State v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 04 October 1977
• Citation: State v. Martinez, 378 A.2d 517, 173 Conn. 541 (Conn. 1977)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. George Luis MARTINEZ.

Page 517

378 A.2d 517

173 Conn. 541

STATE of Connecticut v. George Luis MARTINEZ.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 10, 1977.

Decision Released Oct. 4, 1977.

Nicholas P. Cardwell, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Bernard D. Gaffney, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was George D. Stoughton, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before HOUSE, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and SPEZIALE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The jury in this case reported, after some deliberation, that they were deadlocked. The court delivered the "Chip Smith" charge, ¹ and the jury returned to their deliberations. Subsequently the jury reported for the second time that they were deadlocked. The defendant's sole claim on appeal is that the court then charged the jury in a manner which was both erroneous and prejudicial, after which the jury returned a guilty verdict.

The second charge in its entirety was as follows:

"All right. Sit down, please, ladies and gentlemen. I have your note which says: 'We have reached a deadlock.' Well, my recollection, ladies and gentlemen, is that you have been considering this case for approximately four and a half hours; and you must understand that it is always a terrible disappointment when the jury cannot arrive at a verdict. What it means is this is the consequence of this that I will have to declare a mistrial in this case and the case will have to be tried again, at some other time, before another group, people just like yourselves. So that this further means that the alleged victim in the case, Miss Diaz, and the defendant, Mr. Martinez, will have to suffer the anguish and the pain of waiting and waiting until this whole process is gone through again and again at some future time.

"Now there's something inherently unfair about that, and it seems to me that four and a half hours is not sufficient time for you to have considered all the consequences of not arriving at a decision. So, with that in mind, I'm going to ask you, would you care to consider this further or not? I can listen to a consensus, at least, and then determine what to do."

A juror started to make a remark. The court interrupted him.

"Just a moment, sir. . . . (M)y final question . . . was: In view of these consequences, would the jury be willing to consider this case further? And that's the answer I want."

Another juror expressed willingness.

The court responded: "All right, with that in mind, I want you to do that. If you don't arrive at a verdict before five o'clock, then we'll consider it again tomorrow morning. There's no urgency about this. I want you to be comfortable about it. I want you to be happy about it. And I want you to know that you have done your job as responsible citizens. The more time you take, it's obvious to all of us that you are doing it with intelligence and care and concern, which is all we ask. But in view of what you'll be doing to these people, all of them, it just isn't fair. So I'll ask you to continue on. Thank you very much."

Before the court delivered the second charge, the attorney for the defendant moved that the jury's report that they were deadlocked be accepted by the court, without further instruction. When the court announced its decision to urge the jury to continue deliberations, the defendant took an exception. The record does not reveal any objection or exception based on the actual wording of the charge as given. The defendant apparently relies on the denial of his motion for a mistrial, which gave the second instruction as a ground. This motion was filed the day after the jury returned their verdict.

The "Chip Smith" charge, which has been approved by this court on numerous occasions; e.g., State v. Ralls, 167 Conn. 408, 424, 356 A.2d 147; Tough v. Ives, 162 Conn. 274, 278-79, 294 A.2d 67; sets forth the duty of each juror to reach his own conclusion and to avoid "mere acquiescence." This duty was not mentioned in the second charge. Had the defendant...