State v. Martin, No. 96,126.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Kansas
Writing for the CourtJohnson
Citation179 P.3d 457
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Paul B. MARTIN, Appellant.
Decision Date28 March 2008
Docket NumberNo. 96,126.
179 P.3d 457
STATE of Kansas, Appellee,
v.
Paul B. MARTIN, Appellant.
No. 96,126.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
March 28, 2008.

[179 P.3d 458]

Juanita M. Carlson, of Carlson Law Office, P.A., of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Brenda J. Clary, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Deborah L. Moody, assistant district attorney, Charles Branson, district attorney, and Phill D. Kline, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by JOHNSON, J.:


In his prosecution for possession of marijuana, Paul B. Martin unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence retrieved from his pocket. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court and found that the evidence should have been suppressed. State v. Martin, No. 96,126, 2007 WL 519080, unpublished opinion filed February 16, 2007.

The State of Kansas seeks review, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider how the discovery of Martin's outstanding arrest warrant should affect the lawfulness of the search and that the Court of Appeals erroneously based its decision upon a theory that was not presented to the district court or briefed on appeal. Finding that the discovery of the arrest warrant presented an intervening event which removed the taint of the illegality of the preceding unlawful detention, we reverse.

The Court of Appeals succinctly described the factual background as follows:

"After officers observed a man exhibiting physical activity similar to that of someone attempting to urinate, they confronted the man and asked if that was his intent. He admitted his intent to urinate, and one of the officers told him, `You were honest, why don't you just get out of here.' The man mounted his bicycle and rode away. The officers then noticed a second bicycle and saw Martin standing about 20 feet away. Although the arresting officer would later admit that he `didn't see [Martin's] motion' and `[didn't] know what he intended to do,' the officers `stopped' Martin and asked for his identification. Martin was cooperative, identified himself, and provided his date of birth. When the officers ran his name and birthdate through dispatch, they discovered an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Upon Martin's arrest the officers searched his person and

179 P.3d 459

found an Altoids tin containing a substance confirmed as marijuana." Martin, slip op. at 2.

In the ensuing prosecution for possessing the marijuana, Martin moved to suppress the evidence. Although defense counsel conceded that the initial encounter was permissible, Martin's attorney argued that the encounter became an unlawful detention when the officer called dispatch for a wants and warrants check. The district court announced that, because the defense had raised no issue as to the initial stop, the court would not address it. Declaring that it is always permissible for an officer to run a warrant check, the district court denied the motion to suppress.

Martin was convicted of possession of marijuana at a bench trial upon stipulated facts at which Martin preserved the suppression issue for appeal. Upon direct appeal, the Court of Appeals noted trial counsel's concession that the initial stop was a voluntary encounter, but opined that it "[disagreed] that any stop was justified." Slip op. at 4-5 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals proceeded to analyze whether the encounter lost its consensual nature and became unlawful when the officers detained Martin to conduct a wants and warrants check. The Court of Appeals concluded:

"Whether one focuses upon the initial stop or the detention as an extension of a purported voluntary encounter, we conclude that Martin should not have been detained for a wants and warrants check under these circumstances, and we reverse the district court's refusal to suppress the evidence revealed during the subsequent search of his person." Slip op. at 6.

In its petition for review, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred by: (1) failing to consider the controlling authority of State v. Jones, 270 Kan. 526, 17 P.3d 359 (2001); and (2) reversing the district court based upon a theory which was not presented to the district court or briefed on appeal. We take the liberty of considering the issues in reverse order.

BASIS FOR COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

The State complains that neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals was presented argument on the theory used by the appellate court to reverse the denial of the suppression motion. We disagree.

As the State points out in its review petition, the suppression motion alleged that the officer checked with dispatch without having "reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant had been committing a crime, was about to commit a crime or had committed a crime." Trial counsel argued that, although the encounter was permissibly initiated, it became unlawful when the officer detained Martin to run the warrant check. In his brief to the Court of Appeals, one of Martin's issues was stated as, "[w]hether Mr. Martin's encounter with Officer Walter initially was a voluntary encounter then became an illegal investigatory detention when the officer ran a warrant check without reasonable articulable suspicion."

As noted above, the Court of Appeals analyzed the very issue presented, i.e., whether the officer was unlawfully detaining Martin when the officer ran the warrant check. Even if the opinion's discussion of the legality of the initial encounter is gratuitous, the ultimate holding directly addressed the theory of unlawfulness presented to both the district court and the Court of Appeals.

The State also argues that because of the manner in which the issue was presented below, it was denied the opportunity "to present evidence to prove the lawfulness of the encounter or provide details regarding the sequence and timing of events." Pointedly, however, the State begins by reciting the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3216(2), which specifically provides that "the burden of proving that the search and seizure were lawful shall be on the prosecution." Once Martin raised the issue of the lawfulness of extending the encounter to run a wants and warrants check, the State had the burden of proving the actions of law enforcement were lawful. That burden would include the detailing of the sequence and timing of events in order to prove that the extended encounter was not an unlawful detention. In short, the

179 P.3d 460

State had ample notice and opportunity to address the specific issue and theory upon which the case was decided.

