State v. Manbeck
| Decision Date | 30 January 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 89,303.,89,303. |
| Citation | 277 Kan. 224,83 P.3d 190 |
| Parties | STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. SCOTT E. MANBECK, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Shawn E. Minihan, assistant appellate defender, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Nanette L. Kemmerly-Weberly, county attorney, argued the cause, and Phill Kline, attorney general, was with her on the brief for appellee.
David L. Miller, of Topeka, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas County and District Attorneys Association.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This case comes before us on petition for review by the State of Kansas from a Court of Appeals decision which vacated Scott E. Manbeck's sentence for his conviction of involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
Manbeck pled guilty to one count of involuntary manslaughter as a result of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Manbeck had four prior DUI convictions. Pursuant to K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4711(c)(2), the presentence investigation report gave Manbeck a criminal history score which included his four previous DUI convictions as person felonies. The significance of this scoring is that it raised his criminal history score from "F" to "A."
Manbeck objected to his criminal history score, but the sentencing court overruled his objection and sentenced him to 162 months' imprisonment, using a criminal history score of "A."
The Court of Appeals vacated Manbeck's sentence and remanded the matter to the district court for resentencing using a criminal history of "F." State v. Manbeck, 31 Kan. App. 2d 618, 621, 69 P.3d 636 (2003). This court granted the State's petition for review.
The State argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted the provisions of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4711(c)(2). Resolution of this question involves the interpretation of a statute, over which this court has unlimited review. State v. Gordon, 275 Kan. 393, 402, 66 P.3d 903 (2003).
K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4711(c)(2) provides:
"If the current crime of conviction was committed on or after July 1, 1996, and is for involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, each prior adult conviction, diversion in lieu of criminal prosecution or juvenile adjudication for: (A) An act described in K.S.A. 8-1567 and amendments thereto; or (B) a violation of a law of another state or an ordinance of any city, or resolution of any county, which prohibits the act described in K.S.A. 8-1567 and amendments thereto shall count as one person felony for criminal history purposes." (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals concluded that the phrase "driving while under the influence of alcohol and drugs" applied to a defendant's prior DUI convictions that were for driving while under the influence of both alcohol and drugs. Manbeck, 31 Kan. App. 2d at 620-21. The Court of Appeals held that only those prior DUI convictions for driving under the influence of both alcohol and drugs could be counted as person felonies for the purposes of sentencing a defendant for involuntary manslaughter. 31 Kan. App. 2d at 620-21.
Judge Johnson of the Court of Appeals wrote a concurring opinion in which he interpreted the phrase "[i]f the current crime of conviction . . . is for involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs" as a condition precedent to the application of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4711(c)(2). Under Judge Johnson's reasoning, a defendant must have committed involuntary manslaughter while under the influence of both alcohol and drugs for the sentencing provisions to apply. The convictions subject to Judge Johnson's interpretation are limited to those that violate K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3442, involuntary manslaughter committed while driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
The majority opinion applies the same phrase to the prior DUI convictions rather than the manslaughter conviction. If a prior DUI conviction is not for driving while under the influence of both alcohol and drugs, then it cannot be used to modify the criminal history score for involuntary manslaughter. Under the majority interpretation, the provisions of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4711(c)(2) apply to all involuntary manslaughter convictions, not just those in violation of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3442.
K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3442 states:
The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is that the intent of the legislature governs, if that intent can be determined. Gordon, 275 Kan. at 402.
An appellate court may consider various aspects of the statute in attempting to determine the legislative intent. The court must first look at the intent as expressed in the language of the statute. When the language is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court is bound to implement the expressed intent. Gordon, 275 Kan. at 402. Ordinary words are to be given their ordinary meanings without adding something that is not readily found in the statute or eliminating that which is readily found therein. State v. Haug, 237 Kan. 390, 391-92, 699 P.2d 535 (1985).
Courts, however, are not limited to examining the language of the statute alone but may also consider the causes that impel the statute's adoption, the statute's objective, the historical background, and the effect of the statute under various constructions. State v. Dickson, 275 Kan. 683, 689, 69 P.3d 549 (2003).
An appellate court must consider all of the provisions in pari materia rather than in isolation, and these provisions must be reconciled, if possible, to make them consistent and harmonious. Gordon, 275 Kan. at 402. As a general rule, statutes should be interpreted to avoid unreasonable results. State v. Allison, 259 Kan. 25, 34, 910 P.2d 817 (1996).
Generally, criminal statutes are construed in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt about their meaning must be resolved in favor of the accused. Nevertheless, this rule of strict construction is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be sensible and reasonable to effect the legislative design and intent. State v. Vega-Fuentes, 264 Kan. 10, 14, 955 P.2d 1235 (1998).
As evidenced by the different interpretations given by the Court of Appeals, the language of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4711(c)(2) is ambiguous.
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