State v. Manck

• Decision Date: 15 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 1,1
• Citation: 385 Md. 581,870 A.2d 196
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. The Honorable Joseph P. MANCK, et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

870 A.2d 196

385 Md. 581

STATE of Maryland v. The Honorable Joseph P. MANCK, et al.

No. 1, September Term, 2004.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 15, 2005.

Annabelle L. Lisic, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellant.

Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Public Defender (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, Allison E. Pierce, Asst. Public Defender, Brian M. Saccenti, Asst. Public Defender, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.

BATTAGLIA, J.

This case presents us with the task of determining the scope of this Court's authority to issue prerogatory writs or other extraordinary relief when requested by the State, when the trial court has stricken the Notice of Intention to Seek the Penalty of Death. Based upon our jurisprudence and that of the federal system with respect to its identical powers to issue writs of mandamus or prohibition, we conclude that the State's Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Mandamus, or Other Appropriate Extraordinary Relief cannot be granted under the circumstances of this case.

I. Background

On June 7, 2002, a grand jury in Anne Arundel County indicted Michael Darryl Henry for first degree murder under Section 407 of Article 27 of the Maryland Code¹ for his actions in the death of a fellow inmate at the Maryland House of Correction Annex in Anne Arundel County. On February 3, 2003, the State filed a Notice of Intention to Seek the Penalty of Death (hereinafter "Notice") pursuant to Md.Code (2002), § 2-202(a)(1) of the Criminal Law Article.² In the Notice, the State set forth two aggravating factors enumerated in Md.Code (2002), § 2-303(g)(1)(ii) and (vii) of the Criminal Law Article, which provides:

(ii) the defendant committed the murder while confined in a correctional facility;

* * *

(vii) the defendant employed or engaged another to commit the murder and the murder was committed under an agreement or contract for remuneration or promise of remuneration.

On May 1, 2003, Henry filed a motion to strike the State's Notice and argued that based on the United States Supreme Court's opinions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), the State constitutionally could not seek to impose the death penalty unless all of the elements of a crime required for the defendant to be eligible for death are considered by the grand jury and contained in the indictment. Henry contended that he would not be eligible for the death penalty because the indictment failed to allege that he was a first degree principal. On June 25, 2004, Judge Joseph P. Manck denied Henry's motion.

At approximately the same time, Judge Pamela J. North of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County heard similar arguments in another capital proceeding. In that case, State v. Kenneth Ernest Abend, K-02-00506, the State, on May 4, 2002, had filed a Notice of Intention to Seek the Penalty of Death enumerating two aggravating circumstances contained in Section 2-303(g)(1) of the Criminal Law Article.³ As in the case against Henry, the indictment failed to allege Abend's status as a first degree principal.

Abend filed a motion to strike the State's Notice arguing that the indictment was insufficient to support the Notice because it did not allege that he was a principal in the first degree. On September 2, 2004, Judge North granted Abend's motion and permitted the State to either withdraw its notice and pursue life imprisonment or to re-indict Abend and allege that he was a first degree principal, if the State wanted to continue to seek the death penalty. The State chose to re-indict Abend and did so on September 3, 2004.

On September 28, 2004, Judge Manck reconsidered his earlier denial of Henry's motion and, relying in part on Judge North's analysis in the Abend case, granted Henry's motion to strike the State's Notice of Intention to Seek the Penalty of Death. Judge Manck granted a postponement to permit the State time to obtain a new indictment and file a new notice within the required 30-day period prior to trial. On September 29, 2004, rather than obtain a new indictment, the State filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Mandamus, or Other Appropriate Extraordinary Relief with this Court requesting that we direct Judge Manck to vacate his order striking the notice.

On October 4, 2004, we ordered both the State and Henry to file briefs or memoranda addressing the following issues:

1. Does this Court have the authority to grant a writ of prohibition, mandamus or to grant other appropriate extraordinary relief under the circumstances presented herein?

2. Does a judge have any discretion to strike a notice of intention to seek death penalty that is timely filed and conforms to Md.Code, Criminal Law, §§ 2-202(a) and 2-301?

