State v. Martz
| Decision Date | 18 November 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. DA 07-0340.,DA 07-0340. |
| Citation | 196 P.3d 1239,347 Mont. 47,2008 MT 382 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Daniel Joseph MARTZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender, Roberta R. Zenker, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana.
For Appellee: Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Micheal S. Wellenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana.
¶ 1 Daniel Joseph Martz appeals his conviction and sentence in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County, for partner or family member assault. We affirm.
¶ 2 The procedural history of this appeal is somewhat convoluted, involving multiple charges of partner or family member assault ("PFMA") in three separate criminal cases, all filed in the Sixth Judicial District Court. At the outset, it is useful to note that a first or second conviction of PFMA is considered a misdemeanor, while a third or subsequent conviction is considered a felony. See § 45-5-206(3)(a), MCA (2005); § 45-2-101(23), (42), MCA. Furthermore, Martz was convicted of PFMA in 2002; and for the purpose of determining the number of Martz's prior PFMA convictions, the 2002 conviction was his first.
¶ 3 On January 24, 2006, the State filed an information in Cause No. DC 06-09 charging Martz with the following:
Count I: partner or family member assault, second offense, a misdemeanor, allegedly committed on or about December 23-24, 2005.
Count II: partner or family member assault, third offense, a felony, allegedly committed on or about December 25-26, 2005.
Count III: assault with a weapon, a felony, allegedly committed on or about December 25-26, 2005.
¶ 4 On May 4, 2006, the State filed an information in Cause No. DC 06-48 (the instant action) charging Martz with the following:
Count I: partner or family member assault, fourth offense, a felony, allegedly committed on or about April 10, 2006.
Martz entered a plea of not guilty to this charge on May 15. On June 1, the District Court entered an order setting trial for December 19, 2006.
¶ 5 On August 31, 2006, the State moved to dismiss, without prejudice, the charges pending in DC 06-09. The State provided two grounds: (1) "[a] material witness is not currently available" and (2) "[i]nterests of justice." The District Court granted the motion that same day.
¶ 6 On September 20, 2006, the State refiled the charges previously dismissed in DC 06-09. The case was given a new cause number: DC 06-103. The District Court set trial for December 20, 2006. Thus, Martz was scheduled to be tried on the charge of PFMA, fourth offense, the day before he was to be tried on the charges of PFMA, second offense and third offense.
¶ 7 On December 18, 2006, Martz filed a motion in DC 06-48 to dismiss the charge of PFMA, fourth offense, for lack of a speedy trial. Martz explained, first, that while the State had charged this offense as a felony, "in substance, it is actually a misdemeanor." Martz reasoned that because he had only one prior PFMA conviction (in 2002), his trial on the instant charge on December 19 could only be his second PFMA conviction. As noted, a second conviction of PFMA is a misdemeanor.
¶ 8 Based on the theory that the PFMA charge in DC 06-48 was a misdemeanor, Martz argued that the speedy trial statute applied. That statute provides:
After the entry of a plea upon a misdemeanor charge, the court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the prosecution to be dismissed, with prejudice, if a defendant whose trial has not been postponed upon the defendant's motion is not brought to trial within 6 months.
Section 46-13-401(2), MCA. Martz observed that he had entered his plea of not guilty on May 15, 2006, and that he had never asked for any postponements or trial delays. Thus, Martz argued, he should have been brought to trial by November 15, 2006, and the failure to do so required dismissal of the charge.
¶ 9 The State responded to Martz's motion, asserting that the PFMA offense in DC 06-48 was properly charged as a felony. The State noted that the charges of PFMA, second offense and third offense, had been refiled in DC 06-103. The State did not deny that Martz was scheduled to be tried on his "fourth" offense before being tried on his "second" and "third" offenses; however, the State claimed that charging him in DC 06-48 with a fourth offense was correct given the chronology of when the offenses occurred. (The second and third offenses were based on events in December 2005, while the fourth offense was based on events in April 2006.) The State posited that Martz could be charged in separate actions based on the number of "offenses" he allegedly had committed, as opposed to the number of "convictions" actually reflected in his criminal record. The State also argued that if Martz were found guilty in DC 06-48 of a "fourth" offense but was not found guilty the next day in DC 06-103 of either the "second" or "third" offense, then his "fourth" offense could simply be reduced to a misdemeanor at the time of sentencing. In this connection, the State requested "that the sentencing in [DC 06-48], should a jury convict, be held off until after the outcome of the trial in DC 06-103."
