State v. Martinez

Citation638 S.W.3d 740
Decision Date02 September 2021
Docket NumberNo. 11-20-00144-CR,11-20-00144-CR
Parties The STATE of Texas, Appellant v. Brandon Nicholas MARTINEZ, Appellee
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

Micheal Murray, District Attorney, Alex R. Hunn, Assistant, for Appellant.

Tommy M. Adams, Goldthwaite, for Appellee.

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

OPINION

W. STACY TROTTER, JUSTICE

On June 25, 2018, after a traffic stop, Appellee, Brandon Nicholas Martinez, was arrested, and later indicted by a grand jury, for possession of a controlled substance, namely Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), other than marihuana, in an amount of less than one gram. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.116(a), (b) (West 2017). Appellee filed a motion to suppress and contended that the actions taken by law enforcement personnel in seizing THC from the vehicle that he had operated on that date violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After a hearing and considering the evidence, the trial court granted Appellee's motion.

The State now appeals the trial court's grant of Appellee's motion to suppress evidence.1 In two issues, the State asserts that the trial court erred when it (1) determined that "there were no separate articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion or probable cause of any other crime apart from the traffic infraction" and (2) created a "per se" time limitation for the arrival of a canine unit and then ruled on this issue after it was raised for the first time by Appellee's trial counsel during his closing argument. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand.

I. Factual Background

On the day of Appellee's arrest, Officer Roberto Rodriguez, a four-year veteran of the Brownwood Police Department, observed Appellee driving a vehicle on Highway 377 in Brownwood. Officer Rodriguez was familiar with Appellee because he had, within the past year, arrested Appellee for possession of marihuana. Appellee pulled into a gas station, and Officer Rodriguez followed in his patrol unit. Appellee did not exit the vehicle that he was driving; rather, he left and drove to another gas station that was approximately one-half of a mile away. According to Officer Rodriguez, Appellee committed a traffic violation when he failed to signal his intention to turn at least one hundred feet before turning left onto the premises of the second gas station. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.104(b) (West 2011).

Upon observing Appellee's traffic violation, Officer Rodriguez activated his emergency overhead lights and initiated a traffic stop; the vehicle operated by Appellee eventually stopped at one of the fuel pumps, with the vehicle's fuel cap facing away from the pump. Appellee immediately exited the vehicle that he had been driving without being prompted to so do, which Officer Rodriguez testified was a very unusual gesture given the circumstances. Officer Rodriguez then exited his patrol unit, approached Appellee, and introduced himself. Before Officer Rodriguez could explain the reason for the traffic stop, Appellee interrupted and thanked Officer Rodriguez for arresting him previously because, according to Appellee, the arrest had changed his life. Another Brownwood police officer, Officer Patrick Weaver, arrived shortly thereafter as backup to Officer Rodriguez. After Appellee had spoken to Officer Rodriguez for almost an entire minute, Officer Rodriguez explained the reason for the traffic stop to Appellee and asked Appellee to produce his driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. As Appellee retrieved these items, he continued to speak about his previous arrest by Officer Rodriguez, how the arrest had affected his life, and the probation that he was still serving because of the arrest.

Meanwhile, Officer Rodriguez was informed by dispatch that the vehicle Appellee had been driving was registered to someone other than Appellee. When confronted with this information, Appellee claimed that he had purchased the vehicle several years prior but could not explain why it was still registered to someone else. After Officer Rodriguez told Appellee that he would only receive a warning, and not a traffic citation, Officer Rodriguez asked Appellee if he had anything illegal in the vehicle. Appellee stated that he did not. Officer Rodriguez then requested, and received, consent to search Appellee. Subsequent to the search of Appellee's person, Officer Rodriguez requested, and received, consent to search the vehicle that Appellee had been driving. However, immediately after consenting to the search of the vehicle, Appellee, who was now speaking to both Officer Weaver and Officer Rodriguez, stated that he believed that Officer Rodriguez had violated his rights and had intended to follow him from the first gas station to the second gas station. Officer Rodriguez then opened the vehicle's driver's side door, but, before proceeding further, he noticed that Appellee was still slightly agitated and was continuing to complain to Officer Weaver. Consequently, Officer Rodriguez asked: "Do you want me to stop?" Appellee nodded and responded with a gesture that indicated to Officer Rodriguez that he should move away from the vehicle, which he immediately did.

