State v. M.Y.G.

Decision Date19 May 2022
Docket Number99374-2 (,C/w No. 99379-3)
Citation509 P.3d 818
Parties STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. M.Y.G. and I.A.S., Petitioners.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Andrea Burkhart, Two Arrows, PLLC, 8220 W. Gage Blvd. #789, Kennewick, WA, 99336-8113, Nancy P. Collins, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave. Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98101-3647, for Petitioners.

Larry D. Steinmetz, Jason Moscowitz, Office of Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney, 1100 W. Mallon Ave., Spokane, WA, 99260-2043, for Respondent.

Katherine Elizabeth Hurley, La Rond Baker, King County Department of Public Defense, 710 2nd Ave. Ste. 200, Seattle, WA, 98104-1703, Julia Mizutani, Nancy Lynn Talner, ACLU-WA, P.O. Box 2728, Seattle, WA, 98111-2728, Cindy Arends Elsberry, Washington Defender Association, 110 Prefontaine Pl. S. Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98104-2626, for Amici Curiae on behalf of King County Department of Public Defense, American Civil Liberties Union of WA, Washington Defender Association, Asian Counseling and Referral Service, Center for Children and Youth Justice, Choose 180, Collective Justice, Community Passageways, Council On American Islamic Relations Washington Chapter, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Juvenile Law Center, Kent Black Action Commission, La Resistencia, League of Education Voters, Legal Counsel for Youth and Children, Look2justice, Mockingbird Society, Mothers for Police Accountability, Oneamerica, Real Change, Teamchild, and Urban League of Metropolitan Seattle.

OWENS, J.

¶ 1 RCW 43.43.754(1)(a) requires every adult or juvenile convicted of a felony or certain other crimes or equivalent juvenile offenses to give a DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) sample for identification analysis. But the statute fails to define when a person is "convicted" to trigger the DNA collection requirement. In this case, we are asked whether a juvenile is "convicted" when they enter into a deferred disposition.

¶ 2 Because the deferred disposition scheme, RCW 13.40.127, treats a deferred disposition as a conviction and because a deferred disposition falls under the SRA (Sentencing Reform Act of 1981), ch. 9.94A RCW, and the dictionary definition of "convicted," we hold that a juvenile is "convicted" when they enter into a deferred disposition. However, we hold that the juvenile offenses committed by the petitioners in this case do not trigger the DNA collection statute. We affirm the Court of Appeals in part and reverse in part. Additionally, we vacate the orders requiring a DNA sample from M.Y.G. and I.A.S.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 M.Y.G. was 15 years old when he stole two cars. The State charged him with two counts of theft of a motor vehicle. M.Y.G. moved for and was granted a deferred disposition, but he objected to providing a DNA sample. The trial court ordered M.Y.G. to submit a DNA sample but stayed collection pending appeal. Division Three of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, upholding the DNA collection.

¶ 4 I.A.S. was 17 years old and under the influence of alcohol when he stole a truck, crashed it into a tree, and ran from the scene. The State charged him with one count of second degree burglary, theft of a motor vehicle, second degree theft, driving under the influence, and failure to remain at the scene of an accident. I.A.S. moved for and was granted a deferred disposition. He too objected to providing a DNA sample, but the court ordered him to submit one, staying collection pending his appeal. Division Three of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, requiring I.A.S. to give a DNA sample. I.A.S. and M.Y.G. sought our review, which the court granted by consolidating the two cases.

II. ANALYSIS
A. A Deferred Disposition Is a Conviction under RCW 43.43.754

¶ 5 RCW 43.43.754 requires any person convicted of certain crimes or equivalent juvenile offenses to give a DNA sample. But the statute fails to define what constitutes a "conviction" or when a person is "convicted." Thus, we are tasked with determining whether a juvenile is "convicted" and therefore required to give a DNA sample when they enter into a deferred disposition. This is a question of statutory interpretation we review de novo. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC , 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).

¶ 6 When interpreting a statute, "the court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature's intent." Id. The "surest" indicator of legislative intent is the statute's text, so if the statute's meaning is plain on its face, we " ‘give effect to that plain meaning.’ " State v. Ervin , 169 Wash.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Jacobs , 154 Wash.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005) ). To determine a statute's plain meaning, we look to its text and " ‘the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’ " Id. (quoting Jacobs , 154 Wash.2d at 600, 115 P.3d 281 ).

