State v. Martin

CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)
Citation103 S.W.3d 255
Docket NumberNo. WD 61194.,WD 61194.
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ronnie L. MARTIN, Jr., Appellant.
Decision Date25 February 2003

Kent Denzel, Assistant State Public Defender, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Evan J. Buchheim, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.

Before THOMAS H. NEWTON, P.J., ROBERT G. ULRICH and EDWIN H. SMITH, JJ.

ROBERT G. ULRICH, J.

Ronnie Martin appeals his conviction following a jury trial for driving while revoked, section 302.321, RSMo 2000, and sentence of four years imprisonment. He claims on appeal that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in refusing to permit him to call a defense witness to testify; (2) plainly erred in entering judgment and sentencing him for driving while revoked as a class D felony; and (3) abused its discretion in overruling his objection to the prosecutor's closing argument. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

On the evening of April 7, 2001, Missouri State Highway Patrol Trooper Christopher Shannon was patrolling Missouri Highway 371 near Route A in Buchanan County when he saw a gray Plymouth speeding. As Trooper Shannon drove his car behind the Plymouth, it turned right onto a driveway to a farmhouse. Trooper Shannon activated the emergency lights and siren of his patrol car, and the Plymouth accelerated, drove off the driveway into the grass and around a detached garage, and returned to the highway. While pursuing the car, Trooper Shannon saw that the driver was a black male weighing approximately 200 pounds with long hair sticking out from under a baseball cap and that two other passengers were in the car. He was also able to read the car's license plate and determined that the car was registered to Caroline Wragg. Back on the highway, Trooper Shannon pursued the Plymouth until it recklessly passed another vehicle at high speed on the crest of a hill. The trooper then terminated the high-speed pursuit to avoid danger to other drivers and began following the car at normal speed. Trooper Shannon saw the Plymouth pass another car on the crest of a hill and then exit onto Highway 752 in southern St. Joseph. He continued to follow the car at normal speed and found it five minutes later parked with its lights off near 7th Street and Mason in St. Joseph.

Two females, Caroline Wragg and Stormy Martin, the appellant's wife, were standing outside of the car. Trooper Shannon asked the women who was driving the car, but they told him that they didn't know. Ms. Wragg was arrested on an outstanding warrant and transported to the police station. Mrs. Martin was not arrested. At the police station, Ms. Wragg gave a written statement to Trooper Shannon identifying the appellant, Ronnie Martin, as the driver of the Plymouth.

Mr. Martin was charged with one count of driving while revoked. He was charged with a class D felony because the State alleged he had two previous convictions for driving while revoked and a prior alcohol related enforcement contact. Mr. Martin was also charged as a prior and persistent offender.

At trial, Ms. Wragg testified that Mr. Martin was driving the Plymouth and that after he eluded the police, he stopped the car and ran. She also testified that although she was drunk during the incident, she did remember who was driving and that she did not want to testify because she did not want to get her friends into trouble.

Mr. Martin did not present any evidence in his defense. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly and sentenced Mr. Martin to four years imprisonment. This appeal followed.

I.

In his first point on appeal, Mr. Martin argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit him to call his wife, Stormy Martin, to testify. He contends that excluding Mrs. Martin's testimony was a drastic remedy for his failure to endorse her and that the State failed to show any prejudice to it that would have resulted from Mrs. Martin testifying because Mrs. Martin's involvement in the case was always known by the State.

After the State rested its case in chief, Mr. Martin attempted to call his wife, Stormy Martin, to testify. The State objected arguing that it had not received any discovery concerning the statements Mrs. Martin would make and that Mrs. Martin was never endorsed as a witness. After reviewing his files, Mr. Martin's attorney admitted that he had neglected to endorse Mrs. Martin as a witness. Mr. Martin then presented Mrs. Martin's proposed testimony in an offer of proof. Mrs. Martin testified that a man named Brian, whom she and Ms. Wragg met earlier that day in Kansas City, was driving the car when the trooper began to pursue them. After eluding the trooper for a short time, Brian stopped the car and ran. Mrs. Martin testified that she did not know Brian before that day, had not seen him since the incident, and did not know his last name or how to contact him. Finally, Mrs. Martin denied telling Trooper Shannon that she did not know who the driver was and insisted that she told him a man named Brian was driving.

