State v. Mason

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
• Writing for the Court: Sherwood
• Citation: 155 Mo. 486,55 S.W. 636
• Parties: STATE ex rel. McCAFFERY et al. v. MASON, Auditor.
• Decision Date: 13 March 1900

55 S.W. 636 155 Mo. 486 STATE ex rel. McCAFFERY et al.
v.
MASON, Auditor. Supreme Court of Missouri. March 13, 1900.

STATUTES — ENACTMENT — VALIDITY — PRESUMPTIONS — JUDICIAL NOTICE — ELECTION — REGISTRATION — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. In the absence of protest "noted on the journal" of either house, pointing out in what respect the constitution has been violated during the passage of the bill, as required by Const. art. 4, § 37, it will be presumed that the legislature was not remiss in its duty to make such protest if any grounds therefor existed.

2. Laws 1899, p. 179, relating to registration in cities of 300,000 inhabitants, does not violate Const. art. 8, § 5, requiring the legislature to provide for registration in cities having more than 100,000 inhabitants, and that it "may" provide for such registration in cities having a population exceeding 25,000 inhabitants and not exceeding 100,000, "but not otherwise," since there is no limitation as to the number of inhabitants any one city should contain in excess of 100,000; the concluding words of the section, "but not otherwise," simply permitting laws for registration in cities of 25,000 to 100,000 inhabitants.

3. Laws 1899, p. 179, providing for registration for cities of 300,000 inhabitants, and requiring election commissioners in "cities not within counties" to be paid by the city, thus separating cities not within counties from other cities, is not a special or local law, since the legislature has the right to require cities not within counties to pay election expenses.

4. Laws 1899, p. 179, § 3, providing for the vacation of the office of election commissioners in cities "now having" 300,000 inhabitants, is not a special law on the ground that no provision is made therein for the vacation of such office in cities which might thereafter attain that size, since the title of the act and the first section thereof show that it applies to cities now having or which may hereafter have that population.

5. Laws 1899, p. 179, providing for registration in cities of 300,000 inhabitants, which applies to the city of St. Louis only, does not create a new class of cities within the first class, in violation of Const. art. 9, § 7, authorizing the legislature to divide cities into four

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classes only, since that section of the constitution does not apply to the city of St. Louis, which is singled out by the constitution from the other cities.

6. Const. art. 4, § 25, providing that no law shall be passed except by bill, and that no bill shall be so amended in its passage as to change its original purpose, does not prohibit amendments of mere detail by substituting, omitting, or inserting words in a bill which do not change its purpose.

7. In the absence of any protest in either house showing that a bill was amended during its passage so as to change its original purpose in violation of Const. art. 4, § 25, prohibiting such amendments, it will be presumed that no such amendment was made.

8. Where the number of legislators voting for and against a bill is entered in the journal, the court will take judicial notice of the number of members in the house, in determining whether it received the requisite constitutional majority.

9. A statute is valid if the mandatory provisions of the constitution regulating legislative proceedings have been complied with, though the nonmandatory provisions governing such proceedings have not been observed.

10. It will be presumed that a bill was properly presented and signed, and that the nonmandatory constitutional provisions regulating legislative proceedings have been complied with.

11. The title of Laws 1899, p. 179, entitled "An act to provide for the registration of voters in cities of 300,000 inhabitants or more; to provide for the creation of a board of election commissioners and define its duties; to govern elections in such cities, and to prescribe rules governing registrations and elections therein," etc., — is sufficient, since it clearly expresses the subject of the act.

12. Laws 1899, p. 179, providing for the registration of voters in cities now having or which may "hereafter" have 300,000 inhabitants, which applies only to the city of St. Louis, is not a special or local law within Const. art. 4, § 53, prohibiting the enactment of local or special laws, since that city stands alone under the constitution, and for the further reason that the act makes provision for the future.

