State v. Mack

• Decision Date: 24 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 23579,23579
• Citation: 132 Idaho 480,974 P.2d 1109
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John William MACK, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 1109

974 P.2d 1109

132 Idaho 480

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John William MACK, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 23579

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Feb. 24, 1999.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Catherine O. Derden, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Catherine O. Derden argued.

Rude, Jackson & Daugharty, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Mark A. Jackson argued.

LANSING, Judge

John Mack was charged with providing false information to an insurance company regarding repair work performed at his auto body shop. A jury found Mack guilty. Thereafter, Mack filed a motion for a new trial. The district court granted a new trial, but on a ground not raised by Mack. On appeal, the State contends that the district court did not have the authority to order a new trial on a ground raised sua sponte and that, if it did possess such authority, the court abused its discretion by doing so in this case.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

John Mack owned Mack's Auto Body Shop in Post Falls. In early 1994, he was approached by his brother, Larry Mack, and Nick Cahoon about a repair job on a Dodge truck. The repairs were to be paid for by State Farm Insurance Company. It was agreed that Cahoon and Larry Mack would do the repair work and labor on the vehicle, while Mack would provide the use of his auto body shop and the money to purchase replacement parts. The three agreed to split the profits from the repairs.

A wide variety of parts were purchased for the job. During the repair process, Mack contacted the local Dodge dealer and asked for the prices on certain parts that were needed for the vehicle. Jim Parmentier, the Dodge parts salesman, prepared a number of "invoices" using the dealership computer. Parmentier immediately voided out the invoices on the computer, however, because Mack was not ordering the parts at that time. Parmentier provided copies of both the voided and unvoided invoices to Mack. Some of the parts included on the invoices were ultimately ordered and used in the repairs, while others were not.

Subsequently, the State Farm estimator went to Mack's body shop where he checked the status of the repairs and met with Cahoon and Karla Luraski, Mack's bookkeeper. Mack was talking with a customer at the time and participated only somewhat peripherally in the meeting. During the meeting and in Mack's absence, Luraski handed the estimator a number of invoices, including the unvoided invoices from the Dodge dealership that did not represent an actual purchase of parts. According to Luraski's trial testimony, Mack directed her to give the invoices at issue to the State Farm estimator. However, she admitted on cross-examination that she gave the estimator some invoices that Mack did not ask her to pass on. The estimator spoke with Cahoon about the parts additions and discussed certain of the painting charges with Mack.

Approximately five months after this meeting, Luraski met with police officers and admitted having embezzled money from Mack's business. She later alleged that Mack had defrauded State Farm during the truck repair, and she provided the police a number of files that she had taken from Mack's office. Investigation revealed that some of the invoices given to the insurance company were false, representing that new Following the verdict, Mack filed a motion for a new trial. The motion urged that he was entitled to such relief due to prosecutorial misconduct and insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. The district court found these claims to be without merit, but nonetheless granted a new trial on a ground that it raised sua sponte. The district court concluded that it had erred in the course of the trial by failing to instruct the jury that a defendant may not be convicted solely upon the testimony of accomplices. The court further concluded that this error had deprived Mack of a fair trial, making a new trial necessary.

                parts had been purchased and placed on the truck when in fact used parts had been purchased or the particular part had not been replaced at all.  Mack was charged with submitting a false statement to an insurer for the purpose of obtaining money, I.C. § 41-1325. 1  The case was tried to a jury, and Mack was found guilty
                

The State filed this appeal and presents two issues for our consideration. First, the State argues that the trial court did not have the authority to grant a new trial on a ground not raised by Mack. Second, the State claims that, even if the trial court did have the authority to do so, the granting of a new trial in this case was unjustified.

ANALYSIS

A. The District Court Had Authority to Grant a New Trial on a Ground Not Raised by the Defendant.

The State's assertion that a trial court does not have the authority to order a new trial on a basis that was not raised by the defendant is an issue of first impression in this state. It presents a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Browning, 123 Idaho 748, 749, 852 P.2d 500, 501 (Ct.App.1993); Hanks v. State, 121 Idaho 153, 154, 823 P.2d 187, 188 (Ct.App.1992).

