State v. M.D.M. (In re Interest of M.D.M.)

• Decision Date: 08 June 2021
• Docket Number: 2017AP139,Appeal Nos. 2017AP138
• Parties: In the INTEREST OF M.D.M., a person under the age of 17: State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Appellant, v. M.D.M., Respondent-Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

398 Wis.2d 718

963 N.W.2d 98

2021 WI App 42

In the INTEREST OF M.D.M., a person under the age of 17:

State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.M.D.M., Respondent-Respondent.^†

Appeal Nos. 2017AP138

2017AP139

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs: November 19, 2020

Opinion Filed: June 8, 2021

On behalf of the petitioner-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of John T. Chisholm and Anna E. Gage of the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office in Milwaukee.

On behalf of the respondent-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Jorge R. Fragoso of the Office of the State Public Defender in Milwaukee.

Before Brash, P.J., Dugan and Donald, JJ.

DUGAN, J.

¶1 The State appeals from orders of the circuit court denying the State's "Motion[s] to Resume Suspended Cases" in Milwaukee County Circuit Court Case Nos. 14JV588 and 14JV588B (the 2014 cases) where the State had filed petitions charging M.D.M. with a total of four counts of delinquency.¹ The legal question on appeal concerns competency procedures under WIS. STAT. § 938.30(5)(d) (2019-20).² After competency evaluations and hearings occurred, the circuit court found M.D.M. not competent, but likely to become competent in each case. The court suspended the proceedings and ordered competency restoration services in both cases.

¶2 On May 18, 2016, the State filed a petition in Milwaukee County Circuit Court Case No. 16JV462 (the 2016 case), charging M.D.M. with one count of delinquency. M.D.M.’s competency was again raised, but this time the circuit court found M.D.M. competent to proceed. M.D.M.’s 2014 cases remained in suspended status, but because there was now evidence in the 2016 case that M.D.M. was competent, the State filed "Motion[s] to Resume Suspended Cases" and requested that the court redetermine M.D.M.’s competency in the 2014 cases. After briefing and a hearing, the circuit court denied the State's motions, and this appeal followed.

¶3 On appeal, the State argues that, pursuant to our supreme court's decision in State v. A.L. , 2019 WI 20, 385 Wis. 2d 612, 923 N.W.2d 827, once its motions to recall the suspended cases were filed, the motions triggered a procedural mechanism that was mandatory and required the circuit court to hold a hearing on the issue of whether M.D.M. was competent. We agree and, therefore, reverse the circuit court's orders and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶4 On July 8, 2014, the State filed the first petition for delinquency in Case No. 14JV588, alleging that M.D.M. committed arson of a building. M.D.M. raised competency, and the circuit court ordered a competency evaluation. Following a competency evaluation, the doctor submitted a competency report in which she opined that M.D.M. was not competent, but likely to become competent within the statutory time limit. Neither of the parties objected to the report, and the circuit court found M.D.M. not competent, but likely to become competent during the statutory time limit and suspended the proceedings.

¶5 On August 14, 2014, the State filed a second petition for delinquency in Case No. 14JV588B alleging that M.D.M. committed (1) burglary, (2) negligent handling of burning material, and (3) graffiti. The issue of competency was again raised, and the court ordered a competency evaluation. In his competency report, the doctor opined that M.D.M. was not competent, but likely to become competent within the statutory time limit. The State challenged the report, and the court held a competency hearing on September 23, 2014. At the close of the hearing the circuit court found that M.D.M. was not competent, but likely to become competent within the statutory time limit and suspended the proceedings.³

¶6 On May 18, 2016, the State filed a third petition for delinquency in Case No. 16JV462, alleging that M.D.M. committed first-degree sexual assault—sexual intercourse with a child under age thirteen and soliciting a child for prostitution. M.D.M. again raised competency. The circuit court ordered a competency evaluation, and the doctor submitted a report opining that M.D.M. was competent to proceed. Neither of the parties challenged the competency report, and on August 3, 2016, the circuit court found M.D.M. competent to proceed. The State then requested that the circuit court resume the suspended 2014 cases. The court informed the State that it needed to file motions with the court.⁴

¶7 The State filed its Motions to Resume Suspended Cases on August 25, 2016. The circuit court orally denied the State's motions at a hearing on December 13, 2016, and by written orders filed on January 13, 2017. In its written decision, the circuit court concluded that it had the authority to resume the proceedings in a juvenile delinquency case that was suspended based on the finding that the juvenile was not competent. However, it concluded that the decision whether to resume the case was discretionary. The court then denied the State's motions to resume the 2014 cases based on the following reasons:

