State v. Manley, IN-95-11-1323 thru IN-95-11-1325 & IN-95-12-0684 thru IN-95-12-0685 (DE 10/18/2004)
| Decision Date | 18 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | IN-95-11-1323 thru IN-95-11-1325 & IN-95-12-0684 thru IN-95-12-0685.,IN-95-11-1047 thru IN-95-11-1049 & IN-95-12-0687 thru IN-95-12-0689. |
| Parties | STATE OF DELAWARE v. MICHAEL MANLEY, Defendant. and STATE OF DELAWARE v. DAVID STEVENSON Defendant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Defendants Michael Manley and David Stevenson have jointly moved to have this judge recuse himself from further participation in this case. Citing several sentences in this Court's earlier decision, the defendants argue that this judge's impartiality might be reasonably questioned. The decision in question denied the defendants' motions for post-conviction relief and their motion to bar a new penalty hearing.
As a result of the unique history of this case, part of which involved the removal of the first judge involved in this case, this judge carefully weighed the language utilized in his earlier decision. This judge has re-examined that opinion and the sentences cited by the defendants. That re-examination satisfies this judge that, employing any test applicable in this situation, there is no basis for recusal. The defendants' motions are DENIED.
On November 12, 1996, defendants were found guilty of the November 13, 1995, first degree murder of Kristopher Heath (" Heath"). After a penalty hearing, the jury determined that four statutory aggravating circumstances existed with regard to the defendants. The jury also found that, as to Manley, the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigation factors by a vote of seven to five. As for Stevenson, the jury found that the mitigating factors were outweighed by the aggravating circumstances by a vote of eight to four. Upon consideration of these jury's sentencing recommendations, the originally assigned trial judge sentenced Manley and Stevenson to death by lethal injection.1
The defendants, thereafter, filed a direct appeal which was consolidated with their automatic appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed the guilty verdicts and the imposition of the death penalty for both Manley and Stevenson.2
Subsequent to that affirmance, Stevenson moved to recuse the originally assigned trial judge. That judge denied that motion on January 8, 1999.3 Manley and Stevenson both then presented motions for postconviction relief and an evidentiary hearing. The original judge denied Stevenson's motions on December 21, 1999.4 Manley's motions were denied on April 27, 2000.5 Both appealed to the Supreme Court seeking review of the Superior Court's rejection of their claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, Stevenson petitioned the Supreme Court to review the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself from consideration of the postconviction relief motions. His claim of alleged bias or appearance of impropriety stemmed from that judge's participation in a suppression hearing involving Heath.6 On remand order of the Supreme Court, the trial judge rendered supplemental factual determinations pertaining to Stevenson v. State.7
After getting the case back, the Supreme Court determined that there was an appearance of impropriety in the original trial judge's involvement in this case. First, that judge had presided over the suppression hearing at which Heath had testified. Second, that judge had volunteered to be assigned to preside over the murder trial involving these defendants. The Supreme Court took particular note that the role of a trial judge in Delaware's capital punishment system is unique: while the jury recommends, the judge makes the ultimate sentencing decision.8 That role received special attention in this case when the Supreme Court took particular note of the " narrow" margins of the jury's vote recommending the death penalty for these defendants.
The Supreme Court reversed the original trial judge's decision denying Stevenson's motions to recuse and his motion for postconviction relief. The Court remanded both defendants' appeals. The remand was to (1) have a new judge assigned, (2) consider both defendants' motions for post-conviction relief, (3) allow the defendants to amend those motions, if desired and (4) conduct an evidentiary hearing, if needed, and (5) conduct a new penalty hearing.9
This judge, upon remand, was assigned to undertake these tasks. One threshold issue involved whether Stevenson's appellate counsel could continue to represent him in the renewed proceedings in this Court. The reasons, explained in detail in this judge's prior ruling and irrelevant to the recusal motions, revolved around the question of the applicability of Chance v. State10 to the facts of this case. His counsel who had handled the prior appellate procedures had not raised the Chance issue in the Supreme Court. During an early hearing before this judge, this judge sua sponte informed Stevenson that, as long as he was represented by that counsel, he would forever be barred from raising the Chance issue in these post-conviction proceedings. Stevenson, thereafter, requested new counsel and such counsel were appointed.
While additional matters were being sorted out in connection with the motions for post-conviction relief, the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona.11 Based on the issues spawned by Ring and its possible affect on Delaware's capital sentencing scheme, Manley moved to preclude the holding of a new penalty hearing. Obviously, since Ring was decided subsequent to the remand in this case which included holding a new penalty hearing, this judge had to address those issues and determine whether there could be a new penalty hearing. Further, the legislature, prompted by Ring, amended the capital punishment statute in 2002 regarding the jury's role in the sentencing phase.
The nature of the defendants' post-conviction claims caused the Court to hold evidentiary hearings on their motions. And all sides briefed the applicability, if any, of Ring to a new penalty hearing and the role of the 2002 amendment.
The Court in a 91 page opinion, denied both defendants' motions for post-conviction relief. The Court also decided the Ring issues declaring a new penalty could be held, as those issues had necessarily injected themselves into the remand.12 Both defendants appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed all aspects of this Court's rulings.13
Following the affirmance, counsel and the Court established the date for a new penalty hearing. The date on which jury selection will start is February 1, 2005. Subsequently, the defendants filed their recusal motion.
The defendants premise their recusal motions on four discrete portions from this judge's opinion denying their motions for post conviction relief and holding the penalty hearing would proceed, citing these passages:
1. In fact, the Swan Court distinguished that case from Chance by noting that there was " no credible argument, as in Chance, that Warren's death was an unintended consequence of either Swan's or (co-defendant) Norcross' actions. The same can be said about the evidence in this case.
2. The evidence conclusively showed a planned and intentional killing in which two persons, these defendants, participated. Chance, therefore, is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
3. The evidence was overwhelming.
4. There is a key element of the record in this case which both defendants ignore or have chosen not to address. Whatever infirmities the Supreme Court found with the original trial judge's penalty decision, the fact remains that before his sentencing decision was made, the unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that four statutory aggravating factors existed.14
The defendants contend these statements, when viewed in light of the fact-finding this judge would have to make in the new penalty hearing, establish an objective impropriety that means this judge should not preside over that hearing. Defendants argue that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates their right to judicial proceedings presided over by a neutral and detached judge. They continue that the Delaware Code of Judicial Conduct implements this constitutional guarantee and that disqualification is required when the impartiality of the Court might be reasonably questioned.
On remand, the newly assigned Judge was directed to address the defendants' Rule 61 motions and to preside over a new penalty hearing. There was no suggestion that a single judge would be incapable of doing both. In order to address all the Rule 61 issues these defendants raised, it was necessary to recite and review the factual record established in the first trial and set out in the earlier decision forming the basis for the recusal motions. As this judge noted, that recitation came from those earlier decisions.15 There could be no other way to properly weigh the defendants' motions than to do so in the light of the existing factual record.
The standards governing disqualification require neutrally of the presiding judge as well as the appearance of impartiality.16 These standards are codified in The Delaware Code of Judicial Conduct (" Code"). The pertinent section of Canon 3 states that:
(C) Disqualification. (1) A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. ...
To succeed in their motion for disqualification, the defendants must be able to show that this Court is biased or has a disqualifying interest.17 In a disqualification analysis, the Court must make a painstaking examination of the facts.18 A two-step analysis is to...
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