State v. Maestas
Decision Date | 27 June 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 6168,6168 |
Citation | 1957 NMSC 57,313 P.2d 337,63 N.M. 67 |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Max L. MAESTAS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
David Chavez, Jr., Santa Fe, for appellant.
Fred M. Standley, Atty. Gen., Harry E. Stowers, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Santiago E. Campos, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant, Max L. Maestas, was found guilty of murder in the second degree for the killing of Cipriano Trujillo January 29, 1955. At the time of the killing, appellant, his wife, and his brother, Felipe Maestas, were at the home of Felipe's estranged wife, Ramoncita Maestas. Felipe either asked or ordered the deceased to leave the house. A struggle between the deceased and Felipe ensued inside the house after the other parties had gone outside. Apparently the only eyewitness to the struggle was Leo Gonzales, son of Ramoncita Maestas by another marriage. Appellant testified that he approached the kitchen door, saw that the deceased had his brother bent backward over a table and that his brother was very bloody. Appellant admitted the killing but contended that the homicide was justified in self-defense, or more definitely stated, in defense of his brother. He testified that he shot the deceased because he feared that otherwise the deceased would have killed his brother.
The refusal of the court to give certain requested instructions is assigned as error. Appellant contends first that the jury went uninstructed as to his lawful right to arm himself for the purpose of defending himself and his brother from any anticipated assault, and that the jury was inadequately instructed on the law in regard to justifiable homicide in defense of another. The basis for this contention is the refusal of the trial court to give appellant's requested instructions 9 and 3.
We are unable to agree with appellant's contention. It is quite true that a defendant is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted to the jury if supported by substantial evidence. It is equally true that upon request a defendant is entitled to have the law declared in reference to the facts of his case, if there is evidence reasonably tending to substantiate it. State v. Jones, 52 N.M. 235, 195 P.2d 1020; State v. Martinez, 30 N.M. 178, 230 P. 379. This general rule is equally applicable where one accused of homicide defends upon the theory that his act was in defense of another. 4 Warren on Homicide Sec. 339. But in this case the appellant's right to arm himself and his theory of defense of another was properly submitted to the jury by the following instructions:
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It is appellant's contention that the foregoing instructions are too abstract; that they do not direct the jury's attention to the particular facts of the case. However, in construing a charge as to defense of another the usual rule applies, that is, instructions are to be viewed as a whole, and the charge will be held sufficient, if when thus viewed, they adequately cover every phase of the case raised by the evidence on which the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed. State v. Beal, 55 N.M. 382, 234 P.2d 331; State v. Martin, 53 N.M. 413, 209 P.2d 525; Chandler v. Battenfield, 55 N.M. 361, 233 P.2d 1047.
Viewing the instructions together, the law regarding justifiable homicide in defense of another, is correctly stated, and the law is adequately tied to the particular facts in the case.
Appellant also urges that the court below committed error in not instructing the jury that homicide is justifiable when done while resisting any attempt to commit a felony upon one's brother. The portion of Sec. 40-24-13, N.M.S.A.1953, dealing with justifiable homicide in coming to the defense of another provides as follows:
'Such homicide is also justifiable * * * committed in the lawful defense of * * * brother * * * when there shall be reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony, or to do some great personal injury, and there shall be imminent danger of such design being accomplished * * *.'
It is not imperative that the charge to the jury use the precise terms of the statute. Instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language. 4 Warren on Homicide Sec. 338. In this case it is clear that any design by the deceased to commit a felony arose out of the struggle between deceased and Felipe Maestas. So, the jury was plainly...
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Duffy v. State
...outside the penitentiary, under such circumstances and conditions as the parole authorities may provide." See also State v. Maestas, 63 N.M. 67, 313 P.2d 337 (1957). It is noteworthy and emphasized in New Mexico cases that "it is for the legislature to determine what act shall be regarded a......
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...N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. 1964). Instructions which substantially follow the language of the statute are sufficient. See State v. Maestas, 63 N.M. 67, 313 P.2d 337 (1957). Point M states the five dollar bill and the two one dollar bills were not specifically identified or proven to be the money t......
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State v. Gunzelman
...that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language. State v. Maestas, 63 N.M. 67, 313 P.2: 337 (1957). See also State v. McFerran, 80 N.M. 622, 459 P.2d 148 We invite attention to the recent case in the Court of Appeals, State ......
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