State v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 13 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 22,059.,22,059. |
| Citation | 131 N.M. 746,2002 NMCA 36,42 P.3d 851 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rufino MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, James O. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
Certiorari Denied, No. 27,378, March 18, 2002.
{1} Defendant was convicted of battery on a peace officer after he kicked and spit on a prison guard while engaged in a struggle with that guard. Defendant challenges his conviction on three grounds. First, Defendant contends that the trial court's limitation on the time allowed for voir dire violated his right to due process because he claims his counsel did not have sufficient time to inquire into the potential biases of venire members who had relatives in law enforcement. Second, Defendant contends that he made a prima facie showing that the State used its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner because the State used all three of its challenges to remove Hispanics from the jury, and as a result the trial court should have required the State to provide a racially neutral explanation for its challenges in accordance with Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Finally, Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of battery on a peace officer because the act of spitting on the officer did not constitute a meaningful challenge to the officer's authority, and because the officer suffered only scratches and slight bruising when Defendant kicked him.
{2} We hold that Defendant made a prima facie showing that the State was using its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, and we therefore remand this case to the trial court to determine if the State had a racially neutral reason for exercising its third peremptory challenge against a Hispanic prospective juror. If the State is able to provide a racially neutral reason, then the conviction shall be affirmed, because we hold that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the time allowed for voir dire because defense counsel had sufficient time to inquire into potential biases and (2) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Defendant's act of spitting on a prison guard constituted a "meaningful challenge" to that officer's authority, or in the alternative to conclude that Defendant inflicted actual harm when he kicked the officer in the leg. If the State cannot provide a racially neutral reason for the use of its peremptory challenge, then the conviction must be overturned and a new trial ordered.
{3} Defendant was involved in a scuffle with guards at the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation prison facility in Hobbs, New Mexico. The altercation occurred while one guard (hereinafter "the officer") was taking Defendant to his cell. At the time, Defendant was handcuffed and his legs shackled, with a "black box" securing chains between the cuffs and the leg shackles to further limit Defendant's movements. The officer either grabbed or placed his hand on Defendant's arm as he was leading Defendant into the cell. Defendant jerked away. When the officer touched Defendant's arm a second time, Defendant jerked away again. The officer then pushed Defendant to the ground. At that point, Defendant spit toward the officer's face; some of the spit landed in the officer's mouth. Three other officers came to assist and restrained Defendant by placing him face down on the ground. While the officers were on top of him, Defendant continued to struggle, kicking his legs up and down. As he did so, he kicked the officer in the leg. The officer testified that he had some scratches and discoloration on his leg. He applied an ice pack to his leg after the incident, then continued working his shift. As a result of this incident, Defendant was charged with one count of battery on a peace officer, contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-22-24(A) (1971).
{4} On the day of trial, the trial court reminded counsel of the court's standing policy limiting voir dire to fifteen minutes for each side. During the trial court's initial voir dire, several members of the venire indicated that they had friends or family in law enforcement, some with a connection to the Hobbs facility in particular. The prosecutor, in her fifteen-minute voir dire, asked some questions about these connections. Defense counsel then began questioning the panel. She asked some questions relating to these connections, but spent most of her time on other topics. After fifteen minutes, defense counsel asked for an extension of time to inquire about the panel members' connections to law enforcement. The trial court allowed defense counsel an extra five minutes. When the additional five minutes were up, defense counsel again sought an extension. The court denied the request this time. In chambers, defense counsel objected to the trial court's limitation on voir dire, expressing concern that she did not have enough time to ask seven of the venire members about their acknowledged connections to law enforcement. The trial court overruled the objection. The court then struck for cause seven other venire members who had been questioned about their connections to law enforcement.
{5} Of the seven prospective jurors that defense counsel indicated she wanted to question further, only one was selected to serve as a juror. Of the thirteen jurors, only three had any connection to law enforcement. The first knew a police officer in Texas. The second knew one active and one retired police officer. A third had a brother-in-law who previously worked for Hobbs as a detention officer. Each of these three jurors assured the trial court that they could remain impartial.
