State v. Manuel T.

• Decision Date: 19 November 2020
• Docket Number: SC 20250
• Citation: 254 A.3d 278,337 Conn. 429
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. MANUEL T.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

337 Conn. 429

254 A.3d 278

STATE of Connecticut

v.MANUEL T.^*

SC 20250

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 3, 2020

Officially released November 19, 2020^**

Trent A. LaLima, with whom, on the brief, was Hubert J. Santos, for the appellant (defendant).

Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Elizabeth Tanaka, former assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Jennifer B. Smith filed a brief for the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

ROBINSON, C. J.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Manuel T., was convicted of six counts of sexual assault and four counts of risk of injury to a child arising from the sexual abuse of his girlfriend's daughter, J.¹ The defendant now appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification,² from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of conviction. See State v. Manuel T. , 186 Conn. App. 51, 53, 198 A.3d 648 (2018). On appeal, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly upheld (1) the admission into evidence of a video recording of a forensic interview of J by a nonmedical professional under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule, § 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, because medical care was not the "primary purpose" of the interview, and (2) the exclusion of screenshot photographs of text messages purportedly sent by J to the defendant's niece on the ground that they had not been sufficiently authenticated. We disagree with the defendant's claim that a primary purpose standard applies to the medical treatment exception. We agree, however, that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had properly excluded the text messages, and we further conclude that this evidentiary error requires a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. During all relevant times, J lived with the defendant, whom she considered her stepfather,³ her mother, her younger sister, and her younger brother. J's biological father was mostly absent from her life, in part due to periods of incarceration.

On March 28, 2014, when J was seventeen years old, she reported to her boyfriend, and then her family, and then the police, that the defendant had sexually abused her over the course of many years. In accordance with police protocol, J was referred to the Greater Hartford Children's Advocacy Center (advocacy center) at Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center for a forensic interview.⁴ On April 1, 2014, J participated in that interview, which was conducted by Lisa Murphy-Cipolla, the clinical services coordinator at the advocacy center. Although Murphy-Cipolla interviewed J alone, their conversation was observed through a one-way mirror by Claire Hearn, a police detective, and Audrey Courtney, a pediatric nurse practitioner. Consistent with the standard practice of the advocacy center, the interview was video recorded.

During the interview, J reported that the defendant had sexually abused her over an approximate seven year period, after school and while her mother was at work. She told Murphy-Cipolla that, starting when she was eight or nine years old, the defendant had, on numerous occasions, touched her inappropriately underneath her clothes. J also disclosed that, when she turned fifteen years old, the defendant had forced her to have vaginal and anal intercourse with him. The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged with six counts of sexual assault and four counts of risk of injury to a child. See footnote 1 of this opinion.

The trial court held a pretrial hearing to determine whether the video recording of the forensic interview would be admissible at trial. As an offer of proof, the state presented the testimony of Murphy-Cipolla and played a partially redacted version⁵ of the video recording. Murphy-Cipolla testified regarding her background, the purposes and process of conducting such interviews, and the circumstances of her interview of J. The state argued that the video recording was admissible pursuant to the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule. See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (5). It noted that, if necessary, it could establish through Hearn's testimony that J had been referred for a medical evaluation after the interview. The defendant objected to the admission of the video recording, arguing that, except for a couple of J's statements, the interview statements did not satisfy the medical treatment hearsay exception because J was not seeking medical diagnosis or treatment in the interview and her statements were not made to a medical professional.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court rendered an oral decision overruling the defendant's objection.

The court concluded that the statements in the interview satisfied the standard for admission under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception, as recently interpreted by the Appellate Court in State v. Griswold , 160 Conn. App. 528, 127 A.3d 189, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 907, 128 A.3d 952 (2015). That standard required that the purpose of the interview was "in part" to determine whether J needed medical treatment and that her statements were "reasonably pertinent" to achieving that end. See id., at 552–53, 127 A.3d 189.

Thereafter, the defendant's case proceeded to a jury trial. The state presented J to testify about the abuse and then, over the defendant's renewed objection, also presented the video recording of the forensic interview.

The defendant's theory of the case was that J had fabricated the allegations of abuse. In support of this theory, the defendant sought to introduce two cell phone screenshots depicting text messages purportedly sent by J to V, the defendant's niece, a couple of months before J reported the abuse. On cross-examination, J denied sending any text messages to V.

The court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of the screenshots. As an offer of proof, the defendant conducted a direct examination of V and produced both screenshots. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued an oral decision concluding that the screenshots had not been sufficiently authenticated to be admitted into evidence.

The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty on six counts of sexual assault and four counts of risk of injury to a child. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict and imposed a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration, execution suspended after thirty years, and thirty-five years probation and lifetime sex offender registration.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, contending that the admission into evidence of the forensic interview and the exclusion of the text messages were harmful error.⁶ See State v. Manuel T. , supra, 186 Conn. App. at 53, 198 A.3d 648. The Appellate Court concluded that neither ruling was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Id., at 64–65, 72, 198 A.3d 648. With regard to the interview, the Appellate Court cited the standard it had articulated in State v. Griswold , supra, 160 Conn. App. at 552–57, 127 A.3d 189, and other cases, under which "[s]tatements may be reasonably pertinent ... to obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment even when that was not the primary purpose of the inquiry that prompted them, or the principal motivation behind their expression .... Although [t]he medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule requires that the statements be both pertinent to treatment and motivated by a desire for treatment ... in cases involving juveniles, [we] have permitted this requirement to be satisfied inferentially." (Emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Manuel T. , supra, at 61, 198 A.3d 648. Applying these principles to the present case, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting the recording of the interview "because it reasonably can be inferred from the circumstances apparent to [J] that she understood the interview had a medical purpose." Id., at 63, 198 A.3d 648.

With regard to the screenshots of the text messages, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding them. Id., at 65, 198 A.3d 648. The Appellate Court determined that V's testimony was insufficient authentication and that there was not sufficient additional corroboration for her testimony. Id., at 70–72, 198 A.3d 648. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. Id., at 72, 198 A.3d 648. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

On appeal, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video recorded interview and excluding the text messages. The defendant contends that both rulings rested on the application of improper standards, to the prejudice of the defendant, requiring a new trial. We agree with the defendant's claim with regard to the text messages and conclude that the trial court's exclusion of this evidence was harmful error.

I

We begin with the defendant's challenge to the admission of the recording of the forensic interview. The defendant, supported by the amicus curiae, the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, asks this court to adopt a standard under which a minor victim's statements in this type of interview are admissible under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule, § 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, only if the "primary purpose" in making and eliciting those statements is to obtain...