¶ 10 The District Court heard additional arguments on Martz's motion during a hearing the morning of trial. Defense counsel reiterated Martz's contention that "[t]here is no circumstance that the State can identify, today, where Mr. Martz will be convicted of anything other than a misdemeanor." Counsel asserted that "[the instant charge], if he's convicted, will be his second conviction," which constitutes a misdemeanor. Counsel argued that the way the State "labels" an offense in a charging document should not control with respect to the speedy trial statute; in other words, form should not prevail over substance. Thus, since there was "[no] conceivable outcome, today, other than a misdemeanor," counsel asserted that DC 06-48 fell within the purview of the speedy trial statute and had to be dismissed.
¶ 11 The court, however, focused on the fact that the State had charged the offense as a felony, and the court opined that it was not critical for the misdemeanor and felony offenses to be tried in chronological order. The court indicated that if the State failed to obtain guilty verdicts on either of the PFMA charges in DC 06-103, then any guilty verdict the State obtained in DC 06-48 would be treated as a misdemeanor for sentencing purposes. The District Court therefore denied Martz's motion.
¶ 12 A jury found Martz guilty in DC 06-48 of PFMA, "fourth" offense, on December 19, 2006. The following day, a trial was held in DC 06-103. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, the District Court granted a motion to dismiss Count II (PFMA, "third" offense) and Count III (assault with a weapon) for insufficient evidence. A jury thereafter found Martz guilty under Count I (PFMA, "second" offense).
¶ 13 Shortly after the presentence investigation report was filed in DC 06-48, but prior to sentencing, Martz filed a sentencing memorandum challenging the probation/parole officer's recommendation of a five-year commitment to the Montana State Prison. Martz argued that the guilty verdict in DC 06-48 was his second "conviction" of PFMA; that this conviction, therefore, had to be treated as a misdemeanor; and that his sentence, accordingly, could not be more than one year imprisonment in the county jail. In response, the State asserted that irrespective of the sequence in which the cases were tried, Martz presently stood guilty of PFMA, second offense, committed in December 2005, and PFMA, third offense, committed in April 2006. The State requested "concurrent sentencing" on the two offenses. The District Court agreed with the State's argument and denied Martz's motion to treat the guilty verdict in DC 06-48 as a "second conviction" for sentencing purposes.
¶ 14 The District Court sentenced Martz in both DC 06-48 and DC 06-103 on March 19, 2007. The court first imposed sentence in DC 06-103: thirty days in the Park County Detention Center, to run concurrently with any sentence in DC 06-48. The court then imposed sentence in DC 06-48: two years at the Montana Department of Corrections, with one year suspended. Martz now appeals.
¶ 15 We restate the issues raised by Martz, as follows:
1. Did the District Court lack jurisdiction over the charge in DC 06-48?
2. Did the District Court err in denying Martz's motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial under § 46-13-401(2), MCA?
3. Did the District Court impose an illegal sentence in DC 06-48?
¶ 16 Martz's challenge to the District Court's jurisdiction is an issue of law, which this Court determines de novo. See Stanley v. Lemire, 2006 MT 304, ¶ 52, 334 Mont. 489, ¶ 52, 148 P.3d 643, ¶ 52; City of Missoula v. Gillispie, 1999 MT 268, ¶ 10, 296 Mont. 444, ¶ 10, 989 P.2d 401, ¶ 10; State v. Spotted Blanket, 1998 MT 59, ¶ 18, 288 Mont. 126, ¶ 18, 955 P.2d 1347, ¶ 18.
¶ 17 Whether a misdemeanor charge must be dismissed under the speedy trial statute requires an interpretation and application of § 46-13-401(2), MCA. This Court reviews for correctness a district court's interpretation and application of a statute. State v. Bullman, 2007 MT 288, ¶ 7, 339 Mont. 461, ¶ 7, 171 P.3d 681, ¶ 7. However, any factual findings underlying the application of § 46-13-401(2), MCA, to the case at hand are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, ¶ 119, 338 Mont. 442, ¶ 119, 167 P.3d 815, ¶ 119. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the fact-finder misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if a review of the record leaves this Court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made....
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