State v. Manley
| Decision Date | 20 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 31458.,31458. |
| Citation | 142 Idaho 338,127 P.3d 954 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joseph Allen MANLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Jonathan W. Cottrell, Sandpoint, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Appellant Joseph Allen Manley has requested review of the district court's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial based on manifest necessity. After the mistrial was declared, Manley's motion to dismiss with prejudice on the grounds that any subsequent trial would be barred by double jeopardy was denied. Subsequently, the Respondent State of Idaho asked for a dismissal because new lab results had weakened the State's case against Manley. The district court granted the State's motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. The Court of Appeals upheld the district court's declaration of a mistrial and this Court granted review.
On December 14, 2001, Manley and his brother, Chris, became intoxicated and began fighting at a neighbor's house. Eventually, the two returned to their father's home, where the fighting continued for a time. Manley claims he eventually went into the bathroom to get away from Chris' roughhousing, took off his shoes, laid down on the floor and either fell asleep or passed out. At approximately 11:45 that evening, Chris was shot in the left shoulder as he was sitting on the living room couch. Based on the trajectory of the bullet, if the rifle had been fired by another person, the assailant would have to have fired upward at Chris while crouching or lying on the floor beneath him. Chris, bleeding profusely, made his way to a neighbor's house, but died shortly after the police arrived, without having said a word. The police followed Chris' bloody trail back to the Manley home, found Manley in the bathroom, and removed him from the home by walking him through the blood-spattered living room. A small amount of Chris' blood was later found on Manley's pant cuffs. Manley was arrested and charged with second degree murder.
At trial, the State relied on two primary pieces of evidence to show Manley murdered his brother. The first was a statement allegedly made by Manley when first confronted by the police in the bathroom: This statement was presented by the State to show Manley was aware of his brother's death before it had been mentioned by the police. Manley's attorney1 successfully impeached the investigating officer, forcing the State to acknowledge in front of the jury that such a statement had not been made. The second piece of evidence was the bloodstains found on the cuff of Manley's pants. One of the State's experts testified that the stains resulted from blood splattering from Chris' body onto Manley, indicating Manley was present during the shooting. After the State rested, Manley's attorney delivered his opening statement, during which he had to excuse himself twice to the jury. Once he stated, Excusing himself again, he said, Manley's attorney then attempted to introduce five exhibits to rebut the State's expert about the blood spatter. Outside the presence of the jury, the district court excluded three of these exhibits. In doing so, the district court questioned whether Manley's attorney had purposefully waited until the State's expert had been excused before introducing the exhibits, to which Manley's attorney asked, "Why are you mad at me, Your Honor?" The judge denied being angry and made another evidentiary ruling against Manley. The following discussion then took place:
The district court then took a fifteen minute recess. When the jury returned to the courtroom, the district court declared a mistrial sua sponte without consulting Manley, his attorney, or the State. It appears from the record, the district court did not explore any alternatives to declaring a mistrial. When the mistrial was announced, the district court stated it was based on a concern for the mental and physical health of Manley's attorney. In a subsequent written order, the district court pointed to defense counsel's "loss of control of his emotions in his opening statement," his accusation that the district judge was biased against him, and his remark "God help me if I don't have a heart attack over it," as support for the court's concern for defense counsel's physical and mental health.
Manley moved to dismiss the murder charge, claiming the mistrial order was not justified and that any retrial would be barred by the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. In response to Manley's motion to dismiss, the district court also identified in the written order various circumstances it concluded demonstrated Manley's attorney was ineffective and stated it declared the mistrial to preserve Manley's rights. The district court denied Manley's motion to dismiss. The State then moved to dismiss with prejudice on double jeopardy grounds, but this motion was denied, as well. The district court set a new trial date. A week before the new trial was to begin, the State again moved to dismiss, as new lab results had weakened the State's case against Manley by contradicting their expert's earlier blood spatter testimony. A second expert had concluded the stains on Manley's pants did not show Manley was present at the shooting. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, but did so without prejudice so the charges could be refiled.
Manley appealed and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled Manley's double jeopardy claim was ripe for review and was not mooted by the district court's subsequent dismissal of the case without prejudice, but ultimately concluded the district court had not abused its discretion in declaring the mistrial and affirmed that decision. This Court granted Manley's Petition for Review.
While this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals when considering a case on review from that court, this Court reviews the district court's decisions directly. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 226, 91 P.3d 1127, 1130 (2004). This Court is not merely reviewing the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision, but is hearing the matter as if the case were on direct appeal from the district court's decision. Id. (citations omitted).
The decision to declare a mistrial is within the discretion of the district court, and such a determination will only be reversed when that discretion has been abused. State v. Talmage, 104 Idaho 249, 254, 658 P.2d 920, 925 (1983). In determining whether the district court abused its discretion, the reviewing court considers the following: (1) whether the district court correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156, 45 P.3d 810, 812 (2002).
In contrast, the justiciability issues of ripeness and mootness may be freely reviewed. See Lake v. Newcomb, 140 Idaho 190, 193, 90 P.3d 1272, 1275 (Ct.App.2004) (); see also Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Washington, 271 F.3d 835, 850 (9th Cir.2001) ().
The three key issues raised by this appeal are (1) whether Manley's double jeopardy claim is ripe for review; (2) whether Manley's double jeopardy claim is moot; and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial based on manifest necessity.
The ripeness doctrine concerns the timing of a suit and asks whether a case is brought too early. The purpose of the ripeness requirement is to prevent courts from entangling themselves in purely abstract disagreements. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). Under the ripeness test in Idaho, a party must show (1) the case presents definite and concrete issues; (2) a real and substantial controversy exists (as opposed to hypothetical facts); and (3) there is a present need for adjudication. Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 642, 778 P.2d 757, 764 (1989). This Court has recognized that judicial review may be had where there is no need for further factual development:
No new facts would be introduced and the legal issues presented would be unchanged from the present challenge.... It is clear that this issue will be before us either now or in the future, and a declaration now of the various rights of the parties will certainly afford a relief from uncertainty and controversy in the future. "Since we are persuaded that `we will be in no better position than we are now' to decide this question, we hold that it is...
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