State v. Mann, 16996.

• Citation: 857 A.2d 329,271 Conn. 300
• Decision Date: 05 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 16996.,16996.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Jason MANN.

857 A.2d 329

271 Conn. 300

STATE of Connecticut v. Jason MANN.

No. 16996.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 17, 2004.

Decided October 5, 2004.

Christopher T. Godialis, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Maura Coyne, deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Glenn W. Falk, special public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

PALMER, J.

After a trial to the court, the defendant, Jason Mann, was convicted of possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependant in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278(b), possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a school in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278a(b), and possession of a controlled substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279(c). The trial court rendered judgment sentencing the defendant to a total effective term of seventeen years imprisonment, suspended after twelve years, and five years probation. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence that he claimed had been seized by the police in violation of his rights under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution¹ during a warrantless patdown search of the defendant while he was inside an apartment. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant that the search was constitutionally infirm and, therefore, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant the defendant's motion to suppress and for further proceedings according to law.²State v. Mann, 76 Conn.App. 48, 67, 818 A.2d 122 (2003). We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the question of whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to suppress. See State v. Mann, 263 Conn. 926, 823 A.2d 1218 (2003). We answer that question in the negative and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts. "At approximately 4:25 a.m. on October 3, 2000, three uniformed New Haven police officers, Christopher Rubino, Julie Esposito and Victor Fuentes, responded to a call that a dispute was taking place on Stevens Street near Sylvan Avenue in New Haven. When the officers arrived in the area, they spoke to a woman who identified herself as Tina Jones. Jones admitted having been part of the dispute on Stevens Street³ and volunteered information about drug activity in the area. She told the officers that an apartment at 130 Sylvan Avenue had just received a shipment of drugs, that the recipient of the drugs was a black male, that `they dealt everything out of that apartment' and that she was unsure as to whether there were weapons in the apartment. Jones described the apartment as being on the first floor, last door on the left, when the building is entered from the rear.

"After receiving the information from Jones, the officers proceeded to the apartment at 130 Sylvan Avenue. They entered 130 Sylvan Avenue from the unlocked rear door. At approximately 5 a.m., Rubino knocked on the door of the apartment described by Jones. Although in uniform, the officers did not at anytime announce themselves as police. The defendant responded by opening the door one and one-half to two feet, which was wide enough for the defendant's entire body to be visible. Upon opening the door and seeing the police, the defendant attempted to close the door using his left hand and the left side of his body. Simultaneously, the defendant placed his right hand into his right pocket. When Rubino saw the defendant place his right hand in his pocket, he drew his gun, entered the apartment, placed the defendant against a wall and conducted what he described as `a Terry<sup>4</sup> patdown' for weapons. No weapons were found, but Rubino did, in conducting the patdown, determine that the defendant's right pants pocket `had a quantity of plastic baggies with little rocklike things in them,' which Rubino identified as possible narcotics. After completing the patdown and assuring himself that the defendant had no weapons, Rubino reached into the defendant's right pocket and withdrew its contents, which included fifty small bags containing crack cocaine and four small bags containing marijuana. Thereafter, the defendant was arrested and charged with various offenses relating to his possession of the crack cocaine and the marijuana." ⁵ State v. Mann, supra, 76 Conn.App. at 50-51, 818 A.2d 122. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the crack cocaine and marijuana seized during the patdown search of his person. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a ruling from the bench denying the defendant's motion. In so ruling, the trial court relied on the following factual findings. After speaking with Jones, the officers approached the apartment that she had identified. The officers could hear voices coming from inside the apartment. Rubino knocked on the apartment door two or three times but did not otherwise identify or announce himself or his fellow officers. The defendant then opened the door and immediately tried to shut it while simultaneously reaching into his pocket, giving the officers "the choice of retreating, and possibly being shot through [the] wooden door, or advancing upon the defendant to enable the police officers to conduct a patdown [search of the defendant] ... to determine whether ... [he] was armed." The trial court emphasized that, because the incident had lasted only a few seconds, and because Rubino "was only one and [one]-half feet away from the defendant," Rubino's decision to conduct a patdown search of the defendant for weapons necessarily was a "split-second" decision. The court further observed that, under the circumstances, including the defendant's "furtive acts," the officers' safety was in "extreme jeopardy," and that "retreating would [not] have ensured the safety of those officers." ⁶ Finally, the court determined that the officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was armed and posed a danger to them, and that he "was about to commit a crime," namely, possessing a weapon that "could be fired...." ⁷

On the basis of the foregoing findings, the trial court concluded that the patdown search of the defendant did not violate his fourth amendment rights. Specifically, the trial court determined that, under all of the circumstances, the defendant's conduct had created an exigency justifying the officers' warrantless entry across the threshold of the apartment for the limited purpose of conducting a patdown search of the defendant for weapons. ⁸ On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly had denied his motion to suppress the crack cocaine and the marijuana seized by the officers as a result of the patdown search. The state raised three claims in support of its contrary contention. First, the state claimed that the search was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., State v. Gant, 231 Conn. 43, 64, 646 A.2d 835 (1994) (exigent circumstances exception to warrant requirement applies generally to those activities in which police are "unable or unlikely to effectuate an arrest, search or seizure, for which probable cause exists, unless they act swiftly and ... without seeking prior judicial authorization"), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1038, 115 S.Ct. 1404, 131 L.Ed.2d 291 (1995). Second, the state contended that the search was permissible because the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (police officer may detain suspect and engage in stop-and-frisk investigation if officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion that suspect is armed and dangerous); and the defendant, having exposed himself to public view by voluntarily opening the apartment door for the police, had a sufficiently reduced expectation of privacy such that the Terry patdown search was reasonable even though it was conducted inside the doorway of the apartment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ("[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection"). Third, the state contended that the emergency exception justified the officers' entry into the apartment. See, e.g., State v. Blades, 225 Conn. 609, 618, 626 A.2d 273 (1993) ("[t]he fourth amendment does not bar police officers, when responding to emergencies, from making warrantless entries into premises and warrantless searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid" [internal quotation marks omitted]). The Appellate Court rejected each of these contentions, concluding that, in the absence of a warrant or probable cause and exigent circumstances, the fourth amendment barred the officers from crossing the threshold of the apartment to conduct a patdown search of the defendant. See State v. Mann, supra, 76 Conn.App. at 67, 818 A.2d 122. This certified appeal followed.

On appeal to this court, the state's primary claim is that the patdown search of the defendant was constitutionally permissible because the police, while conducting a lawful investigation, were confronted with an emergency situation stemming from the fact that the defendant, who, upon voluntarily opening the apartment door for the police, engaged in conduct that reasonably caused the police to suspect that he was armed and posed a danger to them. The defendant contends that the Appellate Court properly determined that the patdown search violated the fourth...