State v. Marsh
| Decision Date | 28 June 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 43459,43459 |
| Citation | 96 So.2d 643,233 La. 388 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Willie D. MARSH, Alvin R. Clinton, Herbert K. Morgan, Frank V. Gann, Myron G. Hinds, Alfred Black, and David H. Puckett. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Leon A. Picou, Jr., St. Francisville, for defendants-appellants.
Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Richard Kilbourne, Dist. Atty., Clinton, for appellee.
The defendants-appellants1 herein were jointly charged in a bill of information with having committed the offense of simple escape as defined by LSA-R.S. 14:110 in that they intentionally departed from the lawful custody of an official of the Louisiana State Penitentiary and from a place where they were lawfully detained by an official of the Louisiana State Penitentiary. They were tried by a twelve-man jury, and each of them was found guilty of attempted simple escape and sentenced to imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for a period of two and one-half years, said sentence to run consecutively with any sentence being served by him.
During the course of the trial no bills of exception were reserved save the one reserved to the ruling by the trial judge on a motion in arrest of judgment wherein it is contended that the record contains manifest error in that Act 122 of 1954 (LSA-R.S. 14:110), the statute under which the defendants were prosecuted, is unconstitutional, and that, therefore, no judgment against them can be lawfully rendered, being violative of Art. 1, Sec. 10, Const.La.1921, LSA, and the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Defendants herein were confined in the Louisiana State Penitentiary and escaped from their dormitories sometime during the nighttime and were apprehended the following morning hiding in a pile of sand in the prison compound. They never left the penitentiary grounds.
The defendants contend that under Act 122 of 1954 it is impossible for persons having been sentenced to the penitentiary to commit the crime of simple escape, but that said crime can be committed only in two ways, i.e.: (1) from an official of the penitentiary, and (2) from a place where the offender is lawfully detained by an official of the penitentiary. They contend that the penalty cause provided in this statute provides a penalty only for escape from the lawful custody of an official of the penitentiary, but does not provide a penalty for escape from a place where the offender is lawfully detained by an official of the penitentiary.
Defendants further contend that the statute fails to define the terminology 'lawful custody' or 'place where lawfully detained.'
In 1942, the Legislature adopted Act 43, defining the crime of simple escape and providing penalties therefor, as follows:
'Simple escape is the intentional departure of a person, under circumstances wherein human life is not endangered from lawful custody of any officer or from any place where he is lawfully detained by any officer.
'Whoever commits the crime of simple escape shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both; provided that such imprisonment shall not run concurrently with any other sentence.'
In 1954 the Legislature, by Act 122 (LSA-R.S. 14:110), amended and reenacted the prior simple escape statute so as to provide as follows:
'Simple escape is the intentional departure of a person, under circumstances wherein human life is not endangered, from lawful custody of any officer or official of the Louisiana State Penitentiary or from any place where he is lawfully detained by any officer or official of the Louisiana State Penitentiary.
'Whoever commits the crime of simple escape other than from the lawful custody of an official of penitentiary and who has not been sentenced to the penitentiary shall be imprisoned for not more than one year, provided that such imprisonment shall not run concurrently with any other sentence.
In the case of State ex rel. Priest v. Coverdale, 204 La. 448, 15 So.2d 849, we said that the universal and most effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when its expressions are dubious, is by considering the reason and the spirit of it, or the cause which induced the Legislature to enact it.
When the meaning of a statute appears doubtful it is well recognized that we should seek the discovery of the legislative intent. However, when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite...
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...proposed.' State v. Roberson, 225 La. 74, 72 So.2d 265. Cf. State ex rel. Priest v. Coverdale, 204 La. 448, 15 So.2d 849; State v. Marsh, 233 La. 388, 96 So.2d 643; State v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company, 227 La. 179, 78 So.2d In Landry v. Klopman, 13 La.Ann. 345, Chief Justice Merrick sta......
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...the meaning of a statute appears doubtful it is well settled that we should seek the discovery of the legislative intent." State v. Marsh, 96 So.2d 643 (La.1957). In the present case, neither the words of the statute nor the related articles reveal the meaning of the provision. See, supra n......
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