State v. Martinez

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
• Writing for the Court: GARIBALDI; SCHREIBER; SCHREIBER
• Citation: 97 N.J. 567,483 A.2d 117
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Juan MARTINEZ, a/k/a Johnny Martinez, Defendant-Respondent.
• Decision Date: 16 November 1984

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97 N.J. 567 483 A.2d 117 STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Juan MARTINEZ, a/k/a Johnny Martinez, Defendant-Respondent. Supreme Court of New Jersey. Argued Sept. 11, 1984.
Decided Nov. 16, 1984.

[483 A.2d 118]

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Debra L. Stone, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-appellant (Irwin I. Kimmelman, Atty. Gen. of N.J., attorney).

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John J. Guidera, Union, Designated Counsel, for defendant-respondent (Joseph H. Rodriguez, Public Defender, attorney).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

GARIBALDI, J.

Defendant, Juan Martinez, was convicted of aggravated sexual assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(4). The crux of this appeal is whether there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the sexual assault defendant threatened his victim with a gun, within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(4). The Appellate Division, reversing the conviction, held there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's instruction on aggravated sexual assault. We granted certification, 96 N.J. 286, 475 A.2d 583 (1984), and now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.

I

Early one evening, as Evelyn and her girlfriend were about to enter Evelyn's home, they met defendant Juan Martinez and his friend, Harry Roman. Evelyn, a small fourteen year old, was a special education student at Mount Carmel Guild School where she had been sent because of her difficulties with reading and writing. Evelyn knew the defendant, who was then forty-seven, from the time he resided with her family for a couple of months.

Evelyn joined the two men. They drove in Roman's automobile to a restaurant [483 A.2d 119] where they purchased some food, and then proceeded to Roman's junkyard. At the junkyard, they ate the food in a small building that Roman used as an office.

After eating, they left the office and entered a converted bus located in the junkyard. The bus was furnished with a couch, table, bed, television, and other items. Evelyn and defendant began watching television while Roman, who was intoxicated, slept.

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Evelyn asked defendant to awaken Roman so that she could be driven home. Defendant told her that Roman was too drunk and she should wait. She waited a while and then began to insist upon being taken home. Frustrated by his inaction, she grabbed something and threw it at defendant.

At this point, Evelyn's testimony became confused, rendering the chronology of events uncertain. It is clear, however, that at some point during the evening in question, defendant grabbed Evelyn, pushed her, removed her shorts, and forced her to submit to vaginal intercourse. Evelyn screamed, cried, and attempted to kick defendant during the assault. Roman continued to sleep in a drunken stupor on the bed. ¹

It is also indisputable that at some point prior to the sexual assault, Evelyn was playing with Roman's gun. Defendant took the gun from her and menacingly pointed it at her. He then placed the gun on the shelf under the table next to the couch on which she later was attacked. According to Evelyn, defendant "put the gun up under there where I was laying there and then from there that's how everything started."

After the assault, defendant warned Evelyn not to tell her mother, and threatened to harm her mother if she did. Bruised and bloody, Evelyn then left the junkyard. Defendant walked a few blocks with her to set her in the right direction for home. Evelyn, whose mother was then in the hospital, spent that night at the home of a neighbor. Immediately after arriving at the neighbor's home at approximately 2:00 or 3:00 A.M., she took a bath and advised the neighbor that defendant had sexually assaulted her.

After the mother's release from the hospital, Evelyn told her of the incident. Subsequently, she and her mother reported the

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assault to the Newark police and Evelyn signed a complaint against defendant and Roman.

The court submitted two charges to the jury, first degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(4), and second degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(5). In charging the jury on aggravated sexual assault, the court used the model jury charge.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty against defendant of aggravated sexual assault after deliberating for one hour. He was sentenced to State Prison for a term of eighteen years with a nine-year period of parole ineligibility.

Defendant appealed his conviction alleging that there was insufficient evidence to establish that, in the course of the sexual assault, he was armed with a weapon and threatened Evelyn. Therefore, defendant contended the trial court erred in charging aggravated sexual assault. He asserted that the most the evidence supported was a charge of sexual assault, a second degree crime.

The Appellate Division reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that there was insufficient evidence to indicate "that the assault was accompanied by the threat to use a gun on the victim." In reaching its decision, the Appellate Division relied on this Court's reasoning in State v. Christener, 71 N.J. 55, 362 A.2d 1153 (1976), ruling that the lower court committed reversible error by charging the jury on aggravated sexual [483 A.2d 120] assault when there was no factual support for such a charge.

II

In State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 236 A.2d 385 (1967), we held that the test to be applied by the trial court in determining the sufficiency of the evidence is

whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn

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therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. 50 N.J. at 459, 236 A.2d 385].

We reaffirmed this test in State v. Brown, 80...