State v. Magee

• Citation: 11 Ind. 125
• Parties: The State v. Magee
• Decision Date: 26 November 1858
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

11 Ind. 125

The State v. Magee

Supreme Court of Indiana

November 26, 1858

From the Delaware Circuit Court.

The judgment is affirmed.

D. Nation and C. E. Shipley, for State.

W March and T. J. Sample, for appellee.

OPINION

Davison, J.

Indictment. The charge is, that Magee, on, &c., at, &c., with intent to cheat and defraud one Samuel J. Williams, falsely represented and pretended to Williams, that one Norman Black, of, &c., was then indebted to him, Magee, and if he, Williams, would lend him, Magee, five dollars in money, or in bank notes circulating as money, that then he, Black, would upon demand, repay the money or bank notes, then and there to be loaned by Williams to Magee. And Williams, believing from the aforesaid representations, that Black was so indebted, and would repay him, Williams, upon such demand, and fully confiding in, and relying on the representations so made, loaned to Magee one five dollar bank note, then and there current, circulating as money, and of the value of five dollars; whereas, in truth and in fact, the representations so made, &c., were false and fraudulent; Black was not indebted to Magee, in any sum or amount whatever; and Williams demanded of Black the sum so loaned, but he, Black, then and there refused to pay, &c. And so the jurors, &c.

The Court, upon the defendant's motion, quashed the indictment.

Are the false pretenses, alleged in the complaint, sufficient to make a case, within the purview of the statute? This is the only question presented by the record.

The statute says: "If any person, with intent to defraud another, shall designedly, by color of any false token or writing, or any false pretense, obtain the signature of any person to any written instrument, or obtain from any person any money, transfer, note, bond, or receipt, or thing of value, such person shall, upon conviction thereof, be imprisoned," &c. 2 R. S. p. 410, § 27.

This enactment seems to be broad enough to embrace any and every false representation made by a party, by means of which he has fraudulently obtained the property of another. It cannot however, intend to have a range so wide as its terms would seem to indicate; because, if it be literally construed, breach of contract and crime will scarcely be divided by an appreciable line, and acts which have been understood as creating mere civil liabilities, will be punished criminally. The pretenses must be of some...