State v. Mares

• Decision Date: 09 October 2014
• Docket Number: No. S–13–0223.,S–13–0223.
• Citation: 2014 WY 126,335 P.3d 487
• Parties: The STATE of Wyoming, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Edwin Ike MARES, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

335 P.3d 487

2014 WY 126

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellant (Plaintiff)

v.Edwin Ike MARES, Appellee (Defendant).

No. S–13–0223.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Oct. 9, 2014.

Representing Appellant: Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Christyne Martens, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Martens.

Representing Appellee: Diane E. Courselle, Defender Aid Program, University of Wyoming College of Law; and Graham Hersh, Student Director. Argument by Mr. Hersh.

Representing Amicus Curiae Juvenile Law Center et al: Marsha L. Levick, Philadelphia, PA; and Dona Playton, Laramie, WY.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE^* , DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

Opinion

HILL, Justice.

[¶ 1] In 1995, Edwin Mares was convicted of felony murder as a juvenile and sentenced to life in prison, which sentence was by operation of law the equivalent of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In 2013, Mr. Mares filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, to correct an illegal sentence. Through that motion, Mr. Mares contended that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). This Court accepted certification of two questions from the district court. The first question concerns the test to be used in determining the retroactivity of new constitutional rules when a judgment is challenged on collateral review. The second question is whether Miller applies retroactively under our chosen test.

[¶ 2] We conclude that as a result of amendments to Wyoming's parole statutes in 2013, Mr. Mares' life sentence was changed from one of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to one of life with the possibility of parole in twenty-five years. This change occurred by operation of the amended law, and the sentence Mr. Mares challenged in his Rule 35 motion therefore no longer exists. We are aware, however, that other collateral challenges to juvenile offender sentences are pending throughout our district courts, and we therefore, in the interests of judicial economy and to avoid conflicting rulings, choose to answer the certified questions. In response to the first certified question, we hold that the proper rule for determining whether a new constitutional rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review is the test announced by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). In response to the second question, we conclude that under a Teague analysis, the rule announced in Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.

CERTIFIED QUESTIONS

[¶ 3] The district court certified the following questions to this Court:

1) What is the proper rule for Wyoming courts to use when considering whether a new constitutional rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review?

2) Should the recent decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455 [183 L.Ed.2d 407] (2012) be applied retroactively when a collateral attack on a Judgment and Sentence is made in Wyoming?

[¶ 4] The State presented the following additional question in its opening brief, raising the issue of mootness:

A case is moot when a court's determination of the issues will have no practical effect on the controversy. Mares committed first degree murder as a juvenile and was sentenced to life imprisonment, which at the time did not include the possibility for parole. Because recent amendments brought the sentencing statutes into compliance with the rule from Miller v. Alabama, he is now eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years of incarceration. When the basis for a motion to correct an illegal sentence is no longer applicable, is the controversy moot?

[¶ 5] Mr. Mares responded to the State's mootness question with the following framing of the issue:

Whether the Certified Questions the State/Appellant asked this Court to answer remain justiciable where recent amendments to the sentencing and parole states may make Mr. Mares eligible [for] parole but do not provide for individualized sentencing determinations for juveniles and thus do not fully remedy the violation of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455 [183 L.Ed.2d 407] (2012), in Wyoming's sentencing scheme?

FACTS

[¶ 6] In its certification order, the district court provided the following statement of facts related to Mr. Mares' conviction and sentence:

Defendant Mares was charged with felony murder, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit burglary. The charges stemmed from a burglary at a Casper home on November 30, 1993 during which Velma Filener, age seventy-six was killed. Mares and three other defendants were charged. Mares was charged on July 29, 1994. Mr. Mares was convicted at jury trial and sentenced on all three charges. On May 11, 1995 he was sentenced to life in prison on the charge of first-degree murder. In addition, Mr. Mares was sentenced to 20–25 years on the charge of aggravated burglary, to be served concurrently with the first-degree murder sentence, and 4–5 years on the conspiracy charge, to be served consecutively. Mares was sixteen (16) years old on the date of the crime, November 30, 1993. Mares filed a timely appeal.

The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence for aggravated burglary. Mares v. State, 939 P.2d 724 (Wy.1997). The Defendant filed a Motion for Sentence Reduction on October 2, 1995. The Motion was denied on October 9, 1995. No appeal was taken from the denial of the Motion.

[¶ 7] On June 3, 2013, Mr. Mares filed a motion to correct his sentence pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Mares argued that because he was sentenced to a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for an offense he committed as a juvenile, his sentence was illegal pursuant to Miller, 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2464, the 2012 decision in which the Supreme Court held that “mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.”

[¶ 8] On July 1, 2013, legislation enacted to amend Wyoming's sentencing scheme for juveniles convicted of first degree homicide became effective. The revised statutes provide, in part, that “a person convicted of murder in the first degree who was under the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the offense shall be punished by life imprisonment,” and that “[a] person sentenced to life imprisonment for an offense committed before the person reached the age of eighteen (18) years shall be eligible for parole after commutation of his sentence to a term of years or after having served twenty-five (25) years of incarceration.” See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6–2–101(b) ; 6–10–301(c) (LexisNexis 2013). The amended statutes also provide that the Board of Parole may grant parole to a juvenile offender sentenced to life imprisonment. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–13–402(a) (LexisNexis 2013).

[¶ 9] On July 3, 2013, the State filed a motion to certify questions of law to this Court, and on October 8, 2013, the district court entered an order granting the motion and certifying questions. On November 6, 2013, this Court issued a Notice of Agreement to Answer Certified Questions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 10] “Certified questions are questions of law that are reviewed de novo pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11.” Smith v. State, 2013 WY 122, ¶ 9, 311 P.3d 132, 135 (Wyo.2013) (citing Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 2012 WY 66, ¶ 4, 277 P.3d 81, 83 (Wyo.2012) ; Sublette Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. Nine v. McBride, 2008 WY 152, ¶ 14, 198 P.3d 1079, 1083 (Wyo.2008) ).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 11] Through his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Mares asserted that the mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole to which he was sentenced as a juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment. Because the Eighth Amendment, and how it has been interpreted to limit the sentencing of juvenile offenders, is central to the issues presented in this appeal, we begin our discussion with a summary of that Eighth Amendment framework. We will then address the present sentence being served by Mr. Mares and the certified questions.

A. Eighth Amendment Framework

[¶ 12] The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment guarantees individuals the right to not be subjected to excessive sanctions or to punishments that are disproportionate to the crime committed. Miller, 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2463 ; Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 18, 294 P.3d 36, 41 (Wyo.2013) (Bear Cloud II ). The United States Supreme Court has in recent years decided a line of cases setting Eighth Amendment limitations on the sentencing of juvenile offenders, including, most recently, its 2012 decision in Miller. Because Miller addressed the constitutional parameters of imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on a juvenile offender convicted of homicide, that decision is of particular significance in addressing the issues presented by this appeal. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. We nonetheless start our discussion with the two decisions that preceded Miller because those decisions provided the backdrop for the Supreme Court's holding Miller.

[¶ 13] In 2005, the Court decided Roper v. Simmons, which held that offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed could not be sentenced to the death penalty. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1200, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). In 2010, the Court decided Graham v. Florida, which held that a juvenile offender who committed a non-homicide offense could not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2030, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). In this Court's decision in Bear Cloud II, the first decision in which this Court was...