State v. Machado
| Decision Date | 12 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0080,2 CA-CR 2013-0080 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. LOUIE THOMAS MACHADO, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Appeal from the superior court in Pima county
The Honorable Howard Fell, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Phoenix
By David A. Sullivan, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender
By Frank P. Leto and Katherine A. Estavillo,
Assistant Public Defenders, Tucson
Judge Howard authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kelly and Judge Vásquez concurred.
¶1 Following a jury trial, appellant Louie Machado was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in refusing to give or omitting certain jury instructions and making incorrect evidentiary rulings, and imposed an illegal sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict. State v. Haight-Gyuro, 218 Ariz. 356, ¶ 2, 186 P.3d 33, 34 (App. 2008). In October 2000, R.R. attended a pizza party at her church following the night service. She drove home and, when she arrived, Machado confronted and shot her in the front yard. R.R. died of a single bullet wound to her chest.
¶3 In 2008, Machado was convicted of second-degree murder after a jury trial. We reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial after concluding the trial court erred by precluding certain evidence supporting Machado's defense that J.H., and not Machado, had killed R.R. State v. Machado, 224 Ariz. 343, 230 P.3d 1158 (App. 2010), aff'd, 226 Ariz. 281, 246 P.3d 632 (2011). Following his second trial, a jury found Machado guilty of manslaughter, a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. The court sentenced him to an aggravated eighteen-year prison term. We have jurisdiction over his appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 13-4033(A)(1).
¶4 Machado first argues the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide. He claims that the court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to his defense, and that the evidence supported the instruction. We review a trial court's decision whether to give a particular jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 233 Ariz. 153, ¶ 24, 310 P.3d 29, 37 (App. 2013). A court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law. State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 148, 150 (2006). We defer to a trial court's assessment of the evidence. Id. ¶ 23.
¶5 Generally, "negligent homicide is a lesser-included offense of manslaughter and the only difference between the offenses is an accused's mental state at the time of the incident." State v. Nieto, 186 Ariz. 449, 456, 924 P.2d 453, 460 (App. 1996). "'Negligent homicide is distinguished from reckless manslaughter in that for the latter offense, the defendant is aware of the risk of death and consciously disregards it, whereas, for the former offense, he is unaware of the risk.'" State ex rel. Thomas v. Duncan, 216 Ariz. 260, n.7, 165 P.3d 238, 243 n.7 (App. 2007), quoting State v. Walton, 133 Ariz. 282, 291, 650 P.2d 1264, 1273 (App. 1982); see also A.R.S. §§ 13-105(10)(c), (d), 13-1102(A), 13-1103(A)(1).
¶6 A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense if sufficient evidence supports giving the instruction. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, ¶¶ 17-18, 126 P.3d at 151; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 23.3. Evidence is sufficient if "'the jury could rationally fail to find the distinguishing element of the greater offense.'" State v. Bearup, 221 Ariz. 163, ¶ 23, 211 P.3d 684, 689 (2009), quoting State v. Detrich, 178 Ariz. 380, 383, 873 P.2d 1302, 1305 (1994). In other words, "[t]he jury must be able to find (a) that the State failed to prove an element of the greater offense and (b) that the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction on the lesser offense." Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, ¶ 18, 126 P.3d at 151.
¶7 "It is not enough that, as a theoretical matter, 'the jury might simply disbelieve the state's evidence on one element of thecrime' because this 'would require instructions on all offenses theoretically included' in every charged offense." Id., quoting State v. Caldera, 141 Ariz. 634, 637, 688 P.2d 642, 645 (1984). Rather, "the evidence must be such that a rational juror could conclude that the defendant committed only the lesser offense." Id. A trial court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent." State v. Nottingham, 231 Ariz. 21, ¶ 14, 289 P.3d 949, 954 (App. 2012).
