State v. Martinez

Decision Date07 April 1999
Docket Number24-722
Citation979 P.2d 718
PartiesSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AARON MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant.Opinion Number: 1999-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO Filing Date:
CourtNew Mexico Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY

W. John Brennan, District Judge

Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Susan Roth, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM for Appellant

Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Max Shepherd, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM for Appellee

OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} Defendant Aaron Martinez appeals his convictions of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Martinez contends that the trial court erred in admitting his pre-arrest statements to police. We conclude that the trial court properly admitted these statements because Martinez knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination. Martinez also contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his involvement in a prior shooting. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence to show consciousness of guilt. We affirm Martinez's convictions.

I. Facts

{2} On the morning of March 10, 1995, the police found the bodies of April Jaramillo and James Morgan in Morgan's car. Both Jaramillo and Morgan had been shot with a .25 caliber gun. On the same morning, the police found the body of Hector Aponte in a separate location. Aponte had been killed with a shotgun.

{3} The police connected the .25 caliber gun responsible for the deaths of Jaramillo and Morgan with a prior shooting incident involving Martinez. As a result, the police picked up Martinez from his apartment for questioning regarding the three murders. The police told Martinez's mother, who was present at the apartment, that he was being questioned about a shoplifting incident, though the police later informed Martinez on the way to the police station that the interview would not concern shoplifting. During questioning, Martinez told police that he sold drugs for Pedro Gonzales and that Jaramillo and her boyfriend, Aponte, both owed Gonzales money for drugs. He also told police, after several changes to his story, that he gave his .25 caliber gun to Francisco Cuellar the night before the killings and instructed Cuellar to collect the drug money from Jaramillo and Morgan. Throughout the interview, Martinez denied killing Jaramillo, Morgan, and Aponte.

{4} The police also questioned Martinez about the prior shooting incident involving the .25 caliber gun. Martinez originally told police that on February 22, 1995, about two and a half weeks before the killings, Marvin Sandoval drove past Martinez's house and shot at him but Martinez did not return fire. Further into the questioning, however, and after being confronted with a ballistics report from a bullet extracted from one of Marvin Sandoval's tires, Martinez acknowledged that he returned fire at Sandoval with his .25 caliber gun.

{5} Following Martinez's first interview, the police consulted with the district attorney's office and decided to interview Martinez a second time due to the exclusion of Martinez's mother from the first interview. Martinez's mother attended the second interview, and Martinez gave a substantially similar statement to the police.

{6} At trial, the State introduced both of Martinez's statements to the police, including Martinez's responses to questions about the earlier shooting incident involving Marvin Sandoval. In addition, a police officer testified for the State that he removed a bullet from Marvin Sandoval's tire, and another officer testified that the bullet matched the bullets responsible for the deaths of Jaramillo and Morgan.

{7} In addition, the State introduced evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the killings. Several witnesses testified, in accordance with Martinez's own statements to police, that Jaramillo and Aponte owed Pedro Gonzales money for drugs and that Martinez sold drugs for Gonzales. In addition, Martinez told police that he and Gonzales went to Aponte's residence on March 9, 1995, the night preceding the killings, in order to get the drug money. Three witnesses confirmed this information. The same three witnesses, one of whom was Aponte's neighbor at the time and had not previously seen Martinez and one of whom was Martinez's cousin, also testified that Martinez had a sawed-off shotgun underneath his coat at that time that became visible because Martinez accidentally dropped it. Martinez had maintained throughout both interviews with police that he did not have a shotgun at Aponte's house.

{8} The State introduced evidence that Aponte died from a single shotgun wound to the upper left arm and chest on the morning of March 10, 1995. The State linked Aponte's and Jaramillo's killings by their relationship, by the fact that both owed drug money to Gonzales, by the date of their deaths, and by the weapons used to kill them, showing that Gonzales and Martinez had the .25 caliber gun and a shotgun at Aponte's residence and that both guns were seen together at the home of Louis Montoya, another cousin of Martinez, after the killings. In addition, police found Aponte's wallet, with his driver's license, in Morgan's car during the investigation into the shooting of Jaramillo and Morgan.

{9} Additionally, with respect to the conspiracy charge, the State introduced evidence that Martinez entered into an agreement with Cuellar to kill Jaramillo and Morgan. Martinez told police that, when he and Gonzales met Cuellar on the night of the killings, Martinez gave his .25 caliber gun to Cuellar and instructed Cuellar to get the drug money from Jaramillo and Morgan because the latter "always had tools and stuff." Martinez denied in his police interviews that he instructed Cuellar to kill Jaramillo and Morgan.

{10} The State also introduced evidence that Cuellar intentionally killed Jaramillo and Morgan. Witnesses placed Cuellar at Morgan's motor home during the early morning hours of March 10, 1995. In addition, a witness testified that Cuellar left with Jaramillo and Morgan in Morgan's car near the established time of death. Further, police found Cuellar's fingerprint in the backseat of Morgan's car. Finally, a witness testified that Cuellar bragged about killing Jaramillo and Morgan in exchange for drugs from Gonzales.

{11} A jury found Martinez guilty of trafficking a controlled substance, see NMSA 1978, § 30-31-20 (1990), conspiracy to commit trafficking, see NMSA 1978, § 30-28-2 (1979), tampering with evidence, see NMSA 1978, § 30-22-5 (1963), conspiracy to commit tampering, see § 30-28-2, the first degree murder of Aponte, see NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1 (1994), and conspiracy to commit the murders of Jaramillo and Aponte, see § 30-28-2. Martinez appeals only the latter two convictions, contending that the trial court erred in admitting his statements to the police and erred in admitting evidence of the prior shooting incident involving Marvin Sandoval.

II. Statements to Police

{12} Martinez argues that the trial court should have excluded his statements to the police because the State failed to demonstrate that Martinez knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Specifically, Martinez contends that the statements should have been suppressed due to Martinez's age at the time of the statements, the fact that the police excluded his mother from the first interrogation by misleading her about the subject of the interview, and the fact that, although Martinez answered questions after being advised of his rights, the police did not obtain an express waiver of rights, either oral or written, from Martinez. We disagree.

{13} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964), secures a criminal defendant's right against self-incrimination. See footnote 1 In order to protect this right, law enforcement officials conducting a custodial interrogation must advise a suspect "that he [or she] has a right to remain silent, that any statement he [or she] does make may be used as evidence against him [or her], and that he [or she] has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Prior to questioning the individual, the police must first obtain a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of these rights. Id.

{14} In response to a defendant's motion to suppress a statement made to police, the State bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the constitutional right against self-incrimination. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1986). The State must demonstrate that the waiver of rights "was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception" and that it was "made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). Courts evaluate "'the totality of the circumstances and the particular facts, including consideration of the mental and physical condition, background, experience, and conduct of the accused,'" as well as the conduct of the police, in determining whether the State has successfully carried its burden in demonstrating a knowing and voluntary waiver. State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, ¶ 62, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996 (quoting State v. Boeglin, 100 N.M. 127, 132, 666 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Ct. App. 1983)). "[E]very reasonable presumption against waiver is indulged." Id.

{15} On appeal,

we accept the factual findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous, and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's ruling....

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