State v. Martin
Decision Date | 12 February 1996 |
Docket Number | No. S95G1753,S95G1753 |
Parties | The STATE v. MARTIN. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Clayton County State Trial Judge; John C. Carbo, III.
Keith C. Martin, Solicitor, State Court of Clayton County, Jonesboro, for State.
J. Michael Mullis, Atlanta, for Martin.
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, Daryl A. Robinson, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, Neal B. Childers, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for Amicus Curiae.
Michael Martin was stopped on September 10, 1994 and charged with driving under the influence. The trial court denied his motion in limine to suppress his breath test results and the Court of Appeals reversed, applying the April 1995 amendment to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 to Martin's appeal. Martin v. State, 217 Ga.App. 860, 460 S.E.2d 92 (1995). We granted certiorari in this case to address the validity of the implied consent warning in this case, including the effect of the April 1995 and the August 1995 amendments to OCGA § 40-5-67.1. We conclude that the Court of Appeals' opinion must be reversed pursuant to the August 1995 amendment.
1. OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b) was amended in April 1995 ("the April amendment"). Ga.L.1995, p. 1160. In regard to drivers suspected of DUI, it provided that "the arresting officer shall select and read to the person the appropriate implied consent warning," (emphasis supplied), id. at section 1, p. 1161, and set forth the precise language of the warnings. Section 5, which was not codified, provided that the April amendment "shall apply to all cases pending at the time of its approval by the Governor," Ga.L.1995, § 5, p. 1164, to-wit, April 21, 1995.
As correctly recognized by the Court of Appeals, the language in the April amendment was mandatory and was expressly made applicable to pending cases by the Legislature. The language employed by the arresting officer in Martin's case did not comply with the language in the April amendment. Given the well-established rule that an appellate court applies the law as it exists at the time its opinion is rendered, Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263, 265, 161 S.E.2d 281 (1968); Houston v. State, 192 Ga.App. 73, 74, 383 S.E.2d 571 (1989), the Court of Appeals acted properly when it reversed the trial court's denial of Martin's motion.
2. While Martin's petition for certiorari was pending in this Court, the Legislature, during the 1995 Extraordinary Session, amended OCGA § 40-5-67.1. The amendment, which retained the language of subsection (b), as set forth in the April amendment, added a new subsection (b)(1) to provide as follows:
Subsection (b) of this Code section shall apply to any case wherein the request for chemical testing is made regarding an offense committed on or after April 21, 1995. Section (b) of this Code section shall not apply to any case wherein the request for chemical testing was made regarding an offense committed prior to April 21, 1995, in which case those provisions of former Code Sections 40-5-67.1 and 40-6-392 governing the content of the notice required to be given by the officer to the person regarding administration of chemical testing and governing the admissibility of evidence of results of chemical testing or refusal to submit to chemical testing which were in effect at the time of the offense was committed shall apply.
This language ("the August amendment") was made effective August 18, 1995. Ga.L.1995, Ex.Sess., p. 5, § 1.
The August amendment renders the April amendment applicable only to those stops made after April 21, 1995. By its plain language the August amendment applies to Martin's case. Accordingly, if the August amendment is valid, it would constitute the law in current effect and thus would control our consideration of Martin's appeal. Hill, Houston, supra.
3. The August amendment does not violate federal or State ex post facto constitutional provisions. U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. IX, Par. III; Art. I, Sec. I, Par. X, Ga. Const. of 1983. The August amendment modifies the scope of evidence which may be offered in a DUI trial. It does not affect the manner or degree of punishment and does not alter any substantive rights conferred on Martin by law. Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402(1)(e), 444 S.E.2d 748 (1994); Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 751, 187 S.E.2d 831 (1972).
4. The August amendment does not violate the uniformity provision of the Georgia Constitution. Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV (a), Ga. Const. of 1983.
[Cits.] A law which operates uniformly upon all persons of a designated class is a general law within the meaning of the Constitution, provided that the classification thus made is not arbitrary or unreasonable.
C & S Nat. Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 889(3), 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975). The August amendment applies to all persons who were arrested for DUI prior to April 21, 1995. This classification was created to protect the welfare and safety of the general public, see OCGA § 40-5-55(a), which would have been adversely affected by application of the April amendment to those persons who had been arrested but whose cases had not been disposed of, prior to the enactment of the April amendment.
We hold that the August amendment "operates uniformly throughout the state upon the subject or class of subjects with which it proposes to deal, [cits.]" Lasseter v. Ga. Public Service Comm., 253 Ga. 227, 229(2), 319 S.E.2d 824 (1984), and that the Legislature's classification of the designated class is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. See generally McAllister v. American National Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246(2), 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977).
5. It follows from our ...
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