¶8 If the defendant employs an all-or-nothing defense such as third-party culpability, he is not precluded from receiving a lesser-included instruction. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, ¶ 25, 126 P.3d at 152. But, in such a case, the defendant generally "produces evidence that he simply did not commit the offense and the state produces evidence that he committed the offense as charged," leaving "little evidence on the record to support an instruction on the lesser included offenses." Caldera, 141 Ariz. at 637, 688 P.2d at 645. The record, consequently, "is such that defendant is either guilty of the crime charged or not guilty." State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 408, 844 P.2d 566, 575 (1992). In such cases, "the trial court should refuse a lesser included instruction" because it is not supported by any evidence. Id.
¶9 At trial, Machado's defense was that J.H. had killed R.R. The evidence adduced at trial showed that Machado brought a loaded gun to R.R.'s house at night and waited outside until she returned home. The two had an argument, R.R. stated she "did not want to go," and Machado then shot R.R. in the chest, causing her death. Machado told his mother that he arrived at R.R.'s house intending to "scare her" because her father owed Machado's father a "drug debt," and that he used an "old antique gun" because it could not be traced. Additionally, because R.R. was shot in the chest, the evidence shows Machado pointed the loaded gun directly at her. Based on this evidence, no jury could rationally conclude that he was unaware of the risk of his actions by showing up to R.R.'s house with a loaded gun at night and confronting her. See §§ 13-105(10)(d), 13-1102(A); Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, ¶ 18, 126 P.3d at 151.
¶10 Additionally, the evidence Machado now points to does not support a finding that he committed only negligent homicide. See Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, ¶ 18, 126 P.3d at 151. First, Machado contendsthat because he "was [nineteen] at the time of the offense and no one ever had seen him handling guns or other weapons," a jury could rationally find he was unaware of the risks. He does not explain, however, and we fail to see, how his age would have allowed the jury to find that he was unaware of the risk posed by pointing a loaded gun at the victim in an effort to scare her. The risk inherent in the situation is precisely why R.R. would have been scared, as Machado intended. This evidence thus does not support his argument.
¶11 Machado also relies on the testimony of one of his former girlfriends that she had never seen Machado with a gun or weapon, and a detective on the case that he "never had any information that [Machado] had ever carried or even possessed a gun." This testimony, however, only shows that others did not see Machado with a gun. It does not demonstrate he was completely unfamiliar with guns, or that he was unaware that pointing a loaded gun at someone posed a "substantial and unjustifiable risk." See §§ 13-105(10)(d), 13-1102(A); Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, ¶ 18, 126 P.3d at 151.
¶12 Next, Machado contends that trigger pressure on antique revolvers "varies from revolver to revolver," and thus "a rational jury could find that [Machado] failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk." Again, however, he does not explain why this fact compels the conclusion he was unaware of the risks associated with pointing a loaded gun at R.R. to scare her. And although trigger pressure may vary among guns, no testimony indicated that Machado was unfamiliar with the trigger pressure required on the particular gun he used. Moreover, Machado had stated he used an antique revolver because it "couldn't be traced." Thus, when viewed in the context of other evidence presented at trial, whether trigger pressure varies among antique guns would not lead a rational jury to conclude that Machado was completely unaware of the risks posed by his conduct. See Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, ¶ 18, 126 P.3d at 151.
¶13 Machado additionally argues that because he intended only to scare R.R., not harm her, the jury could conclude he failed to perceive the risk that his conduct would cause death. However, his intentions are irrelevant to whether he understood the risks associated with pointing a loaded gun at R.R. to scare her. Aninstruction on negligent homicide required evidence supporting an inference that Machado "fail[ed] to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that his conduct would result in R.R.'s death. § 13-105(10)(d). Even if the jury accepted that Machado originally did not intend to harm R.R., that conclusion would not affect its analysis of whether he was unaware of the risks associated with his conduct. See Bearup, 221 Ariz. 163, ¶ 23, 211 P.3d at 689.
¶14 Finally, Machado points to evidence which suggested he and R.R. had an argument which was then followed by a scream and a single gunshot. Machado contends that R.R.'s "scream was a startling event which led to the accidental pulling of the trigger." Again, however, whether Machado...
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