Given the time lag between the alleged commission of these offenses and the dispositions of the JIPS orders the court finds that the legislative purposes of Chapter 938 have already been accomplished and the resumption of these cases would result in a waste of court time, resources and public funds, and, in addition, lead to potential violations of the juvenile's right to due process. The public has already been protected, even without the benefit of adjudication, the juvenile has been held accountable. The juvenile[ ] has received an individualized assessment and treatment consistent with his best interest and the protection of the public.

Nowhere in its decision did the circuit court address the issue of whether M.D.M. was competent. The effect of the circuit court's decision is that the 2014 cases remain in a state of suspension.

¶8 On January 23, 2017, the State filed its petitions for leave to appeal the circuit court's orders denying the motions to resume the 2014 cases.⁵

M.D.M. opposed the petitions in a memorandum filed on February 1, 2017, and on February 13, 2017, he filed motions with this court asking the court to hold the State's petitions for leave to appeal in abeyance until this court rendered its decision in State v. A.L. , which was pending before this court at that time.⁶ This court granted M.D.M.’s motions to hold the State's petitions in abeyance.⁷ As noted, A.L. was ultimately decided by the supreme court, and this court proceeded with these appeals.⁸

DISCUSSION

¶9 The issue before this court is whether a circuit court's redetermination of a juvenile's competency pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 938.30(5) is mandatory or discretionary when the circuit court receives information that the juvenile's competency is restored. The State argues that a competency hearing is mandatory, not discretionary. By contrast, M.D.M. argues that the circuit court has discretion in deciding whether to resume the suspended proceedings. We conclude that a competency hearing is mandatory when the circuit court receives information reflecting that the juvenile's competency is restored.

¶10 Our supreme court's decision in A.L. is instructive on this issue. As noted, one of the issues before the court in A.L. was whether a circuit court can resume suspended juvenile delinquency proceedings to redetermine the competency of a juvenile who was initially found not competent to proceed under WIS. STAT. § 938.30(5)(d) and not likely to become competent within the statutory time limits. A.L. , 385 Wis. 2d 612, ¶12, 923 N.W.2d 827. The court concluded

that the language of WIS. STAT. § 938.30(5), read in conjunction with the language of ch. 938, allows a circuit court to resume delinquency proceedings that were suspended because a juvenile was initially found not competent to proceed under § 938.30(5)(d) and not likely to become competent within the statutory time limits.^{[9 ]}

A.L. , 385 Wis. 2d 612, ¶23, 923 N.W.2d 827.

¶11 In A.L. , our supreme court explained that "the word ‘suspend[ed]’ signifies a temporary postponement and implies that a circuit court can resume the proceedings if the reason for the suspension disappears." Id. , ¶16. The court went on to say that "[t]he word suspend thus implies that something is postponed until a condition has been met. Here, the precondition of suspension that no longer exists is A.L.’s lack of competency." Id. The court further stated that "[i]f the circuit court cannot resume suspended proceedings once a juvenile becomes competent, there would be no means of conclusion or resolution of the case, and ... delinquency proceedings would be suspended indefinitely." Id. , ¶18.

¶12 Therefore, under our supreme court's decision in A.L. , the circuit court has the authority to resume M.D.M.’s suspended (2014) cases. However, in A.L. , the court did not directly set forth the procedure that the circuit court must follow when the issue of resuming a suspended case arises. As the State notes, the court did not discuss whether the competency determination is mandatory or discretionary. The State further argues that the court's emphasis on the "temporary" nature of a "suspension" establishes that a redetermination of the competency of the juvenile is mandatory. It then asserts that if a suspension is to be temporary, then a circuit court would not have the discretion not to hold a hearing when it receives information that the juvenile's competency was restored—otherwise, a juvenile's case will remain suspended indefinitely.

¶13 We agree with the State's analysis. Moreover, in its decision in A.L. , our supreme court noted that the State's motion to recall a suspended case "would be the procedural mechanism triggering a circuit court to order a competency evaluation." Id. , ¶12 n.5. The court went on to state that "[i]f [the juvenile] is ultimately found competent, the circuit court could then resume the proceedings[.]" Id. ¶14 By contrast, M.D.M. argues that the circuit...