As an attempt to cure any prejudice to the State as a result of the failure to endorse Mrs. Martin, counsel for Mr. Martin requested a recess until the next morning to allow the prosecutor to interview Mrs. Martin. The prosecutor argued that such a recess would not cure the prejudice to the State because (1) it had no prior knowledge that the defense would present evidence that someone else was driving the car and (2) it had already released its witnesses, Trooper Shannon and Ms. Wragg. The trial court ultimately refused to allow Mrs. Martin's testimony as a sanction for the failure to endorse her.

Discovery rules are "intended to allow both sides to know the witnesses and evidence to be introduced at trial" and to eliminate surprise. State v. Simonton, 49 S.W.3d 766, 781 (Mo.App. W.D.2001)(quoting State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Mo. banc 1992)). Rule 25.05(A)(2) requires a defendant, upon written request by the State, to disclose the names of any witnesses he intends to call to testify. Rule 25.05(A)(2); State v. Watson, 755 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Mo.App. E.D.1988). Rule 25.16 provides for sanctions for failure to comply with the discovery rules. Rule 25.16; Watson, 755 S.W.2d at 645. In fashioning sanctions for a discovery violation, the focus is generally on the removal or amelioration of any prejudice that the State suffers due to the violation. Simonton, 49 S.W.3d at 781 (quoting State v. Massey, 867 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Mo.App. E.D.1993)). Among the sanctions authorized by Rule 25.16 is the exclusion of the testimony of a witness whose identity has not been properly disclosed. Rule 25.16; Simonton, 49 S.W.3d at 780; State v. Lopez, 836 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Mo.App. E.D.1992). The remedy of disallowing the relevant and material testimony of a defense witness, however, essentially deprives the defendant of his right to call witnesses in his defense. Simonton, 49 S.W.3d at 781 (quoting State v. Mansfield, 637 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Mo. banc 1982)); Lopez, 836 S.W.2d at 32. Thus, a trial court's refusal to allow testimony in a criminal case is a drastic remedy that should be used with the utmost caution. Simonton, 49 S.W.3d at 781 (quoting Mansfield, 637 S.W.2d at 703); Lopez, 836 S.W.2d at 32. Nevertheless, the decision to impose sanctions under Rule 25.16, including the exclusion of a witness, is within the discretion of the trial court. Simonton, 49 S.W.3d at 780.

In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, an appellate court must first consider what prejudice the State would have suffered as a result of the discovery violation and second, whether the remedy resulted in fundamental unfairness to the defendant. State v. Allen, 81 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002); Simonton, 49 S.W.3d at 781; State v. Anderson, 18 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Mo.App. W.D.2000). The initial consideration, whether the State would have suffered prejudice by permitting the witness to testify, is important because where the prejudice to the State is nonexistent or negligible, the imposition of the drastic sanction of witness exclusion is not necessarily appropriate. Allen, 81 S.W.3d at 233 (Holliger, J., concurring); Anderson, 18 S.W.3d at 16. In this case, even if the prosecutor was given overnight to interview Mrs. Martin as suggested by the defense, the State would still have suffered prejudice if Mrs. Martin had been allowed to testify. Mrs. Martin's testimony would have been that a man named Brian, whom she and Ms. Wragg met earlier that afternoon, was driving the car when Trooper Shannon attempted to stop it. This proposed testimony unfairly surprised the State. At no time prior to Mr. Martin's attempt to call Mrs. Martin and his offer of proof after the State rested its case was the State aware that the defense would offer evidence that a man other than Mr. Martin was driving the car. The only information known by the State concerning the identity of the driver was that Ms. Wragg identified Mr. Martin as the driver in her written statement at the police station. While the State knew that Mrs. Martin was in the car, it could not have known that she would testify that a man named Brian was actually driving. The only information known by the State concerning Mrs. Martin's potential testimony was that she did not know who was driving. Trooper Shannon testified that Mrs. Martin had told him this when he asked her and Ms. Wragg who had been driving. To have allowed Mr. Martin to present, through the testimony of Mrs. Martin, this new defense that a man named Brian was driving the car would have prejudiced the State in that it would not have had the opportunity to investigate the claim that someone other than...

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