State v. Maloy, No. 1D02-1200.
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
| Writing for the Court | ALLEN, C.J. |
| Citation | 823 So.2d 815 |
| Decision Date | 16 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D02-1200. |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Rudolph MALOY, Appellee. |
823 So.2d 815
STATE of Florida, Appellant,v.
Rudolph MALOY, Appellee
No. 1D02-1200.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
July 16, 2002.
Rehearing Denied August 15, 2002.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Stephen S. Dobson, III, of Stephen S. Dobson, III, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ALLEN, C.J.
The state appeals an order dismissing six counts of a criminal information filed against the appellee, based on acts committed while the appellee served as a county
The appellee was charged with official misconduct and multiple counts of grand theft and petit theft. He filed a motion to dismiss, and it was indicated that the charged crimes were predicated on allegations involving false reimbursement claims on travel vouchers submitted in connection with the appellee's status as a public officer. The appellee maintained that the offense identified in section 112.061(10) is the appropriate charge for these acts, with the legislature having made this the pertinent charge to the exclusion of other offenses identified in the general laws of this state. Section 112.061 is a comprehensive enactment relating to the per diem and travel expenses of public officers and employees, with subsection (10) addressing fraudulent claims and providing that one who willfully makes and subscribes such a claim as to a material matter which he does not believe to be true and correct "is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083." This subsection (10) offense is thus distinguished from the dismissed charges here, which were brought under other criminal provisions in the general laws and which involve various criminal penalties.
The state suggests that section 112.061(10) could be treated as merely providing an alternative means of prosecution for the alleged acts. However, section 112.061(1)(b)1 clearly and explicitly states a legislative intent that (in the absence of a specific exemption) the "provisions of this section shall prevail over any conflicting provisions in a general law, present or future, to the extent of the conflict ...." The state would...
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Clement v. State, No. 2D04-1253.
...clearly within the intent and terms of the statute." Hutchinson v. State, 315 So.2d 546, 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); see also State v. Maloy, 823 So.2d 815, 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that provisions of particular and specific statutory proscription are ordinarily controlling over any con......
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Clement v. State, No. 2D04-1253.
...clearly within the intent and terms of the statute." Hutchinson v. State, 315 So.2d 546, 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); see also State v. Maloy, 823 So.2d 815, 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that provisions of particular and specific statutory proscription are ordinarily controlling over any con......