State v. Martin
Citation | 827 A.2d 1 |
Decision Date | 08 July 2003 |
Docket Number | (AC 22978). |
Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT, v. TOMMIE L. MARTIN. |
The defendant, Tommie L. Martin, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a) (2), robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-133 and 53a-134 (a) (2), and felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c. On appeal, the defendant claims, among other things, that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of the fact that Carlton Martin, the defendant's alleged coconspirator and accomplice, had been convicted of the crimes of felony murder, robbery in the first degree and five counts of tampering with a witness.
1 Because we agree that the court improperly took judicial notice of the conviction of the defendant's alleged coconspirator and accomplice, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.2
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's appeal.3 In connection with the death of Robert Gallo during an alleged armed robbery at Gallo's liquor store in Danbury on January 18, 1999, the defendant pleaded not guilty to a long form information charging him with conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a) (2), robbery in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-133 and 53a-134 (a) (2), and felony murder in violation of § 53a-54c.4 In each count of the long form information, the state alleged that the defendant and his cousin, Carlton Martin, were coconspirators or accomplices.5 On December 14, 2000, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all three counts, and on February 16, 2001, the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of ninety years imprisonment.6 This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant claims that the court, during its final instructions to the jury, improperly took judicial notice of the fact that Carlton Martin had been convicted of the crimes of felony murder, robbery in the first degree and five counts of tampering with a witness. The defendant argues that contrary to the court's determination, statements made by defense counsel during closing argument to the jury did not require the court to inform the jury that Carlton Martin had been convicted of crimes arising out of the same incident that prompted the defendant's trial. The defendant contends that the value of the court's instruction informing the jury of the conviction was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial under the federal constitution.7 We agree.
The following additional facts are necessary for our resolution of the defendant's claim. At the defendant's trial, the state called Carlton Martin as a witness after he had been convicted in a separate trial.8 The court determined that because Carlton Martin had testified at his criminal trial, he could no longer invoke his privilege against self-incrimination at the defendant's trial.9 Nonetheless, when Carlton Martin was called to testify before the jury at the defendant's trial, he refused to answer any questions that could have placed the defendant in his company on January 18, 1999, or connected the defendant to the alleged murder weapon.10 During the evidentiary phase of the defendant's trial, the jury was not informed of Carlton Martin's conviction or the disposition of any charges brought against him.
During closing argument, defense counsel argued that the state had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant and Carlton Martin committed the robbery and murder. Specifically, defense counsel emphasized the lack of blood evidence linking the defendant or Carlton Martin to the crime and stated: (Emphasis added.)
In light of defense counsel's statement that the defendant and Carlton Martin were "not guilty," the state, before presenting its rebuttal argument to the jury, asked the court to take judicial notice of the fact that Carlton Martin had been convicted of robbery in the first degree, felony murder and five counts of tampering with a witness. Defense counsel objected, arguing that it would be "incredibly prejudicial to the defendant" to advise the jury that Carlton Martin already had been found guilty of the charges. Defense counsel maintained:
The court, in overruling the objection, concluded: 11
Thereafter, following the state's closing rebuttal argument,12 the court gave its final instructions to the jury. In instructing the jury, the court stated:
We begin by setting forth certain legal principles that guide us in our review. (Citations omitted.) State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 368-69, 216 A.2d 625 (1966); see also De Luca v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 94 Conn. 7, 10, 107 A. 611 (1919) ().
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) De Luca v. Board of Park Comm'rs, supra, 94 Conn. 10; see also Conn. Code Evid. § 2-1 (b); C. Tait, Connecticut Evidence (3d Ed. 2001) § 2.2, p. 108. "Whether to take judicial notice of a fact is a function of the exercise of judicial discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pie Plate, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 35 Conn. App. 305, 316, 645 A.2d 1044, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 935, 650 A.2d 172 (1994).
Thus, (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Drabik v. East Lyme, 234 Conn. 390, 398-99, 662 A.2d 118 (1995).
As previously set forth, the court determined that defense counsel's statement that "they're not guilty," exceeded the appropriate scope of final argument because, in essence, the statement suggested an inference from facts not in evidence, such as the verdict in Carlton Martin's trial, and presented a matter that the jury had no right to consider.
13 Thus, it was within the court's discretion to limit the scope of final argument to prevent the jury from being influenced by improper matter that might prejudice its deliberations. We generally accord...
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