On November 9, 2004, the State and Henry presented oral argument. The following day this Court issued a stay of "all proceedings in the Circuit Court ... pending a decision by this Court."

II. The Power to Issue Prerogatory or Extraordinary Writs

A. When Such Writs May Be Issued

In In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988), our seminal opinion on prerogatory writs authored by Judge William Adkins, we considered this Court's authority to issue prerogatory or extraordinary writs such as writs of mandamus or prohibition. Although there is no express language authorizing the issuance of such writs by this Court as an aspect of our original jurisdiction in the Maryland Constitution, we identified the power to do so as arising out of the Court's appellate jurisdiction. We explained:

The Maryland Constitution is silent as to any mandamus or prohibition power in this Court. The only general statutory provision dealing with mandamus jurisdiction is [Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.); § 3-8B-01 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article]; it relates only to the circuit courts. Nor is there any express grant of superintending power to this Court. Whether we have, as the highest court in this State, an inherent superintending or supervisory power over the courts below us in the judicial hierarchy, and whether any such power is implicit in Article IV, § 18 of the Maryland Constitution, are questions we reserve for another day. We need not and do not address them today because we hold that under the circumstances of this case we have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition in aid of our appellate jurisdiction.

In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. at 292-93, 539 A.2d at 669-70 (citations omitted). Moreover, we stated that:

it is manifestly necessary, to the ends of justice, that there should be a power in special cases to suspend proceedings on the matter appealed from....

Id. at 298, 539 A.2d at 672. We recognized that the availability of the writs "in aid of our appellate jurisdiction" has long been established, even if "we almost never exercised the power to issue them," id. at 297, 539 A.2d at 672, and then considered what circumstances would properly warrant issuing a writ "in aid of [our] appellate jurisdiction." Id. In response to this inquiry, we stated:

[I]t appears that mandamus or prohibition may issue in aid of appellate jurisdiction even though no appellate proceeding is pending in the appellate court, at least where there is some potentiality of eventual appellate review by appeal or by certiorari.... If the writ is "necessary to enable ... [the Court] to exercise appellate jurisdiction" it is in aid of that jurisdiction.

Id. at 302-03, 539 A.2d at 675. Thus, we recognized that "by making possible the review of a potentially unreviewable question [writs such as mandamus and] prohibition aided the appellate process." Id. at 299, 539 A.2d at 673. These writs are used "to prevent disorder, from a failure of justice, where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government there ought to be one." Id. at 307, 539 A.2d at 677, citing Runkel v. Winemiller, 4 H. & McH. 429, 449 (Gen. Ct. Oct. Term 1799). The power to issue prerogatory writs is "necessarily incident to this Court, to preserve the usefulness of its appellate jurisdiction. If it were otherwise, cases might arise in which the appeal would be but as a shadow, pending which the substance might be lost." In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. at 298, 539 A.2d at 672, quoting Thompson v. McKim, 6 H. & J. 302, 333 (1825).

In Philip Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 752 A.2d 200 (2000), we determined that mandamus relief should be granted, based upon a petition for interlocutory relief, where a trial judge improperly certified a class action in complex civil litigation about tobacco. Id. at 699-700, 752 A.2d at 205-06. Several large tobacco manufacturers and distributors petitioned this Court to vacate the circuit court's certification of two plaintiff classes, current and former users of tobacco products, that claimed to be injured by tobacco use or nicotine addiction and argued that the circuit court grossly abused its discretion in certifying the classes, in violation of the Maryland Constitution and this Court's rules of civil procedure. Id. at 699-700, 704, 752 A.2d at 205-06, 208. We noted, however, that class certification normally was only appealable after a final judgment in the underlying case. Id. at 714, 752 A.2d at 213-14. See Md. Rule 8-131(d) (stating "[o]n appeal from a final judgment, an interlocutory order previously entered in the action is open to review by the Court unless an appeal has previously been taken from that order and decided on the merits by the Court"). Petitioners, therefore, would have had to endure a costly and lengthy trial and the trial court's entry of a final judgment before seeking appellate review of the class certification action. Philip Morris, Inc., 358 Md. at 714, 752...