State v. Mason

• Decision Date: 27 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 9–16–34.,9–16–34.
• Citation: 2016 Ohio 8400,111 N.E.3d 432
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Maurice MASON, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

111 N.E.3d 432

2016 Ohio 8400

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Maurice MASON, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 9–16–34.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Marion County.

Dec. 27, 2016.

Brent W. Yager, for appellant.

Kort Gatterdam, Columbus, and Todd Anderson, for appellee.

Timothy J. McGinty, Cleveland, for Amicus Curiae, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office.

Jeffrey M. Gamso, Cleveland, for Amicus Curiae, Ohio Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

PRESTON, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the entry of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas granting defendant-appellee's, Maurice Mason ("Mason"), motion to dismiss the death-penalty specification from his indictment. In 1994, Mason was sentenced to death for the 1993 murder of nineteen-year-old Robin Dennis ("Dennis."). See State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 144–148, 694 N.E.2d 932 (1998). In 2008, Mason was granted federal habeas corpus relief as to his death sentence and, while his resentencing was pending, the United States Supreme Court invalidated Florida's death-penalty statute in Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). Mason filed a motion to dismiss the death-penalty specification from his indictment arguing that Ohio's death-penalty statute is unconstitutional under Hurst. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court's decision granting Mason's motion and declaring unconstitutional Ohio's death-penalty statute in effect in 1993.

{¶ 2} On September 30, 1993, the Marion County Grand Jury indicted Mason on three counts: Count One of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B), with a death-penalty specification under R.C. 2941.14 and 2929.04(A)(7) alleging that the murder occurred during the commission of a rape; Count Two of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a first-degree felony, with a prior-aggravated-felony specification under R.C. 2941.142 ; and Count Three of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a fourth-degree felony, with an offense-of-violence specification under R.C. 2941.143. (Doc. No. 1).¹ On December 21, 1993, Mason was re-indicted by the Marion County Grand Jury on the same charges, with a firearm specification under R.C. 2941.141 and 2929.71 added to each count. (Doc. No. 67).

{¶ 3} After pleading not guilty to the charges in the indictments, the case proceeded to a jury trial on May 31, 1994 through June 18, 1994. (Doc. Nos. 10, 99, 391). On June 18, 1994, the jury found Mason guilty of the charges and specifications in the December 21, 1993 indictment. (Doc. Nos. 340, 341, 342, 391). On June 27, 1994, the trial proceeded to the penalty phase and mitigation evidence was presented in the presence of the jury. (Doc. No. 391). On June 29, 1994, the jury recommended that Mason be sentenced to death under R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) after concluding that the aggravating circumstance of which Mason was convicted outweighed the mitigating factors in the case. (Doc. Nos. 380, 391).

{¶ 4} On July 7, 1994, the trial court issued its separate opinion accepting the jury's death-sentence recommendation after weighing the aggravating circumstance against the mitigating factors. (Doc. No. 391). That same day, the trial court sentenced Mason to death on Count One, 15–25 years in prison on Count Two, 3–5 years in prison on Count Three, and 3 years in prison on the firearm specification, and ordered that Mason serve all of the sentences consecutively. (Doc. Nos. 388, 391). The trial court filed its sentencing entry on July 12, 1994. (Doc. No. 391). After a hearing on August 9, 1994, the trial court denied on August 12, 1994 Mason's motion for a new trial. (Doc. No. 414). Mason filed his notice of appeal on September 6, 1994. (Doc. No. 423). On December 9, 1996, this court affirmed Mason's conviction and sentence, and the trial court's denial of Mason's motion for a new trial. State v. Mason, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9–94–45, 1996 WL 715480 (Dec. 9, 1996). See also State v. Mason, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9–94–45, 1996 WL 715479 (Dec. 9, 1996) (affirming Mason's death sentence). On June 17, 1998, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed Mason's convictions and death sentence. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932.

{¶ 5} Prior to this court's review of Mason's direct appeal, Mason filed a petition for post-conviction relief on September 20, 1996. (Doc. No. 447). The trial court denied Mason's petition on November 21, 1996. (Doc. No. 451). This court affirmed the decision of the trial court on June 6, 1997. State v. Mason, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9–96–70, 1997 WL 317431 (June 6, 1997).

