State v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 25 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 26180.,26180. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Luis Norberto MARTINEZ. |
Annacarina Del Mastro, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Jessica Probolus, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, former state's attorney, and Anne F. Mahoney, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
FLYNN, C.J., and BISHOP and FOTI, Js.
The defendant, Luis Norberto Martinez, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A), sexual assault in the first degree (alleging penile penetration) in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a)(1), sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a)(1) and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(2).1 On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly precluded him from questioning the alleged victim about two prior incidents in which she claimed that she was sexually assaulted without first holding a hearing to determine the relevance of that evidence to his claims as to her credibility.2 We agree with the defendant and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for a new trial.
On February 13, 2002, the alleged victim, J,3 was thirteen years old and lived on the second floor of a multifamily house with her mother and two sisters. The defendant, who was twenty-one years old lived with his mother on the third floor of the same house. On the evening of February 13, 2002, J walked by herself across the street to a store to purchase a sticker. When J came back from the store, she saw the defendant in front of her apartment. J testified that the defendant then grabbed her by the arm and took her to the back of the house, where he proceeded to force his hands inside her pants, touch her buttocks and put his fingers inside her vagina. He then grabbed her arm and took her up the back stairs to his apartment. The defendant took J to a bedroom, pushed her on the bed, pulled down her pants and forced his penis into her vagina. The bedroom door was partially open, so J was able to see the defendant's sister in the living room.
When the defendant was finished with J, he pulled her into the bathroom where he covered her mouth and told her not to scream. At that point, the defendant's sister knocked on the door to tell the defendant that he had a telephone call. The defendant then rushed J out of the apartment through the back door. J ran down the stairs with the defendant behind her. The defendant ran across the street to his sister's apartment. When J arrived at the front of the house, she ran upstairs to her apartment and immediately disclosed to her mother what had happened. Soon thereafter, J was taken to a hospital where physicians examined her and performed a sexual assault examination.
The defendant was arrested on the night of the sexual assault. With regard to his conduct at the time of J's assault, the defendant told the police that he had been in his mother's bedroom using drugs when his sister walked into the apartment. He then stated that he ran to the bathroom, flushed the drugs down the toilet and left the apartment by way of the back stairs so his sister would not see him high on drugs. He claims, therefore, that the encounter with the victim never occurred. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant claims that the court improperly refused to hold an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of allowing him to question J about two prior complaints of sexual abuse. We agree.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of the defendant's claim. The state filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the defendant from offering into evidence J's prior sexual conduct. The defendant presented evidence that, prior to the incident in question, J had accused both her stepuncle and her brother of sexually assaulting her in two different incidents. Both men pleaded guilty.4 The defendant then filed an objection to the motion in limine and requested a hearing on whether he should be permitted to question J under one of the exceptions to the rape shield statute, General Statutes § 54-86f.5
The defendant argued that the evidence was relevant to two issues: J's credibility and whether the defendant used force in kidnapping and sexually assaulting her.6 As part of his offer of proof, the defendant presented to the court two police reports based on complaints filed by J.7 One police report concerned the incident with J's brother, and the other involved the incident with J's stepuncle. In addition to offering the police reports, the defendant also argued that he should be allowed to question J about falsely reporting that her brother had forced her against her will to have sex. The defendant cited the police reports for his assertion that J may have made false accusations against her brother. First, he noted that in the police report regarding the sexual assault by J's brother, J's sister, M, had stated that this was the second time that she had observed J having sex with their brother. On a previous occasion, M had observed J having sex with her brother on his bed. With regard to the incident at issue in the police report, M stated that she had been watching television when the brother had come into the room to tell her that J wanted him to shower with her. M stated that a few minutes later, she opened the bathroom door and observed J and her brother having sex in the shower. In contrast, J had reported to the police that when she got out of the shower, her brother came into the bathroom and began to touch her "private parts" inappropriately. She stated that she attempted to get away, but her brother pulled her by the hand into his bedroom, closed the door, put J on the floor and began having sex with her.
The defendant also noted that in the police report regarding the incident with J's stepuncle, a police officer stated that a social worker had told him that J began to change her story about her brother's having sexually assaulted her. The officer stated that J had told the social worker that, in fact, it was her stepuncle who actually had touched her inappropriately. The defendant argued that this statement by J to the social worker coupled with M's account of the incident with J's brother served to call J's credibility into question. The defendant wanted to question J about what she told the police regarding the incident with her brother and about whether she changed her story regarding that incident.
The court found that the prior incidents of sexual assault were not relevant. The court, therefore, limited the defendant's cross-examination of J to asking her whether she ever had made a false report regarding sexual assault. In addition, the court found that the incidents were protected by the rape shield statute and that, even if the prior incidents were relevant, their probative value did not outweigh their prejudicial impact. The defendant renewed his objection on the following day on the basis of State v. DeJesus, 270 Conn. 826, 841, 856 A.2d 345 (2004). He stated that the prior incidents were relevant to J's credibility regarding the element of force and to whether the assault occurred at all. The court refused to change its ruling. The court did state, however, that the defendant's defense, at this point, was that he did not commit the assault but that if the scope of the defense changed later on in the trial, the court would reconsider its ruling.8
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the legal principles that guide our resolution of the defendant's claim. "[A] determination that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing involving the victim's testimony is ... subject to the discretion of the trial court." State v. Manini, 38 Conn.App. 100, 111, 659 A.2d 196, cert. denied, 234 Conn. 920, 661 A.2d 99 (1995). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 112, 659 A.2d 196.
Id., at 106, 659 A.2d 196. In Manini, the court concluded that Id., at 114, 659 A.2d 196.
"The defendant bears the burden of establishing the relevance of the proffered testimony." State v. Sullivan, 244 Conn. 640, 648, 712 A.2d 919 (1998). (Citations...
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