¶ 7 As for definitions, "legislative definitions provided in a statute are controlling." Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles , 148 Wash.2d 224, 239, 59 P.3d 655 (2002). If the statute at issue does not define a term, a court may rely on the legislature's definition of that term in another statute. See Champion v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412 , 81 Wash.2d 672, 676, 504 P.2d 304 (1972) (when the legislature uses a word in a statute with one meaning and subsequently uses the same word in legislating on the same subject, the word will be given the same meaning (quoting State ex rel. Am. Piano Co. v. Superior Court , 105 Wash. 676, 679, 178 P. 827 (1919) )). But when the legislature does not define a word, "courts may resort to the applicable dictionary definition to determine a word's plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent within the statute appears." Am. Legion Post No. 32 v. City of Walla Walla , 116 Wash.2d 1, 8, 802 P.2d 784 (1991) (citing State ex rel. Graham v. Northshore Sch . Dist. No. 417 , 99 Wash.2d 232, 244, 662 P.2d 38 (1983) ).

¶ 8 While these are our general guiding principles in interpreting statutes, we have been wary of the term "conviction" in interpreting statutes that govern criminal matters involving juveniles. See In re Det. of Anderson , 185 Wash.2d 79, 86, 368 P.3d 162 (2016). We have said that "we cannot rely on the word [conviction] alone—we consider the particular statutory context and purposes to determine what the legislature intended." Id. Accordingly, we also consider the deferred disposition statutory scheme, RCW 13.40.127, to determine whether a deferred disposition is a conviction.

¶ 9 All three sources—other statutory definitions, the dictionary definition, and the deferred disposition statutory scheme—lead us to the conclusion that a deferred disposition constitutes a conviction for purposes of DNA collection under RCW 43.43.754.

1. A Deferred Disposition Is a Conviction under the SRA and Dictionary Definition

¶ 10 Because RCW 43.43.754 does not define when a person is "convicted," we first look to other relevant statutes for an applicable definition. The SRA defines "conviction" as "an adjudication of guilt pursuant to Title 10 or 13 RCW and includes a verdict of guilty, a finding of guilty, and acceptance of a plea of guilty." RCW 9.94A.030(9). This definition shows the legislature views a finding of guilt under Title 13 RCW, which governs juvenile adjudications, as a conviction.

¶ 11 The SRA definition is reinforced by a common understanding of what "convicted" means as reflected by dictionary definitions. Webster's defines "convict" as "to find or declare guilty of an offense or crime by the verdict or decision of a court or other authority." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 499 (3d ed. 2002). Black's Law Dictionary similarly defines "conviction" as the "act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; the state of having been proved guilty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 422 (11th ed. 2019).

¶ 12 In light of the SRA definition, we consider whether the trial court finds the juvenile guilty in a deferred disposition. Under RCW 13.40.127, a juvenile court may defer sentencing a juvenile and place them under supervised release. This process requires the juvenile to (1) stipulate to the facts in the police report, (2) acknowledge the police report will be used to support a finding of guilt, (3) waive the right to a speedy disposition and the right to confront witnesses, and (4) acknowledge the consequences of being found guilty and the consequences of entering an order of disposition. RCW 13.40.127(3). "Following the stipulation, acknowledgement, waiver, and entry of a finding or plea of guilt, the court shall defer entry of an order of disposition of the juvenile." RCW 13.40.127(4). The case is then continued for up to a year after "the juvenile is found guilty." RCW 13.40.127(2). Taken together, these provisions show that the juvenile court finds a juvenile guilty as part of the deferred disposition. Under the SRA definition, this finding of guilt constitutes a conviction triggering RCW 43.43.754 ’s DNA sample requirement.

2. RCW 13.40.127 Refers to a Deferred Disposition as a Conviction

¶ 13 After looking at the DNA collection statute's text, we look to related provisions and the statutory scheme as a whole. See Campbell & Gwinn , 146 Wash.2d at 11-12, 43 P.3d 4. We have emphasized this principle in juvenile cases, looking to statutory context to determine whether a statutory reference to "convictions" includes juvenile adjudications. In re Det. of Anderson , 185 Wash.2d at 86, 368 P.3d 162. Our emphasis on looking to statutory context stems from the fact that "the Legislature's use of ‘conviction’ in statutes to refer to juveniles appears to be endemic." In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E , 121 Wash.2d 80, 87, 847 P.2d 455 (1993). Accordingly, we look to RCW 13.40.127, which created the deferred disposition...

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