State v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 02 August 2017
• Docket Number: No. 20141043,20141043
• Citation: 424 P.3d 83
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Appellant, v. George M. MARTINEZ, Jr., Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

424 P.3d 83

STATE of Utah, Appellant,

v.George M. MARTINEZ, Jr., Appellee.

No. 20141043

Supreme Court of Utah.

Filed August 2, 2017

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst. Solic. Gen., Mikelle C. Daugherty, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Joan C. Watt, Ralph W. Dellapiana, Salt Lake City, for appellee.

Justice Pearce authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Durham, and Justice Himonas joined.

Amended Opinion^*

On Certification from the Court of Appeals

JUSTICE PEARCE, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 A Utah Highway Patrol Trooper stopped a vehicle for an improper lane change and asked both the driver and George Matthew Martinez, a passenger, for identification. The trooper ran a warrant check and learned that Martinez had an outstanding arrest warrant. The officer searched Martinez incident to his arrest and discovered a glass pipe with methamphetamine residue inside. The State charged Martinez with possession of a controlled substance, but the district court granted Martinez's motion to suppress the evidence. The district court concluded that the trooper had violated Martinez's Fourth Amendment rights when he asked to see Martinez's identification and ran a warrants check without reasonable suspicion that Martinez had committed or was about to commit a crime. The State appeals the district court's suppression order, arguing that an officer may ask a passenger to supply his identification and run a background check on him during a routine traffic stop. We hold that officer safety concerns justified the negligibly burdensome extension of the traffic stop and reverse the district court's order.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Jeremy Horne stopped a car after the driver failed to properly signal a lane change. Martinez was a passenger in the vehicle. Trooper Horne explained the reason for the stop and asked the car's driver for his license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. While the driver was collecting his documents, Trooper Horne also asked Martinez for identification.

¶ 3 Trooper Horne gathered documentation from both the driver and Martinez and returned to his patrol car. He conducted a records check of both the driver and passenger using his in-car computer system. He entered the driver's driver license number first and then immediately entered Martinez's driver license number. According to Trooper Horne, after entering a number, it generally took "less than five seconds or so" to retrieve information regarding warrants, license status, and a photo. Trooper Horne first learned that the driver's license was valid and that the driver had no outstanding warrants. "Immediately after" that, Trooper Horne reviewed Martinez's inquiry results and learned that Martinez had an outstanding arrest warrant.

¶ 4 Trooper Horne returned to the car—now two to three minutes into the stop—and arrested Martinez. When Trooper Horne asked Martinez if he had anything illegal on his person, Martinez admitted that he did and produced a glass pipe, which later tested positive for methamphetamine residue. After Martinez's arrest, Trooper Horne gave the driver a "verbal warning and allowed him to leave." The driver chose to stay, however, to help Martinez locate a battery for his hearing aid. The driver left twenty-two minutes after the initial stop.

¶ 5 The State charged Martinez with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Martinez moved the district court to suppress the evidence Trooper Horne collected, arguing that the officer had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Martinez claimed that " ‘[a]ny further temporary detention’ for investigative questioning after fulfilling the original purpose for the traffic stop constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause to arrest or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality." (Quoting State v. Hansen , 2002 UT 125, ¶ 31, 63 P.3d 650 ). Because Trooper Horne asked for Martinez's identification without reasonable suspicion, Martinez argued, the information Trooper Horne obtained as a result of that illegal inquiry should be suppressed.

¶ 6 The district court granted Martinez's motion to suppress evidence after concluding that Trooper Horne had violated Martinez's Fourth Amendment rights when he asked to see Martinez's identification. It concluded that "[i]nvestigation of the passenger without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is beyond the scope of a routine traffic stop."

¶ 7 The State appeals the district court's suppression order, arguing that an officer may ask a passenger to supply his identification and run a background check during a routine traffic stop as long as it does not unreasonably extend the stop's duration. The State's argument is consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 The district court's determination presents us with a mixed question of law and fact. We disturb the district court's findings of fact only when they are clearly erroneous. See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 12, 164 P.3d 397. But the deference we afford the district court's application of the law to those factual findings depends upon

(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal rule relies on "facts" observed by the trial judge, such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that weigh for or against granting [deference] to trial courts.

Murray v. Utah Labor Comm'n , 2013 UT 38, ¶ 36, 308 P.3d 461 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

¶ 9 In Murray , we suggested how we would apply that framework to a Fourth Amendment question. We opined that

"a finding that a common set of recurring law enforcement practices qualifies as a ‘reasonable’ search or seizure" would warrant nondeferential review. Such a finding is "law-like" in that law enforcement and the general public need "a consistent rule established by set appellate precedent." And it is not "fact-like" because the ultimate determination will often rest on the "general reasonableness" of the facts rather than "the demeanor or credibility" of witnesses.

Id . ¶ 39 (citations omitted). We thus afford no deference to the district court's application of law to the underlying factual findings.

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 This case presents a single issue: does a law enforcement officer violate the Fourth Amendment if she requests that a passenger voluntarily provide identification and then runs a background check on that passenger without reasonable suspicion that the passenger has committed—or is about to commit—a crime?¹ We conclude that an officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment if she does so. We recognize that the result we reach comports with that of a number of state and federal courts to have considered the issue.²

And while the United States Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue before us, our holding aligns with the analysis the Court employs when discussing the legitimacy of taking steps to promote officer safety during a traffic stop.

¶ 11 The Fourth Amendment provides that "the people [shall] be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST . amend. IV. "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Florida v. Jimeno , 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). Thus, it "is not ... a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).

¶ 12 To decide whether police conduct during a traffic stop is reasonable, we consider whether the stop was (1) "justified at its inception" and (2) carried out in a manner "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances [that] justified the interference in the first place." Id. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). An otherwise lawful traffic stop can become unreasonable "if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005).

¶ 13 Here, Martinez does not argue that the traffic stop was not justified at its inception. Instead, Martinez contends that Trooper Horne was required to have a "reasonable suspicion that [Martinez was] involved in criminal activity" and that the trooper's conduct "impermissibly added to the time reasonably necessary to complete the traffic check." We thus consider the facts of Martinez's case through current Supreme Court precedent with an eye toward both the scope and duration of the traffic stop.

¶ 14 We begin by underscoring that reasonable officer safety measures are related to the mission—and therefore to the scope—of a traffic stop itself. In Rodriguez v. United States , the Supreme Court explained,

Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's "mission"—to [1] address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and [2] attend to related safety concerns.

––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (citations omitted). The Court reiterated that "the government's officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop itself," because "[t]raffic stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers.’ " Id . at 1616 (citation omitted); see also Maryland v. Wilson , 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) ("Regrettably, traffic stops may be dangerous encounters."). "Indeed, it appears ‘that a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making...