 S.Ct. 55. The 'farce, or a mockery of justice' test 1 has gradually been rejected, with the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit now requiring that counsel render 'reasonably effective assistance.' Beasley v. United States (C.A. 6, 1974), 491 F.2d 687, 696.
This court has recently announced, in State v. Hester (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 71, 79, 341 N.E.2d 304, 310, that:
'In formulating a test for effective counsel pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Sections 10 and 16 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution * * *, we hold the test to be whether the accused, under all the circumstances, including the fact that he had retained counsel, had a fair trial and substantial justice was done.'
In addition, we held that '(a)pplication of the test like the application of the exclusionary rule, must be on a case-to-case basis.' Hester at page 80, 341 N.E.2d at page 310. We conclude by nothing that the Pattern Rules of Court and Code Provisions, based upon the A. B. A. Standards for Criminal Justice by Wilson, for the Committee on Implementation of Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, and the A. B. A. Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services, and Standards Relating to the Defense Function might be helpful to the trial court in deciding what is fair and adequate representation.
Appellant herein has structured his evaluation of Keish's performance in the light of those A. B. A. standards. Appellant claims that the assistance of his trial counsel did not meet the standards of skill set forth in those pattern rules, and therefore argues that he was denied competent counsel.
Although the A. B. A. standards have been cited in over 4,000 appellate decisions and codified in part in various codes of legal responsibility, they do not constitute the law of this state. 2
We deem it misleading to decide an issue of competency by using, as a measuring rod, only those criteria defined as...
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