State v. Mark T.

• Decision Date: 07 June 2021
• Docket Number: SC 20242
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. MARK T.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

339 Conn. 225

260 A.3d 402

STATE of Connecticut

v.MARK T.^*

SC 20242

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 21, 2020

Officially released June 7, 2021^**

Robert L. O'Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was William A. Adsit, North Haven, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Brett R. Aiello, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom were Sarah E. Steere, senior assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Michael L. Regan, former state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.^***

McDONALD, J.

This case requires us to evaluate several evidentiary rulings by the trial court, all of which excluded testimony pertaining to a criminal defendant's justification defense. The defendant, Mark T., who was self-represented at trial, claims that these evidentiary rulings violated his constitutional right to present a defense under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.¹ The state contends that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to exclude the testimony and disputes the importance of the testimony to the defendant's defense. Regarding the first evidentiary issue, we agree with the state that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding certain testimony during the defendant's cross-examination of the state's key eyewitness. However, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the defendant's direct examination of himself, during which he attempted to testify about information crucial to his justification defense. We also conclude that the trial court's error was harmful.

The Appellate Court's decision sets forth the facts and procedural history; State v. Mark T ., 186 Conn. App. 285, 287–90, 199 A.3d 35 (2018) ; which we summarize in relevant part and supplement with additional facts that the jury reasonably could have found. In September, 2015, the defendant maintained custody of his biological daughter, A, who was thirteen years old at the time, for about three weeks. He scheduled an appointment for her to receive counseling at a local mental health facility because he was experiencing significant difficulty managing her aggressive behavior. On the day of the appointment, the defendant arrived at the main office of A's school to pick her up. A's special education teacher, Monika Wilkos, escorted A to her locker to gather her belongings. While leaving the classroom and gathering her belongings, A repeatedly protested and stated that she did not want to go with the defendant.

The defendant then approached A and Wilkos while they were on their way to the main office, and he calmly attempted to persuade A to go with him to the appointment. When those efforts proved unsuccessful, the defendant attempted to pick her up and carry her. A resisted, and a "tussle" ensued. Id. at 288, 199 A.3d 35. After A fell to the ground, the defendant dragged her by her ankle down the hallway and through the main office. She continued to resist and protest. School personnel witnessing the incident called the police, attempted to assist A, and enacted a protocol to keep other students in their classrooms. When the police arrived, the defendant released A. The next day, the school psychologist and nurse spoke to A about the incident. They noticed bruising on her body and subsequently reported the incident to the Department of Children and Families.

Thereafter, the defendant was charged with one count each of breach of the peace in the second degree and risk of injury to a child. After being thoroughly canvassed by the trial court, the defendant chose to represent himself at trial, and the court appointed standby counsel in accordance with Practice Book § 44-4. Before trial, the state filed two motions in limine related to the minor child's privacy. The first motion sought to preclude the defendant from calling A as a witness, which the guardian ad litem supported on the basis that testifying would not be in A's best interest. The court declined to rule on the motion when it was filed, and the motion became moot when the state changed its position and called A to testify in its casein-chief. The state's second motion requested that the court seal all references to information that would identify the minor child pursuant to General Statutes § 54-86e. The defendant did not oppose this motion, and the court granted it. For the remainder of the proceedings, the court struck from the record any statements identifying A by her full name and any references to the name of the mental health facility at which A was scheduled for treatment on the day of the incident.

At trial, the defendant raised the defense of parental justification under General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-18 (1) (now § 53a-18 (a) (1) ).² In support of this defense, the defendant attempted to elicit testimony from Wilkos about A's history of aggressive behavior at school. He also attempted to testify directly about A's aggressive behavior at home, his difficulty managing that behavior, and his efforts to obtain mental health treatment for her leading up to the incident. The prosecutor, however, repeatedly objected to this line of questioning, and the court sustained many of the objections. The jury ultimately found the defendant guilty of risk of injury to a child but not guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of four years imprisonment, execution suspended, with three years of probation.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, claiming, among other things, that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense. Specifically, the defendant challenged (1) the trial court's evidentiary ruling limiting his cross-examination of Wilkos, and (2) the series of evidentiary rulings limiting his direct examination of himself. He asserted that the precluded testimony was admissible and crucial to his parental justification defense. The Appellate Court subsequently affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 299, 199 A.3d 35. Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion to limit the defendant's cross-examination of Wilkos because his question about A's history of aggressive behavior was outside the scope of the prosecutor's prior examination. Id. at 295, 199 A.3d 35. The Appellate Court also concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion to limit the defendant's direct examination of himself because the precluded testimony was not relevant and included information that was protected by the court's prior ruling on the state's second motion in limine related to A's privacy. Id. at 298–99, 199 A.3d 35.

Thereafter, the defendant filed a petition for certification to appeal, which we granted, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly reject the defendant's claim that he is entitled to a new trial due to the trial court's rulings, in violation of his constitutional right to present the defense of parental justification, precluding certain testimony by the self-represented defendant and a key state's witness pertaining to that defense?" State v. Mark T. , 330 Conn. 962, 199 A.3d 561 (2019). Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court's evidentiary rulings prevented him from exploring relevant information about his daughter's history of aggressive behavior, the defendant's difficulty managing that behavior, and the urgency of her mental health appointment on the day of the incident. This information, the defendant asserts, was "critical to his [parental justification] defense." The state contends that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion with regard to both challenged evidentiary rulings. Alternatively, the state asserts that any evidentiary error was harmless because, to the extent that A's history of aggressive behavior was relevant to the defendant's parental justification defense, there was sufficient evidence in the record to establish such history.

We begin with the legal principles governing the defendant's appeal. "A [criminal] defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense, but he is [nonetheless] bound by the rules of evidence in presenting a defense. ... Although exclusionary rules of evidence cannot be applied mechanistically to deprive a defendant of his rights, the constitution does not require that a defendant be permitted to present every piece of evidence he wishes. ... Accordingly, [i]f the proffered evidence is not relevant [or is otherwise inadmissible], the defendant's right to [present a defense] is not affected, and the evidence was properly excluded." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bennett , 324 Conn. 744, 760, 155 A.3d 188 (2017) ; see, e.g., State v. Tutson , 278 Conn. 715, 746–51, 899 A.2d 598 (2006) (no violation of constitutional right to present defense when trial court properly excluded evidence on hearsay grounds). Thus, "the question of the admissibility of the proffered evidence is one of evidentiary, but not constitutional, dimension." State v. Shabazz , 246 Conn. 746, 753 n.4, 719 A.2d 440 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1179, 119 S. Ct. 1116, 143 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1999).

"It is axiomatic that [t]he trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to great deference. ... In this regard, the trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, including issues of relevance and the scope of cross-examination. ... Accordingly, [t]he trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court's discretion. ... In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption...