State v. Martino, 92-106-C

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Citation642 A.2d 679
Docket NumberNo. 92-106-C,92-106-C
PartiesSTATE v. Marco A. MARTINO. A.
Decision Date07 June 1994
OPINION

LEDERBERG, Justice.

This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal by Marco A. Martino (defendant) from a judgment of conviction in the Superior Court for sexual assault in the first and second degrees. After a jury trial, the defendant was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment, ten years suspended for the first-degree sexual assault conviction and eight years' imprisonment, five years suspended for the second-degree sexual assault conviction, the terms to run concurrently. The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial justice erred in not instructing the jury on the defense of mistake of fact. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

FACTS

The defendant and L.A.F. (complainant) first met in April 1989 at T.G.I. Friday's, a restaurant in Warwick, Rhode Island. For the next four or five days, defendant phoned complainant regularly. On May 1, 1989, complainant agreed to attend a movie with defendant. After meeting, however, they changed their plans and decided instead to take a drive in defendant's car. The ensuing journey brought them eastward toward Oakland Beach in Warwick and, eventually, into the parking lot of the Ponaug Marina. After defendant had stopped his car, the pair began to converse. Suddenly, however, defendant began to force himself upon complainant; struggling, she told defendant to "knock it off." He refused to comply; complainant continued to struggle and told defendant to "stop." This angered defendant, who responded by pushing complainant down, forcibly removing her clothes, grabbing and shaking her face, and putting his full weight on her. Threatened, abused, and frightened, complainant was told, "Just relax and enjoy it," before defendant proceeded to have intercourse with her.

The defendant subsequently was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual assault and one count of second-degree sexual assault. A jury found him guilty of second-degree sexual assault and guilty on one count of first-degree sexual assault. On appeal, defendant primarily contended that the trial justice had erred in not instructing the jury on the defense of mistake of fact.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

An examination of the trial record disclosed that at the conclusion of defendant's case, the trial justice instructed the jury, in relevant part, as follows:

"Force or coercion means when the accused does any of the following: overcomes the victim through the application of physical force or physical violence, or coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence on the victim, and the victim reasonably believes that the accused has the present ability to execute these threats.

* * * * * *

"If you find that the alleged victim consented to the acts, then there is no force or coercion."

At the close of the charge, the following exchange occurred between the trial justice and defense counsel:

"THE COURT: Exceptions to the charge, Mr. Chiodo?

"MR. CHIODO: No your Honor.

"THE COURT: None?

"MR. CHIODO: No."

The trial justice subsequently directed the jury to retire to the jury room to begin deliberations. Because defense counsel concurred with the charge as given instead of objecting to the exclusion of a mistake-of-fact instruction, defendant may not now challenge the propriety of the original instructions. Super.R.Crim.P. 30 ("[n]o party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict"); see State v. Williams, 432 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I.1981); State v. Cianci, 430 A.2d 756, 765 (R.I.1981); State v. Vargas, 420 A.2d 809, 815 (R.I.1980).

We reach a similar result in respect to defendant's present challenge to the supplemental jury instructions. Approximately two hours after the jury had commenced deliberations on September 19, 1991, the jury foreman forwarded a note to the trial justice that inquired, "1. Definition of coercion--is there an implication that both sides understand?" After being asked to be more specific, the jury forwarded a second communication (September 19 inquiry) to the trial justice:

"1. Could you give us the definition of coercion as you explained it in your instructions? We are particularly interested in whether [defendant] had to understand he was coercing [complainant]. 2. What is the legal definition of force? Thank you."

The trial justice responded by repeating his original instruction on force and coercion and then asked the jury whether his response answered its question. The jurors responded, "Yes," and again were excused.

Relying primarily upon State v. Gomes, 590 A.2d 391 (R.I.1991), defendant argued on appeal that in response to the September 19 inquiry, the trial justice unilaterally should have decided to instruct the jury on the defense of mistake of fact because the inquiry disclosed the jury's concern that defendant might have misunderstood complainant's resistance to his advances. The absence of such an instruction, defendant posited, may have resulted in the jury's conviction of defendant despite a possible finding that defendant believed complainant had consented. We disagree.

"No trial justice may be expected to be endowed with that quantum of total recall which would enable him or her at the conclusion of the charge to be certain that all necessary points have been covered accurately and completely." Williams, 432 A.2d at 670. This, however, is precisely the standard that defendant now attempts to impose upon the trial justice. At no time following the trial justice's response to the jury's September 19 inquiry did defendant either specifically request a mistake-of-fact instruction or object to its omission from the trial justice's supplemental instructions. Accordingly, defendant is now precluded from assigning as error the trial justice's failure to instruct on the defense of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Michalopoulos v. C & D Restaurant, Inc., C.A. PC 95-6509
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Rhode Island
    • August 2, 2002
    ...after the commencement of deliberations, due process requires the justice to 'answer the jury's specific questions.'" State v. Martino, 642 A.2d 679, 682 (R.I. 1994) (citing State v. Collazo, 446 A.2d 1006, 1013 (R.I. 1982) and State v. Giordano, 413 A.2d 93, 94 (R.I. 1980)). Thus, in McKin......
  • Michalopoulos v. C & D Restaurant, Inc., C.A. PC 95-6509
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Rhode Island
    • August 2, 2002
    ...after the commencement of deliberations, due process requires the justice to 'answer the jury's specific questions.'" State v. Martino, 642 A.2d 679, 682 (R.I. 1994) (citing State v. Collazo, 446 A.2d 1006, 1013 (R.I. 1982) and State v. Giordano, 413 A.2d 93, 94 (R.I. 1980)). Thus, in McKin......
  • Michalopoulos v. C & D Restaurant, Inc.
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Rhode Island
    • August 2, 2002
    ...... trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the. courts of this state.". . . The role of a trial justice when reviewing a motion for a new. trial ... requires the justice to 'answer the jury's specific. questions.'" State v. Martino , 642 A.2d. 679, 682 (R.I. 1994) (citing State v. Collazo , 446. A.2d 1006, 1013 (R.I. ......
  • Michalopoulos v. C & D Restaurant, Inc.
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Rhode Island
    • August 2, 2002
    ...... trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the. courts of this state.". . . The role of a trial justice when reviewing a motion for a new. trial ... requires the justice to 'answer the jury's specific. questions.'" State v. Martino , 642 A.2d. 679, 682 (R.I. 1994) (citing State v. Collazo , 446. A.2d 1006, 1013 (R.I. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT