State v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 31 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 88,046.,88,046.
• Citation: 276 Kan. 527,78 P.3d 769
• Parties: STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. JUAN PABLO MARTINEZ, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

276 Kan. 527

78 P.3d 769

STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. JUAN PABLO MARTINEZ, Appellant.

No. 88,046.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed October 31, 2003.

Shawn Minihan, assistant appellate defender, and Randall L. Hodgkinson, deputy appellate defender, were on the brief for appellant.

Lois K. Malin, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and John P. Wheeler, Jr., county attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

GERNON, J.:

In this criminal appeal, Juan Pablo Martinez challenges the constitutionality of the Kansas statute which requires an individual to provide blood and saliva samples for a DNA database after a conviction of burglary. We affirm.

Martinez was charged with one count each of felony aggravated burglary and misdemeanor theft. Martinez entered an Alford plea to one count of burglary pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3715. The district court sentenced Martinez to 24 months' probation and required him to provide blood and saliva samples for the DNA database in accordance with K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 21-2511. Martinez appeals from the court's order requiring him to provide blood and saliva samples for the DNA database. The case was transferred to the Supreme Court pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c).

Martinez argues that forcing him to provide blood and saliva samples pursuant to K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 21-2511 is a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because a DNA sample is not reasonably related to the crime of burglary. Martinez argues that K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 21-2511 is unconstitutional because it was amended to include burglary. Martinez argues that burglary does not involve DNA evidence like sex crimes and other violent crimes.

We recently addressed the constitutionality of K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 21-2511 as it applies to the crime of burglary in State v. Maass, 275 Kan. 328, 64 P.3d 382 (2003). In Maass, 275 Kan. at 337, we upheld the statute applying the balancing test as set forth in Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.),cert. denied 506 U.S. 977 (1992); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995),cert. denied 517 U.S. 1160 (1996); Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 1996); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996); and Gaines v. State, 116 Nev. 359, 998 P.2d 166,cert. denied 531 U.S. 856 (2000), without considering the special needs doctrine. Although we are not overruling the Maass decision, we are clarifying the constitutional analysis, including the application of the special needs doctrine.

Case law clearly establishes that the extraction and analysis of bodily fluids, such as blood, saliva, urine, and semen, are searches in the context of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 618, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (blood and urine); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966) (blood); Schlicher, 103 F.3d at 942-43 (blood and saliva); Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247, 253 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (saliva); State v. Murry, 271 Kan. 223, 226, 21 P.3d 528 (2001) (blood); Crutchfield v. Hannigan 21 Kan. App. 2d 693, 694-95, 906 P.2d 184 (1995) (urine); State v. Williams, 15 Kan. App. 2d 656, 667, 815 P.2d 569 (1991) (semen). The United States Supreme Court, however, has not yet addressed whether the collection of blood and saliva for a DNA database is constitutional.

The Fourth Amendment does not protect against all searches and seizures, only those that are unreasonable. Whether a search or seizure is reasonable depends on the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. Generally, a search or seizure is unreasonable if it is not accompanied by individualized suspicion. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000). However, individualized suspicion is not an indispensable component of reasonableness. Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).

The United States Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to the general rule requiring individualized suspicion. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. When analyzing a search that lacks individualized suspicion, the first step in the constitutional analysis is to determine whether one of the three exceptions applies. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37-38; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. If a case falls within one of the recognized exceptions, the next step in the analysis is to balance the need for the search with the invasion of the individual's rights. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 320 (D. Del. 2003); Miller v. United States Parole Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1177 (D. Kan. 2003). "Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).

The first exception to the rule requiring individualized suspicion recognizes the government's "`special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.'" Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (citing Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564, 115 S. Ct. 2386 [1995] [validating the random drug-testing of high school athletes]; Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 [upholding the drug testing of United States Customs employees for transfer or promotion]; Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 [approving the drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees]); see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (invalidating a program for drug testing pregnant mothers); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987) (upholding the search of a probationer's home without probable cause). In determining whether a special need exists, a court must closely review the scheme at issue to determine its primary purpose. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81.

The United States Supreme Court has established several different categories of special needs. The Griffin Court concluded that the government's responsibility to supervise probationers is a special need allowing probation officers to search a probationer's private dwelling without probable cause. 483 U.S. at 875-76. Finding a similar responsibility for supervising schoolchildren to be a special need, the Vernonia School Dist. 47J Court upheld a program of drug testing high school athletes. 515 U.S. at 664-65. In Skinner, the Supreme Court determined that the government's interest in regulating railroad employees to ensure safety is a special need and upheld a policy requiring railroad employees to submit to drug and alcohol screening. 489 U.S. at 620. The Von Raab Court found the government's substantial interest in deterring drug use and the promotion of drug users within the Customs Service to be a special need and validated a regulation requiring employees in certain positions to submit to drug testing. 489 U.S. at 666.

The second exception to the general rule requiring individualized suspicion involves limited administrative searches. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601, 107 S. Ct. 2636 [1987] [upholding the administrative inspection of a closely regulated car-dismantling business]; Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486, 98 S. Ct. 1942 [1978] [validating the administrative inspection of fire-damaged building]; Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 [1967] [approving an administrative inspection for compliance with city housing code]); see also Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (validating the strip search of inmates); Pool v. McCune, 267 Kan. 797, Syl. ¶ 7, 987 P.2d 1073 (1999) (upholding the use of plethysmograph testing for sex offenders).

The third exception to the rule requiring individualized suspicion involves motorist checkpoints. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (invalidating a highway checkpoint for illegal narcotics); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) (validating a sobriety checkpoint); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) (validating an illegal alien checkpoint). This exception clearly has no application to the facts of this case. However, it is interesting to note that although the Edmond Court recognized the checkpoint exception as a separate class, it blurred the line between the special needs exception and the checkpoint exception by invalidating a drug interdiction checkpoint because the government's primary purpose was crime control. 531 U.S. at 44. Most of the courts that have reviewed the constitutionality of DNA collection and cataloging statutes have not categorized the analysis under one of the three exceptions to the general rule requiring individualized suspicion. Instead, these courts upheld the statutes by simply applying an interest balancing test. See, e.g., Jones, 962 F.2d at 307-08

; Rise, 59 F.3d at 1560-62; Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir.),

cert. denied 525 U.S. 1005 (1998); Schlicher, 103 F.3d at 943 (upholding prior version of K.S.A. 21-2511); Boling, 101 F.3d at 1340; Vanderlinden v. State of Kan., 874 F. Supp. 1210, 1214-15 (D. Kan. 1995) (upholding prior version of K.S.A. 21-2511); Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583, 588-89 (D. Minn. 1995),

aff'd on other grounds

77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 1996); Sanders v. Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496, 499 (E.D. N.C. 1994); Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 1493, 1498-99 (E.D. Wash. 1993); Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County, 187 Ariz. 419, 423-24, 930 P.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1996); People v. King, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1363, 1376-77, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220 (2000); L.S. v. State, 805 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. Dist. App. 2001); People v....