State v. Mason

Decision Date09 July 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-1871-CR,85-1871-CR
Citation393 N.W.2d 102,132 Wis.2d 427
PartiesSTATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lewis MASON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtWisconsin Court of Appeals

William J. Tyroler, Asst. State Public Defender, for defendant-appellant.

Sally Wellman, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for plaintiff-respondent; Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., on brief.

Before SCOTT, C.J., BROWN, P.J., and NETTESHEIM, J.

SCOTT, Chief Judge.

The issue is whether the state is permitted under sec. 904.10, Stats., to use statements made during a hearing on a guilty plea, later withdrawn, for impeachment purposes at a subsequent trial. We conclude that sec. 904.10 renders statements made during a guilty plea hearing inadmissible for any purpose at a subsequent trial and we reverse. 1

Lewis Mason was charged with four counts of sexual assault (two counts of first-degree sexual assault and two counts of incest) against his daughter. Faced with these charges, Mason struck a plea bargain wherein he agreed to plead guilty to one count and have the other three dismissed. At a plea hearing held on December 13, 1984, Mason admitted to having had sexual relations with his fourteen-year-old daughter.

Approximately one month later, Mason was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea after he indicated to the probation officer that he did not want to go through with the plea negotiation. Mason recognized that his attorney had negotiated a very favorable deal for him but stated to the court, "[A]s I see it, my daughter is lying and I know this for a fact."

On direct examination at the subsequent trial, Mason denied ever having had sexual intercourse with his daughter. During a side bar conference held off the record in the course of cross-examination, the prosecutor apparently indicated to the court that she intended to use Mason's statements made at the plea hearing for impeachment purposes. Argument was subsequently held to the court. Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the plea-related statements and argued that sec. 904.10, Stats., prohibits the use of such evidence. The prosecutor countered by arguing that the statute should not be construed as "a cloak to perjury," citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), and cases decided thereafter.

The trial court found that Mason's statements at the plea hearing, voluntarily made, were completely contradictory to the statement he made at trial. The trial court ruled that Mason's offer to plead guilty was not admissible but that any of his other statements made at the plea hearing were admissible for impeachment purposes. The trial court stated:

The Harris case stands for the proposition that a person does not have free reign to come up and commit perjury, and it allows the district attorney to use the truth searching devices on cross-examination, which include prior statements, and I cannot see that it should be precluded by anything that was brought up.

The prosecutor was then permitted to engage in the following colloquy with Mason:

Q All right. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Mason, that on December 13th in this courtroom you told the judge that you in fact had had sexual relations, sexual intercourse with your daughter ...?

A Yes, I did, but it was under the assumption that I was going to be giving--given a plea bargain, and at that time I had said that I did, but at that time, no, I had not had any sexual relations with my daughter whatsoever. I was under--

Q But you said that you had?

A Yes.

Q In fact, Mr. Mason, at that time on December 13th you went so far as to say I didn't use a knife, that's not true, but I did have sexual intercourse with my daughter. That part?

A Yes, that is what I said.

Q That part of it is true. You distinguished between certain aspects of the charge?

A Yes, but I was under the assumption that I was going to get a one year in the county jail and five years probation as this was to take and save my job at American Motors, and this is what my attorney had pushed me into and I then said yeah, I'll take it.

Q So you're saying you were forced to do this?

A Yes.

The prosecutor then read aloud portions of the transcript of the plea hearing, including Mason's admission that he had sexual relations with his daughter.

Mason argued at his motion for a new trial and he argues now that under sec. 904.10, Stats., the introduction into evidence of any plea bargain-related statements for any purpose, including impeachment, is impermissible. We agree.

Section 904.10, Stats., provides:

Offer to plead guilty; no contest; withdrawn plea of guilty. Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of no contest, or of an offer to the court or prosecuting attorney to plead guilty or no contest to the crime charged or any other crime, or in civil forfeiture actions, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer or one liable for his conduct. Evidence of statements made in court or to the prosecuting attorney in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers is not admissible.

The construction of a statute in relation to a given set of facts is a question of law. State v. Clausen, 105 Wis.2d 231, 243, 313 N.W.2d 819, 825 (1982). Therefore, we need not give special deference to the circuit court's determination. LePoidevin v. Wilson, 111 Wis.2d 116, 121, 330 N.W.2d 555, 558 (1983).

We employ a number of well-settled rules of statutory construction which must guide our analysis of sec. 904.10, Stats. Principally, our purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the statute, which we determine by looking to the language of the statute itself. Ball v. District No. 4, Area Board, 117 Wis.2d 529, 537-38, 345 N.W.2d 389, 394 (1984). When the statutory...

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11 cases
  • State v. Amidon
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • August 29, 2008
    ...v. State, 135 S.W.3d 55, 65 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); State v. Smith, 190 W.Va. 374, 438 S.E.2d 554, 561 (1993); State v. Mason, 132 Wis.2d 427, 393 N.W.2d 102, 104 (Ct. App.1986). ¶ 22. In sum, we hold that statements made during the course of a plea-related PSI are inadmissible against a defe......
  • State v. Myrick
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • July 10, 2014
    ...the use of statements made in connection with a guilty plea, later withdrawn, at a subsequent trial.” See State v. Mason, 132 Wis.2d 427, 433, 393 N.W.2d 102 (Ct.App.1986). ¶ 20 In order to determine when a defendant made statements in connection with an offer to plead guilty, the court of ......
  • State v. Myrick
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • September 4, 2013
    ...those statements were not made to “the prosecuting attorney” “in connection” with an “offer” to plead guilty. iv. State v. Mason, 132 Wis.2d 427, 393 N.W.2d 102 (Ct.App.1986). Mason held that a defendant's statements made at a plea hearing that contradicted his trial testimony could not be ......
  • State v. Pickens, 96-1839-CR
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • March 20, 1997
    ...they were appropriate and to give the victims an opportunity to refuse them. Pickens argues that our holding in State v. Mason, 132 Wis.2d 427, 393 N.W.2d 102 (Ct.App.1986), requires us here to conclude Pickens' trial counsel was deficient for not objecting on the basis of § 904.10, STATS. ......
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