Officer Rodriguez then asked Appellee if he would roll down one of the vehicle's windows. Appellee refused and predicted that, if he did roll down a window, Officer Rodriguez would have a canine called to the scene to "sniff" the vehicle and that Officer Rodriguez would then find a reason to search it. Based on the nature of his encounter with Appellee and the suspicions that he had developed, Officer Rodriguez called in a request for a canine unit. According to Officer Rodriguez's testimony and the reproduced copy of the dashcam video from his patrol unit that was admitted at the suppression hearing, no more than ten or eleven minutes had elapsed from the time that Officer Rodriguez initiated the traffic stop to the time that he requested a canine unit.

At the time, the closest available canine unit was in the neighboring town of Early. Thirty-eight minutes later, the canine unit from Early arrived, and the canine immediately proceeded to conduct an open-air sniff around the vehicle that Appellee had been driving. The canine alerted on the vehicle in less than one minute, and the officers thereafter searched the vehicle. During the search, Officer Rodriguez mirandized2 Appellee and later asked him if there was any marihuana in the vehicle. Appellee stated that he had smoked marihuana in that vehicle for years, and that he was sure there were either trace amounts, resin, or a "roach" inside the vehicle. As a result of the search, THC was discovered in the vehicle by the officers.

II. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. Martinez v. State , 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Brodnex v. State , 485 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ; Martinez , 348 S.W.3d at 922–23. We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court's fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Derichsweiler v. State , 348 S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ; Amador v. State , 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Guzman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ). We also defer to the trial court's findings as to questions of fact and mixed questions of law and fact that turn on the weight or credibility of the evidence. Brodnex , 485 S.W.3d at 436 ; Wade v. State , 422 S.W.3d 661, 666–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ; Derichsweiler , 348 S.W.3d at 913.

We review de novo the trial court's determination of pure questions of law, the application of the law to established facts, and the legal significance of those facts. Lerma v. State , 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) ; Wade , 422 S.W.3d at 667 ; Derichsweiler , 348 S.W.3d at 913 ; Kothe v. State , 152 S.W.3d 54, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) ). We also review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that are not dependent upon credibility determinations. Brodnex , 485 S.W.3d at 436 ; Derichsweiler , 348 S.W.3d at 913 (citing Amador , 221 S.W.3d at 673 ).

When, as in this case, the trial court makes explicit findings of fact, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those findings. State v. Kelly , 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In that context, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, regardless of whether the trial court granted or denied the motion. Wade , 422 S.W.3d at 666 (citing State v. Woodard , 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ); Wiede v. State , 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As such, we will sustain the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and if it is correct under any applicable legal theory. Lerma , 543 S.W.3d at 190.

III. Analysis

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ; Hubert v. State , 312 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). These constitutional protections extend to investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of a traditional arrest. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State , 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ). A warrantless traffic stop by law enforcement personnel to address traffic violations constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is tantamount to a temporary detention; therefore, the traffic stop must be justified and...

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  • Castillo-Quiroz v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • August 30, 2023
    ...(8th Cir. 1992) (extraordinary nervousness helped support reasonable suspicion to prolong detention and seize bags); State v. Martinez, 638 S.W.3d 740, 754 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2021, no pet.) (quick withdrawal of consent to search helped support reasonable suspicion to wait for K-9 unit); Wi......
  • Seguine v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • January 30, 2023
    ... ... continuing the detention. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ... 355-56 (holding that reasonable suspicion is needed to ... continue an otherwise completed traffic stop to conduct a ... canine sniff); see also State v. Martinez, 638 ... S.W.3d 740, 750-51 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2021, no pet.) ... (recognizing that ... reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity independent ... of a traffic violation can justify a prolonged detention). In ... evaluating the acceptable duration of a temporary ... ...
  • Azzam v. State
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    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • August 31, 2023
    ...to confirm or dispel their suspicions of other crime quickly, so long as they do not unnecessarily detain the driver."); State v. Martinez, 638 S.W.3d 740, 750 App.-Eastland 2021, no pet.) ("[W]hile the investigation is ongoing a law enforcement officer may appropriately request and verify ......
  • State v. Dominguez
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    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • August 18, 2022
    ...that reasonable suspicion is needed to continue an otherwise completed traffic stop to conduct a canine sniff); see also State v. Martinez, 638 S.W.3d 740, 750-51 (Tex.App.--Eastland 2021, no pet.) (recognizing reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity independent of a traffic violati......

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