State v. Madden

• Decision Date: 24 November 2021
• Docket Number: A170903
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jason Benjamin MADDEN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

315 Or.App. 787

502 P.3d 746

STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Jason Benjamin MADDEN, Defendant-Appellant.

A170903

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and submitted November 19, 2020.

November 24, 2021

Zachary Lovett Mazer, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public Defense Services.

Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Adam Holbrook, Assistant Attorney General.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and Powers, Judge.

SHORR, J.

Defendant appeals for the second time, assigning error to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence that he contends was discovered after he was unlawfully seized in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Police officers detained defendant when they discovered him sitting in a car in the driveway of a house that was the subject of a search warrant. The officers handcuffed defendant and his passenger, brought them inside, and questioned defendant after the house was secured. Over the course of two interviews, defendant made incriminating statements and gave his consent to search the car, which led to the officers’ discovery of the evidence at issue. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the initial seizure and transportation of defendant into the house were justified for officer safety reasons, but defendant's continued detention after the house was secured was not similarly justified. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether that later police conduct was instead justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime. State v. Madden , 363 Or. 703, 705, 427 P.3d 157 (2018). On remand, the trial court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion and that defendant's continued seizure after officer safety concerns dissipated was constitutional. Defendant appealed. For the reasons below, we agree with defendant that he was unlawfully seized. Consequently, we reverse and remand Counts 1, 2, and 3; we also remand for resentencing.

We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence for legal error. We are bound by the trial court's findings of fact if there is constitutionally sufficient evidence to support them. To the extent that the trial court did not make express findings of fact, we presume the court found facts consistent with its ultimate conclusion. State v. Maciel-Figueroa , 361 Or. 163, 165-66, 389 P.3d 1121 (2017). No new evidence was presented on remand; the trial court expressly referenced, the Supreme Court's recitation of the facts, indicating that it found the facts as summarized in that recitation. Accordingly, we restate the Supreme Court's description of the historical facts, and discuss additional relevant facts below.

"In January 2013, detectives with the Springfield Police Department obtained a warrant to search the residence of Sheehan, a ‘known user and dealer of methamphetamine,’ for evidence of delivery of controlled substances. The search warrant authorized the police to search Sheehan's person and residence. It did not refer to any other person or location.

"Late in the morning of January 30, 2013, the detectives and other members of the Springfield Police Department—eight in total—parked their cars down the street from Sheehan's house and proceeded to the house on foot, intending to execute the warrant. As they approached the house, they saw two men—defendant and Lando—sitting in a car parked in the driveway. Three of the officers—Detectives Potter, Hargis, and Espinosa—immediately recognized Lando, who was sitting in the front passenger's seat with the door slightly ajar, as a person whom they had arrested on multiple occasions for drug crimes. None of the officers recognized the man sitting in the driver's seat, i.e. , defendant.

"Detectives Potter and Hargis quickly moved toward the car to ‘contact’ defendant and Lando. Before Potter reached the car, he saw defendant reach back and shove a bag down between the seats. Potter removed defendant from the car, directed him to keep his hands raised, and handcuffed him, while Hargis did the same with Lando. Both men were subjected to pat-down searches, during which Hargis pulled two baggies, one of which appeared to contain methamphetamine, from Lando's pocket. All of this occurred very quickly, and defendant and Lando were taken into the house as the officers entered it to execute the search warrant a few minutes later.

"After securing the house, most of the other officers became engaged in the search, while Potter assembled defendant, Lando, and the house's two occupants in the living room. Potter then administered Miranda warnings to them and proceeded to take them, one at a time, into a separate room to question them. Defendant was the first person who was questioned in that manner: Potter had separated him from the others and commenced to question him within five to 10 minutes of entering the house. During that initial questioning, Potter asked defendant about the car and whether it contained anything that was illegal. Defendant responded that the car belonged to a friend, and eventually acknowledged that it contained methamphetamine and a gun. Potter asked if defendant would consent to a search of the car, but defendant seemed reluctant. Potter then told defendant to ‘think about it’ while he questioned Lando and the others. Later, when Potter questioned defendant a second time, defendant agreed to the search and signed a form that stated that he was consenting to the search freely and voluntarily and that he understood that he could refuse to give consent. In the search of the car that followed, the police found a large amount of methamphetamine, a handgun, and other incriminating items inside the bag that Potter had seen defendant push between the seats. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession and delivery of methamphetamine and, based on his status as a felon, unlawful possession of a firearm."

Madden , 363 Or. at 706-07, 427 P.3d 157 (footnotes omitted).¹

At the original motion to suppress hearing, Potter described his knowledge of the house where he encountered defendant. He testified that the department had received reports of drug deals at the house through an anonymous tip line. Potter also worked with an informant who confirmed that methamphetamine was sold at the house and who described the house as a "flophouse" where people were "constantly coming and going." Potter testified that drug transactions took place both inside and outside the house.

In addition to his specific knowledge of the house, Potter described his extensive training and experience with drug crime investigations. According to Potter, drug deals often happened in cars and Potter had personally seen over one hundred drug transactions occur between people in cars. Potter was also aware, based on his training and experience, that drugs are transported from Mexico to Oregon through California and he observed that defendant's car had California license plates.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, deciding that the seizure of defendant was lawful for officer safety reasons. The trial court declined to address the state's other argument, that the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion. Id . at 710, 427 P.3d 157. On review, the Supreme Court agreed that officer safety concerns justified some of the officers’ actions, but not all. Specifically, the court concluded that directing defendant to exit the vehicle, patting him down, handcuffing him and bringing him into the residence were all reasonable safety precautions to minimize the risk in entering and securing the house. Id . at 721, 427 P.3d 157. But, the court explained, "there was no reasonable officer safety justification for continuing to detain him, in handcuffs, Mirandizing him, repeatedly transporting him alone into another room, and repeatedly questioning him" once the house was secured. Id . at 722, 427 P.3d 157. Those later actions "ultimately produced the evidence at issue." Id . at 723, 427 P.3d 157. Therefore, because that conduct was not justified by the officer safety doctrine, the court remanded the case to the trial court to "reach the reasonable suspicion argument it did not address." Id . at 726, 427 P.3d 157.

On remand, the state argued that Potter and the officers’ detention of defendant after securing the house was a lawful stop justified by reasonable suspicion. The state argued that defendant's presence at a high-traffic, known drug house, his association with a known drug dealer, his California license plates, and his attempt to hide his backpack were all facts that supported Potter's reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Defendant contested the state's reasonable suspicion theory. In addition, defendant responded that the seizure was not a stop, but an arrest. And, defendant argued, that arrest was not supported by probable cause based on the circumstances known to the officers.² The trial court rejected defendant's arguments. It decided that defendant was stopped, not arrested, and that the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion. After a stipulated-facts trial and conviction, defendant appeals for the second time, assigning error to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. The parties raise substantially the same arguments on appeal. Because the requisite level of constitutional justification depends on the type of seizure, we begin by determining whether defendant was arrested or merely stopped.

Article I, section 9, guarantees the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Only some police-citizen encounters are protected under that provision. "At one end of the continuum are mere encounters for which no...