{6} In accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court allowed Defendant five peremptory challenges and the State three. See Rule 5-606(D) NMRA 2002. After the State used its first two peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors with Hispanic surnames, Defendant objected and asked that the State provide a racially neutral explanation for its challenges under Batson, which prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to exclude people from jury service on the basis of race. The trial court asked the prosecutor to explain why she struck both potential jurors. As to the first challenge, the prosecutor indicated that she "didn't get a real good feeling" about that panel member because she had made little eye contact. As to the second challenge, the prosecutor indicated that the panel member never spoke up to answer a question and never made eye contact with the prosecutor. Although acknowledging that the panel member could have had difficulty because she required an interpreter, the prosecutor noted that two other panel members who required an interpreter were more responsive to questioning. The trial court found those explanations to be racially neutral and excused both the prospective jurors.
{7} Later, the defense again asked for a racially neutral explanation when the State used its third and final peremptory challenge to strike another prospective juror with a Hispanic surname. This time, the trial court found that Defendant had not made out a prima facie showing that the State was discriminating against Hispanics in the use of its peremptory challenges. The court, in making its ruling, noted that fifteen of the thirty-three prospective jurors on the panel were Hispanic. Of the thirteen jury members selected (twelve jurors and one alternate), seven were Hispanic.
{8} After jury selection, the case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Defendant guilty of battery on a peace officer.
{9} Defendant claims that the State's use of peremptory challenges against Hispanics violated his equal protection rights. It is well established that the State may not, during the jury selection process, use its peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise unbiased and well-qualified individuals solely on the basis of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-88, 106 S.Ct. 1712; State v. Jones, 1997-NMSC-016, ¶ 3, 123 N.M. 73, 934 P.2d 267. Such exclusions violate the equal protection rights of both the defendant and the prospective jurors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-88, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
{10} In Batson, the United States Supreme Court outlined a three-step procedure for trial courts to determine whether a prosecutor has discriminated on the basis of race in using peremptory challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94-95, 106 S.Ct. 1712; Jones, 1997-NMSC-016, ¶ 3, 123 N.M. 73, 934 P.2d 267. A defendant must first make a prima face showing that the State used its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory way. Jones, 1997-NMSC-016, ¶ 3, 123 N.M. 73, 934 P.2d 267. If the defendant makes a prima facie showing, then the State must provide a racially neutral explanation for its challenges. Id. If the trial court finds that the State's explanation is racially neutral, then the burden again falls on Defendant to show that the reason given is in fact pretext for a racially discriminatory motive. Id.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Watson v. State
...evidence to permit the trier of fact to “draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” Id.; see also State v. Martinez, 131 N.M. 746, 42 P.3d 851, 857–58 (N.M.Ct.App.2002). “An ‘inference’ is generally understood to be a ‘conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a l......
-
Nika v. Gittere
...a party questions potential jurors and disparate treatment during voir dire, as evidence of discriminatory intent); State v. Martinez, 42 P.3d 851, 855 (N.M. App. 2002) (considering, among other factors, whether cognizable group was underrepresented on the jury or the case was particularly ......
-
Watson v. State
...evidence to permit the trier of fact to “draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” Id.; see also State v. Martinez, 131 N.M. 746, 42 P.3d 851, 857–58 (N.M.Ct.App.2002). “An ‘inference’ is generally understood to be a ‘conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a l......
-
York v. El-Ganzouri
...or even less, at least when the trial court also propounds questions. See Dhillon, 138 S.W.3d 583 (15 minutes); State v. Martinez, 131 N.M. 746, 42 P.3d 851 (Ct.App.2002) (20 minutes); Roberts v. State, 268 Ind. 127, 373 N.E.2d 1103 (1978) (20 Finally, we note that while Dr. El-Ganzouri now......