THE EFFECT OF THE OUTSTANDING WARRANT

In its brief to the Court of Appeals, the State argued that the encounter remained voluntary up to the time that the outstanding warrant was discovered and Martin was arrested on that warrant. However, it also relied on its Jones argument that the officers had a right to arrest Martin upon discovering the outstanding warrant, regardless of whether Martin was being unlawfully detained when the warrant was discovered. See Jones, 270 Kan. at 527, 17 P.3d 359.

In its petition for review, the State does not present any argument as to whether Martin was being unlawfully detained during the warrant check. Rather, the petition for review asserts that the Court of Appeals' error was in failing to apply the holding in Jones. Specifically, the petition recites:

"While the State does not concede that Martin was detained, legally or otherwise, the holding in Jones dictates that even if he had been unlawfully detained, the arrest was lawful, and consequently, the evidence obtained during a search incident to the arrest was lawfully obtained."

Although the State purports to disavow any concession with respect to the Court of Appeals' determination that Martin was unlawfully detained for a wants and warrants check, its failure to present any argument on the question effects the same result. See State v. Walker, 283 Kan. 587, 594, 153 P.3d 1257 (2007) (an issue not briefed is deemed waived or abandoned). Indeed, consideration of the State's review petition issue on the applicability of the Jones holding would be rendered unnecessary without the existence of an unlawful detention. Therefore, we will restrict our analysis to the question the State has presented us upon review, i.e., whether the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant during an unlawful detention is an intervening event which removes the taint of the unlawful detention from evidence retrieved in a search incident to the warrant arrest.

The Jones Decision

Because the State relies exclusively on Jones, we pause to review that decision in some detail. The Jones scenario began with a traffic stop of a speeding vehicle in which Jones was a passenger. The detaining law enforcement officer asked for Jones' driver's license, in addition to that of the vehicle driver. Jones denied having any identification, but provided his name and birth date. The officer testified that his "standard operating procedure" was to obtain identification and run a records check on all passengers in a stopped vehicle so that they would be available to testify in any court proceeding that might arise from the traffic citation. After being advised by dispatch that Jones had an outstanding...

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56 practice notes
  • State v. Talkington, 107,596.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • 6 Marzo 2015
    ...conduct and the challenged evidence becomes attenuated.’ ” 297 Kan. at 381, 300 P.3d 1072 (quoting State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 994, 1003, 179 P.3d 457 [2008] ). “When evidence “ ‘would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police,’ ” the relevant question is whether the al......
  • State v. Oram, No. 104,163.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Kansas
    • 2 Diciembre 2011
    ...connection between the unlawful police conduct and the challenged evidence becomes attenuated. State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 994, Syl. ¶ 3, 179 P.3d 457, cert. denied 555 U.S. 880, 129 S.Ct. 192, 172 L.Ed.2d 138 (2008). Our Supreme Court has set forth four factors to be considered when determin......
  • State v. Mccaslin, No. 99,628.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • 21 Enero 2011
    ...the court's own rule that an issue not briefed by the appellant is deemed waived and abandoned. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 994, 179 P.3d 457, cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 192, 172 L.Ed.2d 138 (2008). Apparently, the majority feels the "deemed abandoned" rule applies to th......
  • State v. Sanders, No. 118,640
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • 26 Julio 2019
    ...to consider in determining whether confession was sufficiently attenuated from unlawful arrest); State v. Martin , 285 Kan. 994, 1003, 179 P.3d 457, cert. denied 555 U.S. 880, 129 S.Ct. 192, 172 L.Ed.2d 138 (2008) (noting that no single factor is dispositive).We now turn to the Court of App......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
56 cases
  • State v. Talkington, 107,596.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • 6 Marzo 2015
    ...conduct and the challenged evidence becomes attenuated.’ ” 297 Kan. at 381, 300 P.3d 1072 (quoting State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 994, 1003, 179 P.3d 457 [2008] ). “When evidence “ ‘would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police,’ ” the relevant question is whether the al......
  • State v. Oram, No. 104,163.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Kansas
    • 2 Diciembre 2011
    ...connection between the unlawful police conduct and the challenged evidence becomes attenuated. State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 994, Syl. ¶ 3, 179 P.3d 457, cert. denied 555 U.S. 880, 129 S.Ct. 192, 172 L.Ed.2d 138 (2008). Our Supreme Court has set forth four factors to be considered when determin......
  • State v. Mccaslin, No. 99,628.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • 21 Enero 2011
    ...the court's own rule that an issue not briefed by the appellant is deemed waived and abandoned. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 994, 179 P.3d 457, cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 192, 172 L.Ed.2d 138 (2008). Apparently, the majority feels the "deemed abandoned" rule applies to th......
  • State v. Sanders, No. 118,640
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • 26 Julio 2019
    ...to consider in determining whether confession was sufficiently attenuated from unlawful arrest); State v. Martin , 285 Kan. 994, 1003, 179 P.3d 457, cert. denied 555 U.S. 880, 129 S.Ct. 192, 172 L.Ed.2d 138 (2008) (noting that no single factor is dispositive).We now turn to the Court of App......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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