13. Laws 1899, p. 179, requiring registration of voters in cities of 300,000 inhabitants, and requiring voters to reside 20 days in the election precinct before they can vote, does not violate Const. art. 8, providing that every male citizen of the United States over 21 years of age, who has resided in the state 1 year, and in the city where he shall offer to vote 60 days, shall be entitled to vote.

14. Laws 1899, p. 179, prohibiting nonregistered persons from voting, does not violate the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution, providing that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.

In banc. Original application by the state, on the relation of James McCaffery and others, against Isaac M. Mason, auditor, etc., for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel him to audit relators' claim for election expenses. Granted.

The Attorney General, Sam B. Jeffries, and W. J. Stone, for relators. B. Schnurmacher, Geo. D. Reynolds, Noble & Shields, and Morton Jourdan, for respondent.

SHERWOOD, J.

This is an original proceeding in this court, its object being to compel the city auditor to audit a certain bill of expenses incurred by relators, as the board of election commissioners, in and about the performance of their official duties in their capacity as such commissioners. The return of the city auditor, giving reasons for refusing to audit the bill in question, states in substance that the law under which such election commissioners were appointed and are acting is constitutionally invalid, for that in the course of its passage such proceedings were had as violated the constitution of this state in several particulars. The objections thus raised to the constitutional validity of the litigated act will now be discussed. That act is known as "House Bill No. 760," and is entitled "An act to provide for the registration of voters in cities now having or which hereafter may have three hundred thousand inhabitants or more; to provide for the creation of a board of election commissioners, provide for its appointment and define its duties; to govern elections in such cities, defining offenses and providing penalties therefor, and to prescribe rules and regulations governing registration and elections therein, and to repeal all acts and parts of acts in conflict or inconsistent herewith." Laws 1899, p. 179. Section 37 of article 4 of the constitution declares that: "No bill shall become a law until the same shall have been signed by the presiding officer of each of the two houses in open session; and before such officer shall affix his signature to any bill, he shall suspend all other business, declare that such bill will now be read, and that, if no objections be made, he will sign the same to the end that it may become a law. The bill shall then be read at length, and if no objections be made, he shall, in the presence of the house in open session, and before any other business is entertained, affix his signature, which fact shall be noted on the journal, and the bill immediately sent to the other house. When it reaches the other house, the presiding officer thereof shall immediately suspend all other business, announce the reception of the bill, and the same proceedings shall thereupon be observed, in every respect, as in the house in which it was first signed. If in either house any member shall object that any substitution, omission or insertion has occurred, so that the bill proposed to be signed is not the same in substance and form as when considered and passed by the house, or that any particular clause of this article of the constitution has been violated in its passage, such objection shall be passed upon by the house, and if sustained, the presiding officer shall withhold his signature; but if such objection shall not be sustained, then any five members may embody the same, over their signatures, in a written protest, under oath, against the signing of the bill. Said protest, when offered in the house, shall be noted upon the journal, and the original shall be annexed to the bill to be considered by the governor in connection therewith."

Commenting on that portion of the organic law, when it first came under review, and within four years after the adoption of the

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constitution, this court said: "We are convinced that the initial clause of the section, that `no bill shall become a law until the same shall have been signed by the presiding officer of each of the two houses in open session,' is mandatory, though it is quite evident that the mandate of the constitution would be obeyed, so far as concerns proper authentication of the bill, when it receives the signature of the respective presiding officers in open session. But we do not regard the other clauses of the section under review as mandatory; for it is to be observed that those clauses do not declare that `no bill shall become a law' if the presiding officers or the members fail to perform the duties which the residue of the section imposes, but the only penalty directly expressed is that contained in the initial clause just noted. No inference is, however, to be drawn from this that the residue of the section is not to be obeyed, for certainly the duties it enjoins are clearly set forth. The framers of the constitution were evidently of the opinion that they might safely intrust the supervision of the details specified in the remaining clauses of the section to the members of the general...