State v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 11 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 21496,21496 |
| Citation | 128 Idaho 104,910 P.2d 776 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Albert MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Stewart A. Morris, Boise, argued for appellant.
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Tom Watkins, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, and Catherine Derden, Arkansas, for respondent. Catherine Derden argued.
Albert Martinez appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence for male rape, I.C. § 18-6108. We affirm.
On August 1, 1993, while a patron at a bar in Boise, Bruce Mouro went into the restroom, which was approximately six feet long by six feet wide. While Mouro was facing away from the door toward the toilet, Martinez entered the restroom behind him and asked Mouro whether the bar was a "homo bar." After making a few incoherent statements, Martinez told Mouro that he had just been released from prison. Mouro then turned around and saw Martinez lock the door to the restroom.
While Mouro was backed up against the toilet, Martinez exposed his penis and began masturbating. Martinez then indicated that he wanted oral sex performed on him. Mouro complied and at some point thereafter, Martinez produced a knife. Mouro was subsequently forced to submit to anal penetration. While Mouro was bent over the toilet, he noticed that Martinez had slipped the knife into his shoe. Mouro took the knife, pushed it down into the toilet, stuffed paper towels on top of it, and flushed the toilet so that water overflowed. The water startled Martinez, and Mouro was able to leave the restroom and escape into the bar for help.
Mouro immediately told people that he had been raped. As Martinez came out of the restroom to leave the bar, Mouro identified him as the rapist. Martinez left the bar but several other patrons chased after Martinez and cornered him behind a nearby hotel. A security guard from the hotel arrived and called the police. Mouro was taken to St. Luke's Hospital for an examination, and Martinez was arrested. The knife was later retrieved from the toilet by a plumber.
Martinez was indicted on a charge of male rape, I.C. § 18-6108. Following a jury trial on June 20, 1994, Martinez was convicted as charged and the court imposed a unified sentence of thirty-five years with fifteen years as a minimum period of confinement.
On appeal, Martinez argues that the district court erred in allowing testimony from Mouro and other witnesses that Martinez stated he had just been released from prison. He also asserts that the district court improperly allowed a nurse to testify that she believed Mouro had been sexually assaulted. Martinez further contends that the district court erred in allowing the state to proceed by indictment rather than by information and that he was denied his constitutional rights by the admission into evidence of a detective's comment that Martinez exercised his right to remain silent. Finally, Martinez asserts that his sentence is too severe.
On the first day of trial, following the voir dire of the jurors and prior to the commencement of the state's case-in-chief, Martinez moved to exclude testimony by Mouro that Martinez told him he recently had been released from prison. The state argued that it intended to offer the testimony of Mouro and the arresting officer, Officer Clair Walker, regarding Martinez's statements about his release from prison. The court held that the testimony by Mouro and Officer Walker was admissible.
On appeal, Martinez argues that the district court improperly admitted testimony by four witnesses--Mouro; Officer Walker; the emergency room nurse, Julie Winton; and the emergency room doctor, Dr. Keith Sivertson--regarding Martinez's statements that he had recently been released from prison. We will analyze the testimony of these four witnesses in turn, after first noting the applicable standard of review: the trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial and its decision in that regard will be reversed only where there has been an abuse of discretion. State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 973-74, 829 P.2d 861, 863-64 (1992).
Martinez argues that the district court erred in allowing Mouro to testify that Martinez told him he had recently been released from prison. He claims that his statement to Mouro was inadmissible because it was not an "admission against interest." Martinez clearly confuses I.R.E. 804(b)(3), a "statement against interest," which is an exception to the hearsay rule and requires the unavailability of the declarant, and I.R.E. 801(d)(2), an "admission of party-opponent," which is nonhearsay. Therefore, his argument is meritless.
Martinez also argues that his statement was not an "admission" under Rule 801(d)(2) (admission of party-opponent). He claims that although he was admitting that he had just been released from prison, "he certainly wasn't making any admission that pertained to the truth or falsity of the allegations against him." Martinez misinterprets the word "admission" in Rule 801(d)(2) to mean an admission of guilt.
Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is an "admission by party-opponent." A statement is an admission by a party-opponent if "[t]he statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity." Rule 801(d)(2). A "statement" is defined by Rule 801(a) as "an oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." Nothing in Rule 801 indicates that an admission by a party-opponent must be an admission of guilt or an admission against interest. See REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR COMMITTEE, C 801, p. 7 (4th Supp.1985) (); State v. Maturana, 180 Ariz. 126, 882 P.2d 933, 937 (1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2016, 131 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1995) ().
Martinez's statement that he had just been released from prison was an oral assertion, and was offered against him. Thus, it falls within the definition of an admission by a party-opponent under Rule 801(d)(2).
Martinez next asserts that this Court's decision in State v. Boehner, 114 Idaho 311 756 P.2d 1075 (Ct.App.1988), supports his argument that Mouro's testimony was inadmissible. In Boehner, this Court held that it was error to allow testimony from police officers that they had heard from the police dispatcher that Boehner had stated he wanted to kill a police officer. 114 Idaho at 314, 756 P.2d at 1078. This Court held that the officers' testimony was not admissible under any of the hearsay exceptions, and that it was not relevant for any non-hearsay purpose. Id. However, this Court also noted:
No hearsay question would have arisen if the person to whom Boehner made the alleged statement--and from whom the statement eventually found its way to the police dispatcher--had testified. A statement made by Boehner to that person would be a party's statement, which is not hearsay under I.R.E. 801(d)(2).
Id. at 314 n. 2, 756 P.2d at 1078 n. 2. Unlike in Boehner, the testimony in this case was offered by the person to whom Martinez made the statement. Thus, we conclude that the testimony was an admission by a party-opponent, which is not hearsay, and was properly admitted.
Moreover, Martinez's statement regarding his release from prison was admissible because it was probative on an element of male rape: i.e., that the victim was prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by the apparent power of execution. See I.C. § 18-6108(3). Martinez's statement to Mouro that he had just been released from prison had the likely effect of intimidating and threatening Mouro so that he would not resist.
Martinez argues, however, that because there was other evidence which was probative on the issue of Mouro's fear of immediate or great bodily harm, namely, that a knife was used in the attack and that Martinez outweighed Mouro by approximately eighty pounds, the statement regarding release from prison was not probative on this issue. We note, however, Mouro's testimony that the knife was produced directly after he began performing fellatio on Martinez. Therefore, the knife was not initially instrumental in preventing Mouro from resisting Martinez's course of aggression. Indeed, when asked why he performed oral sex on Martinez, Mouro stated, (Emphasis added.) Clearly, Mouro's testimony indicated that Martinez's statement that he has just been released from prison was a factor preventing Mouro from resisting and leading him to believe that he was in danger of immediate and great bodily harm.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Mouro's testimony regarding Martinez's statement that he recently had been released from prison.
During the state's case-in-chief, Officer Walker was asked if Martinez made any statements while being transported to the Public Safety Building. Walker testified, " Martinez objected and moved to strike, but the court overruled his objection and motion. At the conclusion of the trial, Martinez...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Nelson
...and because he specifically requested a preliminary hearing. However, these same distinctions were asserted in State v. Martinez, 128 Idaho 104, 910 P.2d 776 (Ct.App.1995), where we found the reasoning presented in Edmonson to be dispositive. We stated, "[T]he Idaho Constitution does not, o......
-
State v. Burris, Docket No. 33593 (Idaho App. 9/11/2008)
...416, 419 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 677-78, 67 P.3d 1283, 1289-90 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Martinez, 128 Idaho 104, 111, 910 P.2d 776, 783 (Ct. App. 1995). However, no such explicit was made here. The prosecutor made, at most, an indirect remark that could be inter......
-
State v. Welker
...hearsay exclusion rules, the statement reported by Officer Stimpson was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Compare State v. Martinez, 128 Idaho 104, 910 P.2d 776 (Ct.App.1995), holding that a defendant's statement acknowledging his prior misconduct was an admission of a party opponent, I.R.E. ......
-
State v. Dougherty
...by a state agent is fundamental error and is reviewable by this Court even in the absence of an objection. State v. Martinez, 128 Idaho 104, 111, 910 P.2d 776, 783 (Ct.App.1995). Accordingly, notwithstanding Dougherty's failure to object to the detective's testimony, we will review whether ......