State v. MacNeill

Decision Date20 September 2012
Docket NumberNo. 20090863–CA.,20090863–CA.
PartiesSTATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Martin MacNEILL, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtUtah Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Randall K. Spencer and Stephanie L. O'Brien, Provo, for Appellant.

Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before Judges McHUGH, ORME, and CHRISTIANSEN.

OPINION

ORME, Judge:

¶ 1 Defendant Martin MacNeill appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to quash bindover. Defendant argues that Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure bars refiling the charges against him eight months after they were initially dismissed. Defendant also contends that the refiling violated his due process rights and his right to a speedy trial. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 The State charged Defendant with forcible sexual abuse, pursuant to Utah Code section 76–5–404, and witness tampering, pursuant to Utah Code section 76–8–508. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 76–5–404 (Supp.2012); id.§ 76–8–508 (2008).1 After conducting a preliminary hearing and finding probable cause for the charged offenses, Judge Claudia Laycock, acting as a magistrate, bound Defendant over to district court for trial. The case was assigned to Judge Laycock, who scheduled a four-day jury trial. Two weeks before trial, however, the State moved to dismiss the charges without prejudice. It did not provide any explanation for its request. Defense counsel did not oppose the motion, and neither the court nor defense counsel sought an explanation for the State's requested dismissal. The court granted the motion without specifying whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, stating only that the case was dismissed “upon good cause appearing.”

¶ 3 Four months after the criminal charges were dismissed, the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct (OPC) undertook an investigation of Defendant, a lawyer, stemming from accusations of misconduct related to the dismissed criminal charges. In the course of its investigation, OPC contacted the State seeking information regarding the charges. OPC then wrote a letter explaining that it was dismissing the Bar complaints against Defendant because the State had dismissed the criminal charges against him. The letter also characterized the dismissal as being due to the State “not believ[ing] that they had a good faith basis to proceed with this case.”

¶ 4 Eight months after the dismissal, the State refiled the same charges against Defendant. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to have the charges dismissed on the basis that refiling them was a violation of his rights to due process and a speedy trial. The parties stipulated that bindover on the refiled charges could proceed based on the transcript of the original preliminary hearing. The case was then set to be tried before Judge Samuel D. McVey. Defendant sought, unsuccessfully, to have the case moved back to Judge Laycock's docket. Defendant then filed a motion to quash the bindover, rearguing his due process and speedy trial claims. SeeUtah R.Crim. P. 25. Judge McVey denied Defendant's motion to quash. Finally, Defendant petitioned this court for permission to appeal the interlocutory order denying the motion to quash, and we granted the petition.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 5 On appeal, Defendant argues that Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure bars the State from refiling the charges against him because Rule 25 does not expressly authorize refiling in cases like this. Defendant also argues that the court failed to comply with Rule 25 by not listing a specific reason for dismissing the charges. Accordingly, we must interpret Rule 25 to determine under what circumstances it bars the State from refiling charges that were dismissed pursuant to the rule. SeeUtah R.Crim. P. 25(a). “The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, and we review the trial court's decision for correctness.” Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, ¶ 5, 989 P.2d 1073.

¶ 6 Next, Defendant argues that, wholly apart from the Rule 25 violations he alleges, the State violated his due process rights when it dismissed the case, only to refile again eight months later. Specifically, Defendant cites the requirements of State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647–48 (Utah 1986), and argues that the State was required to follow the refiling mandates outlined there but failed to do so. Interpretation of case law presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.” State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ¶ 7, 89 P.3d 191 (citing State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ¶ 1, 34 P.3d 767).

¶ 7 Finally, Defendant argues that his right to a speedy trial has been violated. “Whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated presents a question of law, which we review for correctness.” State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶ 14, 236 P.3d 161.

ANALYSIS
I. Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Did Not Require that the Charges Be Dismissed with Prejudice.

¶ 8 Defendant contends that Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure barred the State from refiling the charges against him. Rule 25 provides:

(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an information or indictment dismissed.

(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:

(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial;

(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any bill of particulars furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to be charged in the pleading so filed;

(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the impaneling or in the proceedings relating to the grand jury;

(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or

(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations.

(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered in the minutes.

(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was unreasonable delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly alleged in the information or indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred and the court may make such orders with respect to the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated.

An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any other prosecution for the offense charged.

Utah R.Crim. P. 25(a)-(d) (emphasis added). Defendant argues that when a case is dismissed under Rule 25 without a trial, the case may not be refiled unless it meets one of the exceptions enumerated in part (d) of the rule. See id. R. 25(d). Defendant's argument appears to be one of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., that where the Legislature went to the effort to include a list of exceptions allowing the refiling of charges after dismissal for some reasons, it surely did not mean to allow refiling for other reasons. Thus, Defendant argues that the list was intended to be exhaustive so that Rule 25 incorporates a presumption against refiling unless expressly authorized in part (d) of the rule. See id. While we understand the logic of this argument, a careful reading of the text, in the context of the rule's organization, provides a stronger basis for a different interpretation.

¶ 9 Rule 25 describes two possible categories of dismissals: discretionary and mandatory. See id. R. 25(a), (b). The discretionary dismissal subsection, subsection (a), allows for a court “in furtherance of justice ... either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, [to] order an information or indictment dismissed.” Id. R. 25(a). Subsection (a) is silent as to whether a discretionary dismissal is generally one that can later be refiled. See id. The mandatory dismissal subsection, subsection (b), requires a court to dismiss in six situations: unreasonable delay, unconstitutional delay, insufficiency of allegations, substantial and prejudicial defect in the proceedings, lack of jurisdiction, and bar by reason of a statute of limitations. See id. R. 25(b). Subsection (c) requires that [t]he reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered in the minutes.” Id. R. 25(c). Subsection (d) then discusses when a dismissal is to be made with prejudice or without prejudice. See id. R. 25(d). Subsection (d) comprehensively addresses the six reasons listed in subsection (b), explaining for each reason whether a case dismissed under that circumstance may or may not later be refiled. See id. ¶ 10 The court in this case did not specifically state in its order why it dismissed the case, but it appears that the dismissal was a discretionary one under subsection (a), as it came about as a result of the State's motion and it does not fit within any of the mandatory dismissal categories listed in subsection (b). See id. R. 25(a), (b). Significantly, Rule 25 expressly bars refiling in only two instances, both of which involve situations where the dismissal is mandatory: where the dismissal results from an unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to trial and where the dismissal results from a statute of limitations violation. See id. R. 25(d). Neither of these circumstances occurred here, and thus, Defendant's case was not dismissed for any reason with respect to which Rule 25 expressly bars refiling.

¶ 11 While Defendant essentially argues that cases are presumptively dismissed under Rule 25with prejudice and that subsection (d) carves out the only exceptions under which dismissals will be without prejudice,2 subsection (d) does not...

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3 cases
  • State v. MacNeill
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • August 18, 2016
    ...This court granted his petition. In September 2012, we affirmed the trial court's resolution of both issues. See State v. MacNeill , 2012 UT App 263, 286 P.3d 1278. MacNeill then filed a petition for certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court, which the court denied. The case then returned to t......
  • State v. Harrison
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • September 20, 2012
  • State v. Macneill
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • January 31, 2013
    ...P.3d 69Statev.MacNeillNO. 20120996Supreme Court of UtahJanuary 31, 2013 OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE Lower Court Citation or Number: 286 P.3d 1278 Disposition: ...

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