State v. Martin
| Decision Date | 17 October 1924 |
| Docket Number | 36092 |
| Citation | 200 N.W. 213,199 Iowa 643 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. CARL MARTIN et al., Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 20, 1925.
Appeal from Van Buren District Court.--D. M. ANDERSON, Judge.
THIS is a prosecution for conspiracy to commit a felony, viz., the crime of adultery. Upon pleas of not guilty, the defendants were jointly tried, and a verdict of guilty returned and judgment rendered thereon. The defendants have appealed.
Affirmed.
H. B Sloan and J. C. Calhoun, for appellants.
Ben J Gibson, Attorney-general, Macwell A. O'Brien and S. S. Faville, Assistant Attorney-generals, and Emily L. New-bold, County Attorney, for appellee.
I.
The prosecutrix is Ada Winters, an unmarried woman. The defendant Martin was a married man at the time of the acts complained of. The defendant Fry was not married. The evidence introduced by the State was sufficient to establish the conspiracy, unless it be true, as contended by the defendants, that it was legally impossible for these defendants to commit the crime charged, because the defendant Fry was unmarried. The prosecution is had under Section 5059, Code of 1897. Under this statute, we have held that two or more persons may be found guilty of conspiracy to commit adultery (State v. Clemenson, 123 Iowa 524, 99 N.W. 139); likewise, a conspiracy to commit lewdness (State v. Mitchell, 149 Iowa 362, 128 N.W. 378). It is true that Fry, being an unmarried man, could not be guilty of adultery with an unmarried woman. It does not follow that he could not be guilty of conspiracy to have and to aid his codefendant to commit such crime. If he entered into any common design with Martin whereby Martin should commit such crime, we see no reason for saying that one is not as guilty of conspiracy as the other, even though only one be guilty of the overt act charged as the purpose of the conspiracy. Though the evidence in this case discloses that both of these defendants were guilty of actual illicit relations with the prosecutrix, yet such acts of themselves were not essential as proof of the conspiracy, even though they constituted evidence tending to prove the conspiracy. The conspiracy as such was complete even before the actual commission of the overt act. We think, therefore, that the point here urged by appellants is not well taken.
II. Evidence was introduced by the State of conversations and admissions made by each of the defendants separately and in the absence of the other. The admissions thus offered in evidence were, in substance, admissions of guilt, and the admissions of each were substantially alike. Each of them objected to receiving in evidence the admissions of the other. Each of them objected on the ground that neither was bound by the admissions of the other. In State v. Phillips, 118 Iowa 660, 92 N.W. 876, we held such evidence to be clearly admissible in a case where two or more defendants were tried jointly on a charge of murder. We held such evidence to be admissible, under proper instructions. By this qualification, it was meant that the court should limit the application of the evidence strictly to the party who made such admission. This was done in the present case. Does the fact that the charge in this case is a conspiracy, which crime cannot be committed at all except by two or more persons, prevent the application of the rule pronounced in the Phillips case? It is argued by appellants that one defendant could not be found guilty without finding the other guilty also, and that the acquittal of one would necessarily acquit the other. That the receiving of evidence, though admissible against one defendant as tending to show the guilt of such defendant, might operate in the minds of the jury against the other defendant, is doubtless true. It remains the duty of the jury, nevertheless, to follow the instructions of the court, and to refuse to give any weight to such evidence as against the other defendant. Even though one defendant should formally confess his guilt of the conspiracy, it would not sustain a verdict of guilty, without proper proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the other. If, in such a case, one defendant should confess, and the other should defend, the burden upon the State is rendered no less, as against the contesting defendant. The instructions of the trial court on this question appear to have been guarded, and the jury was instructed that only his own admissions, if any, subsequent to the event could be considered against either defendant. If the jury had found that there was not sufficient evidence as against one defendant, though it was sufficient as against the other, this would have required a verdict of not guilty as to both. This is the distinction between the trial of a conspiracy case and the trial jointly of two defendants charged jointly with murder. In the latter case, one could be guilty, and the other not guilty: whereas, in the case of a conspiracy, if one were not guilty, both must be deemed so. The real complaint of the defendants is that the mind of the ordinary juryman is not capable of preserving this distinction, and that the admissions of one defendant might convince them of the guilt of the other.
Inasmuch as the burden is upon the State to prove the guilt of each, we see no reason for withholding from the State the benefit of the ordinary rules of evidence, as applied to each one.
It is argued by the defendants that, if three or more defendants were on trial for an alleged conspiracy, the rule in question could be more appropriately applied; because in such a case, any two of the defendants might be guilty, even though the third one were not. But even this would not lessen the supposed prejudice that two defendants might suffer from the effect of admissions made by the third defendant. This is one of the unavoidable incidents of a joint trial of more than one defendant. But though the burden...
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