A trial court's authority to grant a new trial is derived from I.C. § 19-2406 and Idaho Criminal Rule 34. The State points out that both of these refer to the court's power to order a new trial only upon the defendant's application. That is, I.C. § 19-2406 specifies that, "When a verdict has been rendered against the defendant the court may, upon his application, grant a new trial in the following cases ..." (emphasis added), and I.C.R.34 provides that, "The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial ...." (emphasis added). On the basis of this language in the statute and rule, the State contends that the trial court exceeds its authority if it grants a new trial on a ground not urged by the defendant.

We disagree with the State's assertion. A motion for a new trial may be granted if the criteria of I.C. § 19-2406 and I.C.R. 34 are met. First, the statute and the rule require that the defendant make a motion for a new trial. Second, the motion must be granted on one of the grounds enunciated in § 19-2406. ² State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 83, 86, 878 P.2d 782, 785 (1994); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 873, 781 P.2d 197, 210 (1989). Finally, the grant must be in the interest of justice, pursuant to I.C.R. 34. Lankford, supra. Neither the statute nor

                the rule prohibit the grant of a new trial on grounds not argued by the defendant, so long as the defendant has requested a new trial 3 and the ground relied upon by the court is one of those specified in the statute.  Section 19-2406(5) authorizes a new trial "when the court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law."   Thus, it was within the district court's authority to order a new trial for Mack on the ground that the court had erroneously omitted to give a necessary jury instruction
                

B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting a New Trial.

We next consider the State's argument that, even if the court possessed authority to grant a new trial on a ground raised sua sponte, its order in this case was an abuse of discretion because the jury in Mack's trial was not incorrectly instructed.

A district court has wide discretion to grant or disallow a new trial, and, on appeal, this Court will not disturb that exercise of discretion, absent a showing of manifest abuse. State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 674, 931 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1997); State v. Davis, 127 Idaho 62, 65, 896 P.2d 970, 973 (1995); State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 399, 648 P.2d 203, 211 (1982). However, whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Miller, 130 Idaho 550, 551-52, 944 P.2d 147, 148-49 (Ct.App.1997); State v. Fetterly, 126 Idaho 475, 476, 886 P.2d 780, 781 (Ct.App.1994).

In a criminal case, the district court has a duty to give the jury instructions on "all matters of law necessary for their information." I.C. § 19-2132. The trial court thus must give instructions on rules of law material to the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 951 P.2d 1288, 1298 (Ct.App.1998); Fetterly, 126 Idaho at 476, 886 P.2d at 781. Such obligatory instructions include those necessary to correctly inform the jury with respect to the nature and elements of the crime charged and the essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has been admitted. State v. Beason, 95 Idaho 267, 275, 506 P.2d 1340, 1348 (1973); State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 75-76, 88 P.2d 493, 496 (1939); State v. Brown, 130 Idaho 389, 391, 941 P.2d 361, 363 (Ct.App.1997).

Under Idaho law, a defendant may not be convicted on the testimony of an accomplice unless that testimony is "corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense." I.C. § 19-2117. This requirement for the corroboration of the testimony of the accomplice cannot be fulfilled by the testimony of another accomplice. State v. Rose, 75 Idaho 59, 64, 267 P.2d 109, 112 (1954); State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 892, 904, 655 P.2d 99, 111 (Ct.App.1982).

Where the evidence raises a genuine issue as to whether a witness is an accomplice, the district court must submit the issue to the jury for resolution and instruct the jury accordingly. State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 486, 873 P.2d 122, 131 (1994); State v. Emmons, 94 Idaho 605, 608, 495 P.2d 11, 14 (1972); State v. Ruiz, 115 Idaho 12, 16, 764 P.2d 89, 93 (Ct.App.1988). On the other hand, if it is clear from the evidence that a witness is an accomplice of the defendant, the court should decide the question as a matter of law and inform the jury that the witness is an accomplice. Emmons, supra; State v. Gonzales, 92 Idaho 152, 156, 438 P.2d 897 According to the State, however, such instructions were not required in this case because none of the State's witnesses could be viewed as...