State v. Martin
Decision Date | 23 June 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 22631.,22631. |
Citation | 2004 SD 82,683 N.W.2d 399 |
Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Kenneth L. MARTIN, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Larry Long, Attorney General, Jeffery J. Tronvold, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
Michael Stonefield, Office of the Public Defender for Pennington County, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellant.
[¶ 1.] On August 4, 2001, Kenneth Martin decided he was going to kill someone that night. He smoked some marijuana and built a silencer for his gun. At approximately 10:30 p.m., Martin walked across the street to the home of Robert Ludeman, a Rapid City police officer, and his fiancee LeAnn Barta. When Ludeman came to the door, Martin shot him twice in the chest and once in the abdomen. Ludeman also suffered blunt force trauma to his head and right hand. He died on his living room floor. Martin fled the scene when he saw Barta coming toward the front door from the living room.
[¶ 2.] The next day, believing that Barta had seen him, Martin called 911 and reported that he was the shooter. Martin was arrested and charged with alternative counts of first and second degree murder. He pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
[¶ 3.] Psychiatrist Dr. Manlove testified at trial that Martin suffered from a delusional disorder at the time he shot Ludeman. According to Dr. Manlove, Martin believed that his faith in God gave him the power to raise people from the dead. He developed a theory that if he killed a person and let them experience hell and then raised them from the dead, the person would change their behavior and be "saved." Martin told Dr. Franks, the expert for the State, that he picked Ludeman at random. After shooting Ludeman, Martin did not attempt to raise him from the dead. Dr. Manlove testified that although Martin knew killing Ludeman was illegal, in the context of his delusion, Martin believed the killing was not wrongful. Dr. Franks testified that Martin suffered from a significant personality disorder, but that he knew the murder was wrongful and he was not insane. The jury convicted Martin of first degree murder.
[¶ 4.] On appeal, Martin raises several challenges to his conviction, all of which are centered around jury selection and jury instructions.
[¶ 5.] During jury voir dire, the State exercised thirteen consecutive peremptory strikes against females. Martin objected to the State's thirteenth and fourteenth strikes claiming that they violated his equal protection rights. The trial court accepted the State's justification for the challenged strikes and denied Martin's challenge.
[¶ 6.] Martin requested three jury instructions. The first two instructions distinguished the terms "wrongfulness" and "illegality" and would have informed the jury that it could find Martin legally insane if he proved in part that he "harbored a sincere belief that society would approve of his conduct if it shared his understanding of the circumstances underlying his actions." The third instruction would have informed the jury that if Martin was found not guilty by reason of insanity, he would be committed to the human services center until he could prove to a court by clear and convincing evidence that his release "would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person." Martin refers to this instruction as the "legal consequences" instruction. The trial court denied the instructions.
[¶ 7.] During closing arguments, Martin renewed his request for the legal consequences instruction, asserting that it was necessitated by the prosecutor's statements during jury voir dire and closing arguments. Martin argues that the State insinuated to the jury that by finding Martin not guilty by reason of insanity, the jury would be relieving him of any consequences for the killing. Among the prosecutor's statements were the assertions that, "any other verdict but guilty in the first degree, [Martin] won't be held accountable," and "to think about not holding this man accountable, that's reprehensible." The court sustained Martin's objections to these and other statements, but denied the instruction and Martin's motion for a mistrial.
[¶ 8.] The jury found Martin guilty of first degree murder, and Martin appeals raising four issues:
[¶ 9.] 1. Whether the State's peremptory strikes violated Martin's right of equal protection.
[¶ 10.] Martin objected to the State's peremptory strikes of jurors 13 and 14. At the time of Martin's objection, the State had exercised fourteen peremptory strikes, thirteen of which were against women. Martin argued that the State violated his right of equal protection by removing jurors from the panel based solely on gender.
[¶ 11.] In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1430, 128 L.Ed.2d 89, 107 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that gender discrimination in jury selection violates the Equal Protection Clause. When a defendant alleges gender discrimination in jury selection, he or she must make a prima-facie showing of intentional discrimination. Honomichl v. Leapley, 498 N.W.2d 636, 639 (S.D.1993) (citations omitted). If the defendant establishes a prima facie case, it creates a rebuttable presumption of purposeful discrimination. Id. The State can rebut the presumption by "articulating a clear and reasonably specific [gender] neutral explanation for using its peremptory challenge." Id. The explanation "need not rise to the level of a `for cause' challenge; rather it merely must be based on a juror characteristic other than gender, and the proffered explanation must not be pretextual." State v. Webster, 2001 SD 141, ¶ 18, 637 N.W.2d 392, 397 ( ).
[¶ 12.] The jury selection process began with a pre-trial juror questionnaire that addressed juror's opinions about issues relevant to the case. Based on those questionnaires, the parties struck many jurors for cause before they began voir dire. During voir dire, each party was permitted 22 peremptory challenges, all of which had to be exercised.1
[¶ 13.] Two juries were empanelled to try Martin. The first jury selected was in June, 2002, but due to a medical emergency, a mistrial was declared after the jury was sworn. In the first panel, the State exercised nineteen of its twenty-two peremptory challenges against women. Although there is nothing in the record to indicate a Batson challenge to the first jury selection, Defendant couples the first selection with the thirteen consecutive strikes against females in the second selection to make his prima facie case. The trial court found that under Batson and J.E.B. Martin made a prima facie showing of discrimination and the State does not appear to dispute this finding. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88 (1986); J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89. We accept the finding because it is not clearly erroneous.
[¶ 14.] The trial court required the State to justify the strikes, and the State responded:
The State's reasons for a peremptory strike need not be Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 839 (1995) (additional citation omitted). In his brief, Martin concedes that there is at least one facially non-discriminatory reason for the strike of Juror 14; her answer to the questionnaire regarding insanity. We agree that this is a facially non-discriminatory justification. The trial court also agreed that the State had presented non-discriminatory justifications for the strike. That finding of fact is entitled to deference from this Court, and we will not overturn it absent a determination that the finding was clearly erroneous. Martin's concession, coupled with the deference given to the trial court's fact findings lead to the conclusion that the State proffered a non-discriminatory justification for its strike. Therefore, the burden shifted back to Martin to prove that the justifications were a pretext for gender discrimination. In attempting to meet that burden, Martin's counsel responded:
I don't think [her] responses on the questionnaire are considerably different than the responses of the 120 other people that were qualified to come in for jury service. The fact that she's 71 years old doesn't disqualify her. Many of the men are...
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