State v. Maloney

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BERGER, J.
• Citation: State v. Maloney, 191 So.3d 969 (Fla. App. 2016)
• Decision Date: 13 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 5D14–2702.,5D14–2702.
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. David Vincent MALONEY, Appellee.

191 So.3d 969

STATE of Florida, Appellant,

v.David Vincent MALONEY, Appellee.

No. 5D14–2702.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

May 13, 2016.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and L. Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Michael H. LaFay, Orlando, for Appellee.

BERGER, J.

The State of Florida timely appeals the trial court's order granting David Maloney's motion to suppress certain statements he made to police before he was advised of his Miranda¹ rights. Because we conclude the public safety exception to the Miranda requirement permits the admission of Maloney's statements, we reverse.

Maloney was a member of a motorcycle gang known as the Philly Warlocks. On September 30, 2012, the Philly Warlocks were holding a poker run departing from the parking lot of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (“VFW”) hall in Winter Springs. At about 10:30 a.m., a shootout ensued between the Philly Warlocks and members of a rival gang, the Florida Warlocks, in the parking lot of the VFW. Soon thereafter, police responded.

Officer Bradley Dula was the first to arrive at the VFW. Once on scene, he saw several persons spread throughout the parking lot, some of whom were severely injured or dead.² Officer Dula observed Maloney and another individual crouching in front of a small truck. Officer Dula advanced on them with his service firearm and ordered them to lay down on the ground. They complied immediately.

Officer Dula quickly realized that the situation was of a greater magnitude than his patrol officers could handle. He requested assistance, through dispatch, from all available officers and sheriff's deputies in Seminole County and neighboring jurisdictions. The dispatch request indicated that the shooting was still ongoing at the VFW.

As more law enforcement units arrived, the scene remained chaotic. In an effort to safely secure the scene, police handcuffed thirty to forty people, including Maloney, and directed them to lay face down on the ground. The police also roped off the VFW parking lot with crime-scene tape and controlled and logged access to the area.

Maloney was initially patted down and searched by Officer Nathan Ecalbarger of the Longwood Police Department. Officer Ecalbarger seized a .22 caliber derringer pistol and a double-edge fish blade knife from Maloney. Officer Ecalbarger placed the derringer pistol and the knife near Maloney, but outside of his reach so they could later be collected and inventoried.³

Officer Dula and Officer Ecalbarger testified that Maloney and the other detainees were not placed under formal arrest during this process. Instead, they were placed in investigative detention to ensure the safety of the officers and the public. Maloney did not attempt to escape and was fully cooperative. According to Officer Dula, he had no evidence that Maloney was a suspect at this point.

Sgt. Brad Heath⁴ of the Winter Springs Police Department testified that the scene was not completely secured when he arrived. He noticed a large number of weapons laid out on the sidewalk in front of the grassy area where the detainees were being held. Because he did not want the seized weapons remaining in the open, Sgt. Heath collected the seized property at a centralized location and had each detainee identify their property so the items could be placed in bags. About five to ten minutes after arriving on the scene, and about thirty minutes after Officer Dula first arrived, Sgt. Heath moved Maloney, who was still handcuffed, to the place where the seized property was collected and asked Maloney to identify any property belonging to him. In response, Maloney claimed ownership of the .22 caliber derringer pistol and the knife.

While talking to Maloney, Sgt. Heath noticed that Maloney was wearing an empty holster too large for the .22 caliber derringer. Based on his knowledge that members of both of the Warlocks gangs typically carried more than one weapon, Sgt. Heath asked Maloney if he had any additional weapons that fit his empty holster.

⁵ Maloney told Sgt. Heath that he also had a .380 caliber Ruger pistol and gestured his head towards the area of the parking lot where he had dropped it during the shooting. Sgt. Heath testified that Maloney was not placed under arrest and, consequently, was not advised of his Miranda rights during this interaction. According to Sgt. Heath, he did not yet know whether Maloney was a victim or a suspect.

Maloney was held, in handcuffs, as an investigative detainee for approximately twelve hours. During that time, Maloney was uncuffed only for brief periods to drink water and participate in a gunshot residue test. Over the course of the day, the police narrowed their investigation from the group initially detained down to six persons, including Maloney. As the investigation progressed, all of the detainees were released except Maloney⁶ and three others, who were later arrested and charged early the next morning.⁷

Prior to trial, Maloney filed a motion to suppress, among other things, the statements he made regarding his ownership of the .22 caliber derringer and the knife.⁸ He argued these statements were elicited in response to custodial interrogation without having first been advised of his Miranda rights. The trial court agreed and suppressed the statements. The State moved for reconsideration on the ground that the police were not required to give Maloney Miranda warnings based on the public safety exception established in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984). The trial court denied the motion,⁹ concluding:

[A]t the point where the Defendant was interrogated by Sergeant Heath regarding the empty holster, the exigency had largely dissipated. Approximately 30 minutes had passed since law enforcement had responded and all 30–40 people on scene had been secured, searched, and disarmed.... While it is certainly possible that the Defendant's gun had been tossed aside and not recovered, that theoretical possibility does not justify an expansion of the public safety exception.... In the instant case, the crime scene perimeter had been secured and everyone had been placed in custody, separated, and presumably disarmed. There was no longer any exigency that would justify this pre-Miranda questioning. Thus, this Court finds that the question regarding the holster was asked solely to elicit testimonial evidence from the Defendant, and was not justified by an immediate concern for public safety.

The State raises two arguments on appeal. First, the State contends that Maloney was not in custody when Sgt. Heath questioned him. Second, the State submits that Sgt. Heath's questions were intended to elicit responses that would locate an unaccounted-for firearm, which was an imminent threat, in order to protect both the officers on the scene and the public. Maloney counters that the trial court was correct in ruling that he was in custody when Sgt. Heath questioned him and that any exigency or emergency arising from the shootout dissipated because the scene was secured in the thirty minutes between the time Officer Dula arrived and detained Maloney and when Sgt. Heath questioned Maloney about his empty holster.

Under the Florida and United States Constitutions, each person is provided with the fundamental right of protection against being compelled to become a witness against himself or herself in criminal cases. U.S. Const. amend. V ; art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.; Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 572–73 (Fla.1999) ; Wright v. State, 161 So.3d 442, 447 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that, under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Procedural safeguards include a warning that the person “has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Id. at 444, 457, 467–68, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The person must also be advised that he or she may request that an attorney be appointed if the person cannot afford to retain an attorney. Id. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. It is undisputed that Maloney was not given the Miranda warnings prior to making the admissions at issue.

A Miranda violation gives rise to a presumption of coercion that “is irrebuttable for the purposes of the State's case in chief.” Wright, 161 So.3d at 447 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) ). Evidence obtained from custodial interrogations may not be used against a defendant at trial if these warnings were not provided to the defendant before the interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“[U]nless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.”); see also Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 n. 1, 307, 105 S.Ct. 1285 ; Wright, 161 So.3d at 447.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Maloney was in custody for the purposes of Miranda because he was restrained to the degree usually associated with a formal arrest. See Howes v. Fields, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189–90, 1192, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) ; Ramirez, 739 So.2d at 574 ; Monroe v. State, 148 So.3d 850, 855 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), remanded on other grounds, 191 So.3d 395, 399 n. 2, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S192, S194 n. 2, 2016 WL 1700525, at *3 n. 2 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2016). Maloney was handcuffed for twelve hours; he was held under guard; he was searched before and during the questioning; some of his property had been seized; and he was not told he...