State v. Marcus H.
| Decision Date | 04 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | AC 39379, (AC 40796) |
| Citation | 190 Conn.App. 332,210 A.3d 607 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. MARCUS H. |
Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Jennifer F. Miller, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were, Michael L. Regan, state's attorney, and Sarah Bowman, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Prescott, Bright and Norcott, Js.
The defendant, Marcus H., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60d, two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), two counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-63, reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (1), operating a motor vehicle with an elevated blood alcohol content in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (2),1 interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a, and increasing speed in an attempt to escape or elude a police officer in violation of General Statutes § 14-223 (b). The defendant claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) violated his constitutional right to counsel by denying his application for the appointment of a public defender and (2) violated his constitutional right to due process when it did not order, sua sponte, a judicial marshal to remove his leg shackles during the trial.2 We are not persuaded by the defendant's claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction.3
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In the early morning of May 25, 2014, a motorist driving behind the defendant observed that his car remained stopped through two cycles of a stoplight. The motorist pulled over, exited her car, and approached the passenger side of the defendant's car. She observed the defendant sleeping or unconscious in the driver seat and two young girls in car seats in the back of the car. The motorist woke up the defendant, who then drove off.
Due to concern for the children's safety, the motorist called the police and informed them that she thought that the defendant was intoxicated. On the basis of the information provided by the motorist, the police station issued a "be on the lookout" report over their radio system for a black Acura with a black male operator and two females in the back seat. Officer Jason Pudvah saw a car that matched the description from the report idling at a nearby gas station. Pudvah approached the car and observed the defendant slumped over in the driver's seat and his two and four year old daughters in the backseat. Pudvah knocked on the window and spoke with the defendant. After requesting the defendant's information, Pudvah returned to his vehicle. While Pudvah was speaking with police dispatch, the defendant drove off at a high rate of speed.
Pudvah initially pursued the defendant but stopped due to fear for the children's safety and in the hope that the defendant would slow down. Further down the road, the defendant lost control of his car and crashed into a telephone pole. The car became airborne and landed upside down in a residential swimming pool. As a result of the accident, the defendant's younger daughter suffered serious injuries to her arm and his older daughter sustained an ankle injury
.
After the trial, during which the defendant represented himself, a jury found the defendant guilty of all charges, and the court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. Thereafter, the defendant pleaded guilty to being a subsequent offender to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of § 14-227a (g) (2). The trial court, Jongbloed , J. , sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twenty-three years of incarceration, execution suspended after fourteen and one-half years, followed by five years of probation with special conditions. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant claims that the trial court violated his constitutional right to counsel and, therefore, to due process, by denying his application for the appointment of a public defender. We disagree.
The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. On the first day of jury selection on February 18, 2016,4 the defendant requested a continuance to replace his private attorney, Attorney John Williams, with another private attorney. Specifically, he claimed that he had a dispute with Attorney Williams regarding payment of attorney's fees, and he did not believe that Attorney Williams would represent him properly. Attorney Williams informed the court that he had "told [the defendant] expressly and more than once that under no circumstances would his [lack of payment] in any way, shape, or form affect [his] commitment to [the defendant]." The court denied the motion for a continuance and stated that "[Attorney] Williams is going to honor his professional obligations under all circumstances and represent [the defendant] to the best of his ability."
After the court denied the motion for a continuance, the defendant requested to represent himself. The court canvassed the defendant regarding his decision to represent himself, including inquiring as to whether he understood the dangers of self-representation. After concluding that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, the court granted his request. The court then appointed Attorney Williams as the defendant's standby counsel. Jury selection thereafter commenced, with the defendant representing himself. That afternoon, the defendant applied for a public defender.
The next day, the court held a hearing on the defendant's request for appointment of a public defender. The assistant state's attorney, the defendant, Attorney Williams, and Attorney Sean Kelly from the public defender's office were present at the hearing. Attorney Kelly stated that, after reviewing the defendant's application, the defendant was not eligible for their services and that the Office of the Public Defender did not seek to be appointed in the case.
The defendant argued that he was financially eligible for the services of a public defender. Specifically, he argued that, although he was able to post bonds and had retained private counsel in the past, his financial situation had changed so that he had "the right to free counsel ... on the state's dollar." Attorney Kelly stated that the public defender's office considers many factors when making a decision regarding a defendant's eligibility, including whether the defendant is receiving support from others. After evaluating the defendant's application, the public defender's office concluded that his circumstances did not warrant appointment of a public defender.
The defendant initially posted a $ 25,000 surety bond. His bond subsequently was increased to a $ 75,000 surety bond, which he also posted. Therefore, the defendant was not in custody and was living with his mother at the time he applied for a public defender. Attorney Kelly noted that the defendant's ability to post bond and to obtain private counsel "shows a pattern where, if there's money needed, money comes ...." The defendant himself stated that the money from his initial payment to Attorney Williams came from his mother. Attorney Kelly also noted that this was the second private attorney the defendant had retained in the case and that the defendant had posted significant bonds on two prior occasions. These facts taken together led the public defender's office to conclude that the defendant was not indigent.
The defendant responded to Attorney Kelly by stating that he still owed money to both of his private attorneys and had balances on both bonds. Finally, he restated that he believed that Attorney Williams, who was present and available to represent him, would be ineffective. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request. In denying the defendant's request, the court stated: 5 The defendant continued to trial representing himself, with the assistance of Attorney Williams as standby counsel.
We begin with the relevant law and standard of review that govern this claim.
Practice Book § 37-6 (a) provides in relevant part:
Our Supreme Court in State v. Henderson , 307 Conn. 533, 540–41, 55 A.3d 291 (2012), stated: ...
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...continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marcus H. , 190 Conn. App. 332, 345, 210 A.3d 607, cert. denied, 332 Conn. 910, 211 A.3d 71, cert. denied, U.S., ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 540, 205 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2019). "[......
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