State v. M.A.

Decision Date04 October 2022
Docket NumberA-0304-19
PartiesSTATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. M.A., JR., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

Argued May 24, 2022

Brian P. Keenan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney Brian P. Keenan, of counsel and on the brief).

Kyle A. Petit, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor attorney; Laura Sunyak, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges DeAlmeida and Smith.

OPINION

SMITH, J.A.D.

After defendant, M.A., pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), he was sentenced to an eight-year term of imprisonment with a four-year term of parole ineligibility. He appeals the trial court's orders denying his motion to suppress, and barring use of the defense of necessity at trial. Defendant also appeals his sentence, arguing that the sentencing court failed to find certain mitigating factors and that resentencing is required in order to account for the youth mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14). We affirm the trial court's order denying the suppression motion, reverse the trial court's order barring the necessity defense, and remand for trial.

I.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts. A Lawrence Township police officer, Jose Corado, testified for the State. On the evening of June 23, 2015, at approximately 8:47 p.m., Officer Corado pulled over a blue four-door Acura after noticing that one of its front headlights was not working. He exited his patrol car and approached the Acura's passenger side window on foot. He observed a male driver and a female passenger in the front seats. Out of concern for his safety, the officer asked the driver to lower the tinted rear windows. Once the windows were lowered, he observed two male passengers in the rear seat of the vehicle.

The officer stood by the front passenger window. Before requesting the driver's credentials, Officer Corado observed that the female in the front passenger seat was behaving in an unusual manner, while nervously smoking a cigarette and blowing the smoke in his direction.

After obtaining the driver's credentials, Officer Corado smelled an odor of burnt marijuana coming from the car. He was able to identify the odor based on his experience and training. He next asked the driver if he could search the vehicle, and the driver consented in writing. The officer elected to wait for backup before removing all four individuals from the car.

Eventually defendant, one of the rear seat occupants, was searched by Officer Corado, who felt a "hard metallic object" between defendant's legs. The officer pulled out a small black .22 caliber Beretta pistol, with a single bullet in the chamber and no magazine. Officer Corado also searched the other individuals and the car, but he discovered no other weapons or contraband. Defendant was arrested.

After his arrest, defendant gave a statement to the police. He said he had assisted the police in a previous matter and as a result of that cooperation, other persons in the community were "after him." Defendant explained that he had been beaten up twice and shot at once since cooperating with law enforcement. Seeking protection from law enforcement, defendant contacted the detective and the prosecutor from the case he cooperated in, however, he received no assistance. Defendant explained he wanted to move out of state to avoid the threats, however, he was unable to do so because he was on probation.

Defendant changed residences in the community where he lived, moving from his mother's house to his cousin's house in an attempt to avoid the constant threats on his person. He admitted that he had obtained the Beretta pistol just days before, and that he acquired it in response to being assaulted and fired upon. Defendant told the interviewing detective that he knew the pistol contained only one bullet. He stated that he intended to fire the bullet at a potential assailant and flee, if assaulted for a fourth time.

A grand jury indicted defendant on second degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and fourth degree possession of hollow nose bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f). The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence and later granted the State's motion to preclude the statutory defense of necessity.

On June 25, 2018, defendant pled guilty. The second weapons charge was dismissed. After sentencing, defendant appealed, and now makes the following arguments:

POINT I
THE OFFICER' S REQUEST, WITHOUT A HEIGHTENED AWARENESS OF DANGER, FOR THE DRIVER TO ROLL DOWN THE TINTED REAR WINDOWS SO THAT HE COULD SEE INTO THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT FOR HIS SAFETY, VIOLATED [M.A.'s] RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
POINT II
THE MOTION COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION TO PRECLUDE THE NECESSITY DEFENSE.
POINT III
BECAUSE [M.A.] WAS TWENTY-ONE YEARS OLD AT THE TIME THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED, RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED TO CONSIDER THE RECENTLY ENACTED YOUTH MITIGATING FACTOR, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1B (14). (NOT RAISED BELOW)
POINT IV
THE SENTENCING COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD, AND TO CONSIDER MITIGATING FACTORS RAISED BY THE DEFENSE. (NOT RAISED BELOW)
II.

The scope of review of a motion to suppress is limited. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). "In reviewing a motion to suppress, an appellate court 'must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). An appellate court gives deference to those factual findings in recognition of the trial court's "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Elders, 192 N.J. at 243.

We will not disturb a lower court's determination unless it is "so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412 (2014) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244). However, legal conclusions to be drawn from those facts are reviewed de novo. State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 387 (2012).

The appellate court gives deference to the evidentiary rulings made by a trial court absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021); State v. Rochat, 470 N.J.Super. 392, 453 (App. Div. 2022). The appellate court will not disturb a trial court's determination "unless the evidentiary ruling is 'so wide of the mark' that it constitutes a 'clear error in judgment.'" Garcia, 245 N.J. at 430 (quoting State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 412, 430 (2020)). "A trial court's 'discretion is abused when relevant evidence offered by the defense and necessary for a fair trial is kept from the jury.'" State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) (quoting State v. Cope, 224 N.J. 530, 554-55 (2016)).

III.
A.

In his first appeal point, defendant offers a narrow argument, one which, as best we can discern, was not raised with the trial court. Recognizing that we are not bound to address arguments on appeal not raised in the trial court, State v. Walker, 385 N.J.Super. 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006), we proceed using a plain error standard.

Defendant now contends Officer Corado had no articulable basis to direct the driver to lower the rear tinted windows, and that the court erred by not applying the heightened awareness of danger standard first articulated in State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599 (1994), and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in State v. Mai, 202 N.J. 12 (2010) and State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94 (2017), to the officer's instruction. Defendant's theory now is that without that initial act by the officer, the chain of events which led to the gun seizure would not have occurred.

The State argues before us that reasonableness is the relevant standard to use when analyzing Officer Corado's initial act that led to the warrantless search. Reasonableness is "determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [a warantless search] intrudes on an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 111 (2010) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001)).

At the argument on the suppression motion, the court rejected defendant's argument that the heightened awareness of danger standard should apply, concluding that Smith and its progeny could be distinguished on the facts. Instead, the court applied the doctrine of exigent circumstances, citing State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281 (2013), to support denial of the motion. The trial court found Officer Corado was justified in removing the occupants from the Acura and conducting a warrantless search of the people and the car, concluding that "the smell of burnt marijuana under the total circumstances created a heightened and reasonable suspicion that an offense was being committed." Ibid.

Since defendant now only seeks review of Officer Corado's direction to the driver to roll down the rear windows, we conclude that the standard by which we should evaluate the officer's actions is one of reasonableness, not heightened awareness or...

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