{¶ 6} On July 15, 1999, Mason filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which was denied by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on May 9, 2000. Mason v. Mitchell, 95 F.Supp.2d 744 (N.D.Ohio 2000). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Mason's petition but remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 642 (6th Cir.2003). After the evidentiary hearing, the district court on October 31, 2005 denied Mason's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and dismissed his petition. Mason v. Mitchell, 396 F.Supp.2d 837 (N.D.Ohio 2005). On October 3, 2008, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and granted "a conditional writ of habeas corpus that will result in the vacation of his death sentence unless the state of Ohio commences a new penalty-phase trial against him within 180 days[.]" Mason v. Mitchell, 543 F.3d 766 (6th Cir.2008).

{¶ 7} After a number of pleadings in federal court from 2009 to 2013, which extended Mason's resentencing beyond 180 days, the Sixth Circuit concluded that "the State of Ohio is not barred from seeking the death penalty in the new penalty-phase trial against Mason, even though the State failed to recommence the sentencing proceeding within this court's 180–day deadline." Mason v. Mitchell, 729 F.3d 545, 548–549, 552 (6th Cir.2013).

{¶ 8} On May 6, 2016, Mason filed a "motion to dismiss capital components pursuant to Hurst v. Florida. " (Doc. No. 616). On May 17, 2016, the State filed a memorandum in opposition to Mason's motion. (Doc. No. 618). The trial court granted Mason's motion on June 20, 2016. (Doc. No. 619).

{¶ 9} The State filed its notice of appeal on June 24, 2016. (Doc. No. 620). The State raises two assignments of error. For ease of our discussion, we will address the State's assignments of error together.

Assignment of Error No. I

The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to apply binding precedent from the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Belton, 2016-Ohio-1581 (April 20, 2016)to reject Mason's claim that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury finding that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Trial court decision, Apx. Pgs. 16–19, 43–44.

Assignment of Error No. II

The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the Sixth Amendment requires jury factfinding in capital sentencing. Trial court decision, Apx. Pgs. 36–40.

{¶ 10} In its assignments of error, the State argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the death-penalty specification should be removed from Mason's indictment because Ohio's death-penalty statute is unconstitutional. Specifically, in its first assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred by failing to apply State v. Belton to reject Mason's constitutional argument. 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319. In its second assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred by concluding that Ohio's death-penalty statute in effect in 1993 is unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

{¶ 11} As an initial matter, we address this court's jurisdiction to address the merits of this appeal. Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution provides that courts of appeal "shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the court of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district." R.C. 2501.02 defines the jurisdiction of the courts of appeal, "In addition to the original jurisdiction conferred by Section 3 of Article IV, Ohio Constitution, the court shall have jurisdiction upon an appeal upon questions of law to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final orders of courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district[.]"

{¶ 12} "Both grants of jurisdiction require that, in order to be appealable, a trial court's order must be final." State v. Rivera, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 08CA009426 and 08CA009427, 2009-Ohio-1428, 2009 WL 806819, ¶ 8. See also R.C. 2505.03(A) ("Every final order, judgment, or decree of a court * * * may be reviewed on appeal by a court of common pleas, a court of appeals, or the supreme court, whichever has jurisdiction."). " ‘ "If an order is not final, then an appellate court has no jurisdiction." ’ " Rivera at ¶ 8, quoting Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St.3d 514, 2007-Ohio-607, 861 N.E.2d 519, ¶ 14, quoting Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 540 N.E.2d 266 (1989).

{¶ 13} R.C. 2505.02 describes final orders that may be appealed. Ordinarily, in capital cases, "a final, appealable order consists of both the sentencing opinion * * * and the judgment of conviction." State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 18. See also State ex rel. Bates v. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate Dist., 130 Ohio St.3d 326, 2011-Ohio-5456, 958 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 20 (discussing the appellate court's jurisdiction to review the capital defendant's appeal of the denial of his constitutional challenge). At least a portion—the death sentence—of Mason's sentence was vacated by the trial court on ...