State v. Martin

Citation73 A. 548,77 N.J.L. 652
PartiesSTATE v. MARTIN.
Decision Date14 June 1909
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

Error to Supreme Court.

William R. Martin was convicted of keeping a disorderly house, and he brought error to the Supreme Court, The judgment was affirmed (69 Atl. 1091), and he again brings error. Affirmed.

Gilbert Collins, for plaintiff in error. William J. Crossley, Prosecutor of the Pleas, and William R. Piper, Asst. Prosecutor, for the State.

GUMMERE, C. J. This writ of error brings up for review a judgment of the Supreme Court affirming the conviction of the defendant of the crime of keeping a disorderly house. The gravamen of the offense charged against the defendant is the habitual taking of usurious interest for loans made by him at the office of the Capitol Loan Company in the city of Trenton. Both in the trial court and in the Supreme Court it was contended on his behalf that the habitual taking of usury does not make the place where such practice is carried on a disorderly house. The ruling upon this point was adverse to the defendant in both courts, the precise question having been previously so determined by the Supreme Court in the case of State v. Diamant, 73 N. J. Law, 131, 62 Atl. 286, and the first assignment of error argued before us challenges the soundness of that ruling.

What constitutes a disorderly house has been frequently declared by the courts of this state. In the case of State v. Williams, 30 N. J. Law, 102, it was defined by Whelpley, C. J., speaking for the Supreme Court, as "Any place of public resort, whether an inn, a dwelling house, a store house, or any other building or garden in which illegal practices are habitually carried on." In State v. Hall 32 N. J. Law, 158, Beasley, C. J., delivering the opinion of the same court, says: "In a legal point of view a house may be disorderly in two ways, viz., first, from the end or purpose to which it is appropriated; and, second, from the mode in which it is kept. The end or purpose for which the house is designed will render the keeping of such house illegal, it it be such as, of necessity, contravenes the provisions of any public statute." In the case of McClean v. State, 49 N. J. Law, 471, 9 Atl. 681, this court adopted the definition of a disorderly house given in State v. Williams, supra, and declared that "Any place of public resort in which illegal practices are habitually carried on" is a disorderly house. This definition was again approved by this court in Haring v. State, 53 N. J. Law, 664, 23 Atl. 581. In the earlier case of Meyer v. State, 42 N. J. Law, 157, we declared that "A person who habitually keeps his house open * * * for a purpose which the statute interdicts" is guilty of the offense of keeping a disorderly house.

In view of this line of decisions it must be accepted as settled that any place in which illegal practices are habitually carried on is a disorderly house. The cases of State v. Hall and Meyer v. State would seem to have determined that practices which are prohibited by statute are illegal practices within the meaning of this definition. Counsel for the defendant now contends that the declaration of the two cases last referred to is broader than the decision of those cases required, and that it is only in cases where the habitual violation of a statute involves criminality, or moral turpitude, that a person is guilty of illegal practices, within the meaning of that phrase as used in the case of State v. Williams, and the other cases following it. He further contends that the taking of usury is not made unlawful by the statute of this state.

This latter contention may properly be considered first, for, if it is sound, it is dispositive of the case now before us. The title of our statute is "An act against usury." 3 Gen. St. 1895, p. 3703. The provision of its first section is "that no person or corporation shall, upon contract, take directly or indirectly, for loan of any money, wares, merchandise, goods and chattels, above the value of six dollars for the forbearance of one hundred dollars for a year, and after that rate for a greater or less sum or for longer or shorter time." The object disclosed in the title of the act is the prevention of usury; the method by which the Legislature provides for the carrying of that object into effect is by enacting an express prohibition against taking it. Counsel argues that a violation of this mandate of the statute by a person loaning money does not constitute an unlawful act, first, for the reason that the statute imposes no penalty upon him for so doing, and, second, because there is nothing in the act which prohibits the borrower from paying usury.

The statement that the statute does not impose any penalty upon a person who takes usury is not accurate; for the second section of the act deprives him of the power to enforce the payment of any interest on his loan, and entitles the borrower to have the amount of the usury deducted from the principal of the loan in case usury has been paid. In this respect our usury act is quite similar to our act to prevent gaming (2 Gen. St. 1895, p. 1000), the penalty imposed by which upon the successful bettor is the return of the stake if it has been paid to him. Each statute prevents the person who is benefited by the violation of its provision from enjoying that benefit, and nothing more. A violation of the act to prevent gaming has been declared by this court, in Haring v. State, supra, to be illegal, and a place where such violations are habitually indulged in to be a disorderly house. We conclude, therefore, that the fact that the statute imposes no penalty, except the deprivation of the money which the statute prohibits the lender from taking, affords no ground for holding that the taking of usury is not unlawful.

Nor do we think the suggestion sound that the taking of usury is not unlawful because the statute does not prohibit the borrower from paying it. If it is, then the sale...

To continue reading

Request your trial
23 cases
  • Two Guys From Harrison, Inc. v. Furman
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • April 4, 1960
    ...has been applied in this State quite broadly to habitual violations of non-penal prohibitory statutes. See State v. Martin, 77 N.J.L. 652, 73 A. 548, 24 L.R.A.,N.S., 507 (E. & A.1909); Haring v. State, 51 N.J.L. 386, 17 A. 1079 (Sup.Ct.1889), affirmed 53 N.J.L. 664, 23 A. 581 (E. & A.1891);......
  • State ex rel. Leake v. Harris, 32730.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • February 3, 1934
    ...R.S. 1929; Art. 1, Sec. 1, subsections 29, 44, 61, Charter of Kansas City; State ex rel. Crow v. County, 207 Mo. 439; State v. Martin, 77 N.J.L. 652, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 507. (c) Equity has power to enjoin a public nuisance even though the act of nuisance is a crime. State ex rel. Crow v. Cant......
  • Kansas City v. Markham, 33030.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • November 12, 1936
    ...sec. 130, p. 700, secs. 150, 151, 152, p. 707, sec. 183, p. 718, sec. 241; State ex rel. Crow v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439; State v. Martin, 77 N.J.L. 652, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 507; State ex rel. v. Salley, 215 S.W. 243; State ex rel. v. Iden, 221 S.W. 872; State ex rel. v. Woolfolk, 269 Mo. 389. (e) ......
  • Kansas City v. Markham
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • November 12, 1936
    ...... Constitution and under the Fourteenth Amendment of the. Federal Constitution. State ex rel. Leake v. Harris, 334. Mo. 713, 67 S.W.2d 981; Mo. Const., Secs. 11, 23, Art. II;. U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amend.; State v. Young, 119. Mo. ...697, sec. 130, p. 700, secs. 150, 151, 152, p. 707, sec. 183, p. 718,. sec. 241; State ex rel. Crow v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439;. State v. Martin, 77 N. J. L. 652, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 507; State ex rel. v. Salley, 215 S.W. 243;. State ex rel. v. Iden, 221 S.W. 872; State ex. rel. v. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT