State v. Martin
| Decision Date | 18 January 1917 |
| Docket Number | 13544. |
| Citation | 162 P. 356,94 Wash. 313 |
| Parties | STATE v. MARTIN. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Lincoln County; Joseph Sessions, Judge.
L. J Martin was convicted of larceny by receiving stolen property. From an order granting his motion in arrest of judgment, the State appeals. Order reversed, and cause remanded, with directions to pronounce sentence.
J. D. McCallum, of Davenport, for the State.
Wilson & McDermont and R. M. Dye, all of Davenport, for respondent.
Respondent was accused and upon trial found guilty of the crime of larceny by receiving stolen property. From an order granting a motion in arrest of judgment, the state appeals.
Respondent moves to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that the state has no right of appeal from an order granting a motion in arrest. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1716, subd. 7, expressly confers upon the state the right to appeal from such order. The motion to dismiss will be denied.
It is contended that the information is fatally defective in that it fails to allege the name of the owner of the stolen property. This presents the only question for consideration. The prosecution is based upon section 2601, Rem. & Bal. Code the applicable portions of which read as follows:
The essential elements of the crime, therefore, are: (1) The property must have been appropriated in such manner as to constitute larceny; (2) the accused must have known that the property had been so appropriated; (3) the property must have been received by him with the felonious intent to deprive or defraud the owner thereof. The charging part of the information follows:
'That said L. J. Martin on the 4th day of November, 1914, at the county of Lincoln, state of Washington, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously receive from Jimmie Nee and William Thornburg personal property, to wit, seven cows and three calves, knowing said personal property to have been stolen with intent to deprive the owner thereof of his property, said cows and calves, the said property being then and there of the value of $350, coin of the United States of America.'
It will be seen that it is inferentially, though sufficiently alleged that the property was stolen ( State v Druxinman, 34 Wash. 257, 75 P. 814), that the accused knew it was stolen, and that he received it with the intent to deprive the owner thereof. Thus the elements of the crime seem to be charged. In stating the acts constituting the particular offense for the purpose of identifying the transaction relied upon for conviction, the information alleges the names of the persons from whom the property was received, describes the property as being seven cows and three calves, and contains appropriate allegations of time and place. Under sections 2055 and 2066 of the Code, this court has consistently held that an information which charges the crime substantially in the language of the statute defining it, and states the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language so that a person of common understanding may know what is intended, is sufficient. That many allegations which were considered to be indispensable in charging crimes at common law are not necessary under this rule is obvious. Especially is this true with respect to descriptive allegations merely. Indeed, the very purpose of the sections of the Code referred to was to do away with many of the common-law technicalities, and it must not be overlooked that the question presented in this case is whether the offense charged was sufficiently described. How could respondent fail to know either the crime with which he was charged or the particular offense or transaction upon which the state relied for conviction. While the information is inartificially drawn and is not to be approved as a model, when subjected to the test uniformly applied in this state it seems to be sufficient. The cases holding that it is necessary to allege ownership in charging the crime of receiving stolen property, and there are many such cases, are based not upon the idea that ownership is an essential element of the crime, but that an allegation of ownership is necessary as a matter of description; that the transaction is identified not only by a description of the property, but also by the ownership; that identity of the property embraces the element of ownership as a necessary part of the description. The fundamental...
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State v. McReynolds, 20863-0-III, 20887-7-III, 21222-0-III, 21240-8-III.
...v. Easton, 69 Wash.2d 965, 967-68, 422 P.2d 7 (1966); State v. Kruger, 145 Wash. 654, 655, 261 P. 383 (1927). In State v. Martin, 94 Wash. 313, 317-18, 162 P. 356 (1917), the Supreme Court applied the rule to the crime of receiving stolen property. The rule thus also applies to the modern c......
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State v. Sprague
..., 46 Wash. 522, 525, 90 P. 645 (1907). The corpus delicti of larceny by possession is property that has been stolen. State v. Martin , 94 Wash. 313, 315, 162 P. 356 (1917) ; State v. DePriest , 16 Wash. App. 824, 825, 560 P.2d 1152 (1977).¶ 80 Although our courts have stated that the corpus......
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State v. Greathouse
...other descriptive allegations or by resorting to oral testimony." Easton, 69 Wash.2d at 968-69, 422 P.2d 7, quoting State v, Martin, 94 Wash. 313, 316, 162 P. 356 (1917). Nothing in Lee contradicts the reasoning of the Easton court. And nothing in Easton contradicts the reasoning of the cou......
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State v. Brady
...presupposes, but does not include, larceny. Therefore the elements of larceny are not elements of the crime of receiving.' State v. Martin, 94 Wash. 313, 162 P. 356. And in Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 10th Edition, Volume 1, section 325b, page 643, the essential elements of the crime of re......