State v. Maloney
| Decision Date | 13 February 1973 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 769-770-E,s. 769-770-E |
| Citation | 300 A.2d 259,111 R.I. 133 |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. William Francis MALONEY. x. &c. |
These are two indictments which, consolidated for trial to a Superior Court justice and a jury, resulted in the conviction of the defendant as charged in each indictment.
Thereafter, defendant moved for a new trial in each case and when such motion was denied, he seasonably prosecuted a bill of exceptions in each case to this court.
Similarly the cases were consolidated in this court for hearing on oral arguments and briefs. A majority of the exceptions in each bill prosecuted were disposed of adversely to defendant in State v. Maloney, 109 R.I. 166, 283 A.2d 34 (1971). Furthermore, the relevant facts of each offense are fully marrated in the cited case and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the cases arose out of the arrest of defendant for possession of a stolen automobile and for unlawfully carrying weapons in said motor vehicle. The weapons were discovered in a warrantless search of the automobile, conducted by the police while defendant was in their custody as a result of his arrest for possession of the car.
At trial, defendant objected to the admissibility of the testimony offered by the state to prove that the car had been stolen and to the admissibility of the weapons seized as the result of the warrantless search. The trial justice overruled both objections and thereafter also denied defendant's motions for directed verdicts. In State v. Maloney, supra, we overruled defendant's exceptions taken to the denial of his motions for directed verdicts, pointing out that the trial justice, in passing on said motions, was obligated to consider all the evidence admitted by him. We went on to indicate, however, that, on review in this court, the motions for directed verdicts would be considered by us on the basis of evidence properly admitted, citing State v. Toti, 94 R.I. 212, 179 A.2d 488 (1962). Continuing, we further indicated that with the motions for directed verdicts so postured, the question of whether defendant was entitled to a directed verdict in both cases or either of them would turn on whether the evidence objected to in each of the applicable cases was properly admitted. Having thus reached conclusions not fully anticipated by either defendant or the state in their oral arguments and briefs, we reached the further conclusion that the ends of justice would be better served if the parties were directed to submit supplemental briefs and further oral argument on the evidentiary question raised in each case. See State v. Maloney, supra.
After our opinion was filed, however, the state moved for leave to include in its supplemental brief arguments which would be directed to reconsideration by this court of the distinction apparently made in State v. Toti, supra. Specifically, the state, in the memorandum accompanying its motion, took the position that when a motion for a directed verdict in a criminal case has been properly denied by the trial justice because there was evidence to be considered by the jury, the fact that such evidence has been improperly admitted over defendant's objection should not have an appellate significance different from that in a civil appeal.
In support thereof, the state referred our attention to Glennon v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 87 R.I. 454, 143 A.2d 282 (1958).
That case was a civil action for negligence. Over the defendant's objection, evidence was admitted which was probative of the defendant's liability. The defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied by the trial justice on the ground that there was evidence from which the jury could find negligence. The only such evidence, however, was that to the admissibility of which the defendant had objected. On the defendant's appeal from a verdict for the plaintiff, this court held, in effect, that the trial justice's denial of the motion for directed verdict was correct notwithstanding the fact that the evidence on which he submitted the case to the jury should have been excluded when objected to by the defendant. This court then proceeded to grant the defendant a new trial because the admission of the evidence in question amounted to prejudicial error.
So here, urged the state in its motion for leave to argue reconsideration of the distinction indicated in State v. Toti, supra, each case, or either of them, as the circumstances warranted, should be remitted to the Superior Court for a new trial or trials if we were to hold that the trial justice committed prejudicial error in admitting evidence over defendant's objection.
On rereading State v. Toti, supra, it became immediately apparent that Toti did not stand for the proposition for which it was improvidently cited in State v. Maloney, supra. Consequently, we granted the state's motion for leave to argue, in effect, that on review in this court of an exception taken to a denial by the trial justice of a motion for a directed verdict in a criminal case, the decision of the trial justice on that motion will be viewed in light of all the evidence without regard to whether any or all of such evidence was properly admitted. We did so, however, without prejudice to defendant's right to argue in opposition to the state's contention. State v. Maloney, 109 R.I. 937, 284 A.2d 304 (1971).
Leave, therefore, having thus been granted, both parties briefed and orally argued their respective positions. So doing, the state urged the desirability of having appellate review of a trial justice's decision on a motion for directed verdict in a criminal case governed by the same rule as this court applies in civil cases. The defendant, not surprisingly, vigorously argued in favor of adherence to the distinction seemingly suggested by the language employed in State v. Toti, supra.
However, we agree with the state that there should be no distinction, and moreover that the ends of justice are better served by following the test applied in Glennon v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra. In this manner, the state points out, the prosecution is afforded the same opportunity to produce other evidence, if any it has, as is provided to plaintiffs in civil cases. Furthermore, the distinction seemingly suggested in Toti is more apparent than real.
Toti was charged with carrying a concealed weapon without license so to do. This charge grew out of Toti handing a gun to an acquaintance at the front door of the latter's home. She reported this incident to the police who thereafter apprehended Toti.
At the time of his arrest, Toti admitted to the arresting officer that the gun had been concealed in his waistband while he was en route to the home of his acquaintance.
At trial, Toti objected to the arresting officer's testimony regarding such admission, and when his objection was overruled and the motion to strike the answer was denied, he excepted.
His efforts to exclude the incriminating statement were predicated on the proposition that an uncorroborated confession or admission is insufficient to establish the corpus delicti citing State v. Boswell, 73 R.I. 358, 56 A.2d 196 (1947).
The state agreed with such contention, having no alternative, 1 but argued that the testimony of Toti's acquaintance regarding the handing of the gun to her constituted independent corroborative evidence sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, citing State v. Jacobs, 21 R.I. 259, 43 A. 31 (1899). An examination of her testimony, however, disclosed that she did not see the gun until it was handed to her. In short, so far as the acquaintance knew the gun was never concealed. From this latter circumstance we mistakenly and gratuitously observed that Toti's admission to the arresting officer had been improperly admitted and compounded error by indicating that, because the admission came on the record improperly, the trial justice should have granted Toti's motion for a directed verdict.
Clearly, Toti's incriminating statement to the arresting officer was properly admitted since it would have been probative of his guilt if there had been corroborating evidence sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. This is so because it was not incumbent on the state to establish the corpus delicti before the admission could be properly received. State v. Wheeler, 92 R.I. 389, 169 A.2d 7 (1961).
However, there being no independent corroborating evidence, Toti's motion for a directed verdict should have been granted, not because his self-incrimination was inadmissible, but because the corpus delicti had not been established.
It follows then that Toti is not authority for the proposition that in passing on an exception taken to a trial justice's denial of a motion for a directed verdict, this court will look only to that evidence properly admitted. Rather we will, as must the trial justice, look to all the evidence that comes upon the record without regard to whether the evidence in the record was properly admitted.
In light of the foregoing, it is now apparent, in the instant cases, that the trial justice, not having erred in denying defendant's motions for new trials, defendant's exceptions taken to the denial of his motions are without merit and these exceptions are overruled.
This brings us then to a consideration of the evidentiary exceptions, the disposition of which was deferred pending further oral argument on supplementary briefs.
The Evidentiary Exception Prosecuted in Connection with Defendant's Conviction on Indictment No. 35700 ()
As heretofore stated in this opinion, and fully narrated in State v. Maloney, supra, the guns in question were discovered and seized in a...
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