State v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 23 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 25990.,25990. |
| Citation | 34 P.3d 1119,136 Idaho 436 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Newman Zollinger, Rupert, for appellant. Clayne S. Zollinger, Jr. argued.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Karen A. Hudelson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Karen A. Hudelson argued.
James Martinez appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his automobile. Based on the seized evidence, Martinez pled guilty to one count of trafficking in amphetamine, and the district court imposed a sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed. We affirm.
On the morning of October 25, 1998, Corporal Sweesy of the Idaho State Police stopped to assist the driver of a blue Chevrolet Corsica with Kansas license plates parked in the emergency lane of Interstate 84. Sweesy made contact with the driver, Martinez, who stated that the vehicle was "broke down." There were three passengers in the car, two adults and one juvenile.
Sweesy offered to use the bumper guard on his police vehicle to push Martinez's car to a nearby Chevron station. Martinez agreed. As Sweesy pushed Martinez's car, he requested a license plate check on Martinez's Kansas plates. Dispatch told Sweesy that "Kansas is not returning" and could not confirm the validity of the license plates.
Sweesy successfully pushed Martinez's car to the Chevron station, where they were joined by Corporal Dye of the Idaho State Police. Sweesy approached the vehicle, explained to Martinez that he was unable to check the validity of Martinez's plates and asked for registration paperwork. Martinez provided the registration to Sweesy, who called the vehicle identification number (VIN) listed on the papers into Dispatch. Sweesy then returned the registration to Martinez.
Several minutes later, Dispatch reported that the VIN on the registration did not conform to standards. Sweesy again requested the registration papers from Martinez and compared the VIN on the dashboard of Martinez's car with the number listed on the registration papers. He discovered that due to a clerical error, the VIN on the registration varied by one number. Sweesy radioed in the VIN on the dashboard. While waiting for a response from Dispatch, Martinez and the other passengers went to the restroom in the Chevron station, after which one of the passengers began walking his dog in the vicinity of the car. As they waited, Sweesy and Dye talked with Martinez and the adult passengers about the purpose of their trip and received conflicting stories.
At this point, approximately twenty minutes after arriving at the Chevron station, Sweesy, a certified drug canine handler, decided to walk his drug dog, Jade, around Martinez's vehicle. Sweesy retrieved Jade from the back of his patrol car and conducted the walk around. Jade alerted twice. When Sweesy told Martinez that Jade had alerted, Martinez admitted that there was some marijuana in the car. Sweesy and Dye then conducted a search of the entire vehicle and found syringes, approximately twenty individually packaged bags of a powdery substance, and a container wrapped in duct tape containing approximately a pound of a powdery substance. The powder field-tested positive for amphetamine. After Martinez was arrested and read his rights, he stated that the drugs were his. A total of 382 grams of amphetamine was seized.
Martinez was charged with one count of trafficking in amphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732(a)(3)(B), one count of failure to affix a tax stamp, I.C. §§ 63-4205, -4207, and one count of manufacture, delivery or possession with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance where children are present, I.C. § 37-2737A. Following his arraignment, Martinez filed a motion to suppress all the seized evidence, claiming that he had been unreasonably detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Concluding that the officer's actions did not violate Martinez's constitutional rights, the district court denied the motion.
Martinez subsequently pled guilty to the count of trafficking in amphetamine and, in exchange, the other counts were dismissed. The court imposed a sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed. Martinez appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532, 535, 5 P.3d 993, 996 (Ct.App.2000) (citing State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App. 1996)).
The propriety of the initial contact between Martinez and Sweesy is not contested. Sweesy stopped to do a motorist assist, within the scope of his community caretaking function. The community caretaking function involves the duty of police officers to help citizens an officer reasonably believes may be in need of assistance. In re Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 818, 748 P.2d 401, 402 (1988).
Martinez argues that he was improperly detained when Sweesy asked for his registration papers. He argues that the request exceeded the motorist assistance purpose of the initial encounter, and therefore amounted to an investigative detention, requiring reasonable and articulable suspicion. We disagree.
It is uncontroverted that Sweesy briefly detained Martinez when he took Martinez's registration papers. A limited seizure occurs when an officer takes a driver's license. State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 493, 826 P.2d 452, 454 (1992). Similarly, a limited seizure occurs upon the taking of registration papers. Idaho Code § 49-427 requires that registration papers be in the possession of the driver or carried in a vehicle anytime a vehicle is operated on the highway. By taking registration papers, the police prevent a driver from legally departing in his or her car. Here, even though Martinez's car was mechanically inoperable, the officer's taking of Martinez's registration papers deprived him of property with obvious value and amounted to a limited seizure. See and compare State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 7 P.3d 219 (2000).
To initiate a limited investigative stop, a police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a brief detention. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). However, Sweesy's request for Martinez's registration was not to investigate a crime, but to conclude his community caretaking function. This Court has stated that once a legitimate traffic stop has occurred, "nothing in the Fourth Amendment . . . preclude[s] the officer from routinely asking the motorist to exhibit his driver's license, the vehicle registration and an insurance certificate." State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 165, 686 P.2d 842, 845 (Ct.App.1984).
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that it is reasonable for police officers to request identification from a driver, even if the driver is not suspected of criminal activity, because the police have a strong interest in identifying the individuals they come into contact with in any capacity. Godwin, 121 Idaho at 495, 826 P.2d at 456. In Godwin, the defendant stopped on the side of the road to wait for a friend who had been pulled over by the Idaho State Police. A second police officer approached Godwin and asked to see his license. A license check revealed that Godwin's license was suspended. Godwin argued that it was unreasonable for the officer to request his license, but the Court found that "a police officer's brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver's license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment." Id. The Court explained:
The Godwin decision cited State v. Ellenbecker, 159 Wis.2d 91, 464 N.W.2d 427 (App. Ct.1990), in support of its position. In Ellenbecker, the court faced the issue of "whether an officer who learns that a motorist needs no assistance may still demand to see a driver's license and conduct a status check at the scene." Id. at 428. In applying the balancing test required to evaluate a Fourth Amendment claim,1 the Ellenbecker court determined that legitimate governmental interests were promoted by police officers asking for driver licenses to identify all motorists they contacted for assistance purposes, namely, ensuring accuracy in written reports and protecting against later claims of improper behavior on the part of officers. 464 N.W.2d at 430. Addi...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State Of Idaho v. Vogelpohl
...Idaho at 563, 112 P.3d at 851; State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 440-41, 34 P.3d 1119, 1123-24 (Ct. App. 2001). However, a routine traffic stop may turn up suspicious circumstances that justify an officer asking furth......
-
State v. Liechty
...permit and the defendant was discouraged from driving away because of a dead-end road and muddy conditions); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 441, 34 P.3d 1119, 1124 (Ct.App.2001) (no seizure when defendant's movement was restricted by the inoperability of his car and he was hesitant to wa......
-
State v. Gutierrez
...without further show of authority which would convey a message that the individual is not free to leave. State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 441, 34 P.3d 1119, 1124 (Ct.App.2001). We conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances, that no such evolution from detention to consensual enco......
-
State v. Henage
...Amendment protections do not apply. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (Ct.App. 2002); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 441, 34 P.3d 1119, 1124 (Ct.App.2001). The test to determine if an individual is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes is an objective one, evaluatin......