State v. Manley, Docket No. 28790 (ID 11/24/2004), Docket No. 28790.
| Decision Date | 24 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 28790. |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOSEPH ALLEN MANLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Boundary County. Hon. James Ralph Michaud, District Judge.
Order denying motion to dismiss second degree murder charge on double jeopardy grounds, and order dismissing charge without prejudice on other grounds, affirmed.
Jonathan W. Cottrell, Sandpoint, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
During Joseph Allen Manley's trial on a charge of second degree murder, the district court sua sponte declared a mistrial based on the court's view that Manley's appointed counsel was providing incompetent representation and was emotionally unfit to continue.1 Manley thereafter moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the mistrial order was unjustified and that another trial for the same offense therefore would violate his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. The district court denied Manley's motion but subsequently dismissed the case without prejudice on the State's motion to dismiss for lack of evidence. On appeal, Manley contends that the dismissal should have been with prejudice because a retrial would subject him to double jeopardy. The State argues that the prosecutor's voluntary dismissal of the action renders the double jeopardy issue moot. We conclude that the issue is not moot but that Manley has failed to show that the double jeopardy bar would be violated if he were subjected to reprosecution.
On December 14, 2001, Manley and his eighteen-year-old brother, Chris, were visiting their father in Moyie Springs to celebrate Manley's seventeenth birthday. After their father left home for the evening, Manley and Chris went to a neighbor's house, where they drank alcohol with friends to the point of intoxication. The two got into a fight, but eventually returned together to their father's home. Neighbors then heard loud voices and doors being slammed inside the home. Manley claims that he eventually went into the bathroom to get away from Chris and that he fell asleep or passed out in the bathroom. At approximately 11:45 that night, Chris was shot in the left shoulder as he was sitting on the living room couch. It is disputed whether the shot was accidental, self-inflicted, or fired by an assailant. After being shot, Chris went to a neighbor's residence and banged on the door but did not say anything. He died shortly after the police arrived, without having uttered a word. The police followed Chris's bloody trail back to the Manley home and found the couch and other areas of the living room sprayed with blood, and on the floor in front of the couch, a blood-splattered hunting rifle that belonged to Manley's father. In searching the house, they discovered Manley in the bathroom. He was handcuffed and removed from the home by walking through blood-splattered areas. Manley was arrested that night and charged with second degree murder.
The State's analysis of the trajectory of the bullet through Chris's body and into the wall, together with other forensic evidence, led to the conclusion that at the time of the fatal shot, Chris had been seated on the living room couch, leaning forward toward the floor. At the moment of discharge, the muzzle of the rifle was in contact with Chris's chest, with the butt of the rifle near his feet. Thus, if the rifle was fired by another person, the assailant must have fired upward at Chris while crouching or lying on the floor beneath him.
A public defender was appointed to represent Manley. The trial was scheduled for March 25, 2002. The State made a formal discovery request on January 4, but defense counsel did not provide any written discovery responses until March 19, less than one week before trial. At a pretrial conference the district judge attempted to ensure that pretrial issues, such as discovery and identification of witnesses, and exhibits, were resolved before trial. The State did not disclose one of its expert witnesses, Mr. Park, until March 21, four days before trial. On that date the State produced Park's forensic report which described tests performed on the rifle and a test of blood found on the rifle. The report did not indicate that Park had considered or would testify concerning bloodstains on Manley's pants.
At trial, the State relied upon two primary pieces of evidence—apart from the evidence that Manley and Chris had been fighting the evening before Chris's death—to show that Manley had committed the shooting. The first was a statement that Manley allegedly made to police before he had been told of his brother's death. The second was bloodstains found on the left cuff of Manley's pants. The evidence of Manley's comment to the police came through the testimony of one of the arresting officers, Pete Atkins. He said that he had prepared an arrest report in which he had written what Manley said immediately after being confronted by police in the bathroom of the Manley home. The prosecutor asked Atkins if he recalled that, before being removed from the residence, Manley said, Atkins replied that he recalled that statement. This evidence was proffered by the State to show that Manley was aware of the killing before it had been mentioned by the police. Defense counsel impeached Atkins by showing that the alleged statement was not recorded either in Atkins' arrest report or on a tape recording of the arrest. The parties eventually stipulated that the jury would be instructed that the actual statement recorded in the arrest report was, "My brother (Christopher) kicked my ass . . . my brother kicked my ass, I'm not mad at him at all."
The prosecutor also elicited testimony from expert witness Park that bloodstains found on the lower left cuff of Manley's pants resulted from blood splattering from Chris's body onto Manley, indicating that Manley was present at the shooting.2 Defense counsel objected to this portion of Park's testimony on the ground that the questioning was speculative and lacked adequate foundation, but he made no objection based upon the State's failure to disclose the substance of the blood splatter testimony prior to trial. The objection that was made was overruled.
On the fourth day of trial, defense counsel delivered his opening statement, during which he experienced emotional difficulty at several points. Defense counsel excused himself twice to the jury after breaks in his speech. Once he said, At another point, defense counsel excused himself again and said,
Shortly after this opening, defense counsel attempted to introduce five defense exhibits. The apparent purpose of some of the exhibits was to rebut Park's testimony about the blood spatter evidence. The State objected on the ground of untimely disclosure of the exhibits and lack of foundation. The court excluded three of the five exhibits for untimely disclosure, but left open the possibility that the other two could be admitted if adequate foundation were laid. The court also questioned whether defense counsel may have purposefully waited until the State's experts had been excused before introducing the previously undisclosed exhibits so that the State would be unable to present the experts' rebuttal testimony.
Immediately thereafter, defense counsel asked, "Why are you angry at me, Your Honor?" After the judge denied being angry, counsel moved to exclude Manley's pants and shirt, which had previously been offered by the State and admitted. Defense counsel argued that they should be excluded because the State had not provided to the defense a report as to what Park would testify to, and because defense requests to the State to examine the pants and shirt in the three months before trial had been ignored. The court held that the defense motion was not timely. At that point, the following colloquy took place:
When the court reconvened fifteen minutes later, the district court declared a mistrial sua sponte without first entertaining argument from the parties. The court explained its decision as follows:
Because of the court's concern about either the mental and/or emotional condition of [defense counsel] and because of the court's observation during the proceedings recently in this trial, not just beginning at the beginning of this trial but certainly including them, and because of the things that just happened when we were last in court a few minutes ago, the court is on its own motion pursuant to Rule 29.1(c) declaring this trial at an...
To continue reading
Request your trial