State v. Mason

• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Walter L. Smith, Jr., L. J. Hymel, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen.; TATE; BARHAM; BARHAM
• Citation: State v. Mason, 305 So.2d 523 (La. 1974)
• Decision Date: 02 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 55124,55124
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Rory MASON, Appellant.

Page 523

305 So.2d 523

STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Rory MASON, Appellant.

No. 55124.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 2, 1974.

Robert A. Connell, Jackson, Leslie D. Ligon, Jr., Clinton, for appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Walter L. Smith, Jr., L. J. Hymel, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., J. J. McKenzie, Staff Atty., for appellee.

TATE, Justice.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated arson, La.R.S. 14:51, and sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor. Six bills of exceptions are relied upon on his appeal.

Bill No. 1:

The most serious issue is raised by Bill No. 1. This was taken to the denial of motion for a bill of particulars.

Especially since the defendant was charged by the short-form indictment, the state's initial refusal to answer 14 of the 15 requested particulars courted reversal. We ultimately determine that reversal is not here required, since the motion for the bill of particulars may be interpreted as disclosing that the defendant already knew the minimum detail the state was constitutionally required to furnish. We do not, however, by affirming this particular conviction mean to countenance the violation by the state of the spirit (and nearly the letter) of the constitutional requirement of pretrial disclosure of sufficient information about the offense charged as to enable a defendant to prepare an adequate defense.

The context of the issue in the present proceedings is the following:

The defendant, a 22-year-old inmate of the state penitentiary at Angola, was charged with aggravated arson. As defined by La.R.S. 14:51 (1964), aggravated arson is the 'intentional damaging' of property 'whereby it is foreseeable that human life might be endangered', when committed by either of the following two methods: '(a) by any explosive substance or (b) setting fire to' the property. ¹

As authorized by Article 465 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure of 1966, the defendant was charged by a short-form indictment. In compliance with the requirements of that article, the indictment charges that the defendant Mason on April 16, 1972 'committed aggravated arson of a structure, to-wit: a guard shack on the grounds of the Louisiana State Penitentiary'.

The defendant then moved for a bill of fifteen particulars concerning the crime. The state initially refused to furnish any of the particulars, except for the time of the crime (3:30 PM); but, fortunately for the state's argument for affirmance of this conviction, it was required by the trial court to furnish particulars in four additional instances.

Among the particulars the state refused to furnish, however, was that requested by interrogatory 15: 'What was the alleged method or system used by the defendant to commit the alleged crime?' Since as previously noted, the crime may be committed by either of two methods ('by an explosive substance' Or 'by setting fire to'), the defendant was entitled to at least such information.

The short-form indictment has been attacked many times as inadequately meeting the constitutional requirement that an accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, as required by La.Constitution, Art. I, Section 10 (1921). It has withstood such attack chiefly because of the requirement that, upon request of the defendant for a bill of particulars, the state must inform him of the essential facts constituting the offense with which charged, including more specific facts if the offense may be committed in a number of different ways.

See State v. Clark, 288 So.2d 612, 614--616 (La.1974), where we extensively summarized the jurisprudence. See also: La.C.Cr.P. art. 484 and Official Revision Comment thereto; Comment, The Bill of Particulars in Criminal Trials, 12 La.L.Rev. 457 (1952); Comment, The Short Form Indictment--History, Development and Constitutionality, 6 La.L.Rev. 78 (1944); Note, Right to Bill of Particulars, 22 La.L.Rev. 676 (1962).

Thus, under this jurisprudence, the defendant might be entitled to reversal because of the failure of the state to furnish him, if it knew, formal notice of which of the two statutory methods of committing the crime was the basis of the charge against him.

Nevertheless, interrogatory 11 indicates that the defendant already knew as much of the basis of the charge as did the state, as corroborated by the state's response to this interrogatory and to interrogatory 13 (when ordered by the court to do so).

Interrogatory 11 requested of the state: 'Please describe the type or exact substance believed used in the alleged commission of the crime'. When required by the court, counsel for the state 'answered in open court that the State is not certain as to what substance was used in the commission of this crime'. Interrogatory 13 had asked if any weapons or substances used were in the possession of the state, and the court ordered 'that if the State comes up with a substance that the defendants be allowed to analyze it in accordance with agreement with counsel for the State this date'.

The evidence shows the following: The crime was committed when two inmates came to a guard shack, one with a can of some substance, and one lighting a fire, and threw it in. The substance smelled like gasoline or diesel, and the substance exploded into fire, causing physical burninjuries to a correctional guard in the shack at the time.

The interrogatories indicate that the defendant knew that a substance had been used in committing the arson. The transcription of the proceedings by which the trial court required the state to furnish further particulars concerning the substance and to permit its chemical analysis further indicate that defense counsel was award of the method of commission of the offense. See Tr. 82--90. Actually, under the circumstances, the factual method by which the crime was committed partook of Both the statutory methods (damaging by explosive substance or by setting fire to) of commission of the crime.

Under these circumstances, we do not find reversible error in the court not ordering the state to answer interrogatory 15, although the issue is close. Further, we are unable to find an abuse of discretion in the court's refusal to order other particulars furnished (which guard shack on the penitentiary premises was damaged?; how human life was endangered?; etc.); but we do think that the state's refusal to furnish such particulars is questionable, in the light of the requirement that the accused be furnished such information of what the state intends to prove that the accused may prepare an adequate defense. See State v. Clark, 288 So.2d 612 (La.1974).

The hypertechnicalities of the indictment jurisprudence of the past were based upon the historical circumstance that the indictment furnished the chief procedural pretrial notice of the nature and cause of the accusation. State v. Smith, 275 So.2d 733, 734--738 (concurring opinion) (La.1973). Correlative to this present-day relaxing of the hypertechnical requirements of the indictment and of its formal supplementation by bill of particulars (see also State v. James, La., 305 So.2d 514 (Docket No. 54,874), this day rendered), is an obligation on the part of the State, in the interest of assuring a fair trial, of assuring that the accused is furnished essential enformation concerning the charge, in order that he may adequately prepare what defense he has. Surprise and lawyer-tactics should play as little part in the outcome of criminal prosecutions as they do now in civil litigation.

Sufficiency of the Indictment:

Bill No. 7 was taken to the denial of a post-trial motion in arrest of judgment, which for the first time questioned the sufficiency of the short-form indictment for aggravated arson.

Short forms for charging both aggravated arson and simple arson were first provided by Article 465 of the 1966 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. In providing these short-form indictments, the Official Revision comment notes that 'The arson offenses, like rape and manslaughter, have well-understood meanings'.

The short-forms for arson so provided, like the other short-form indictments which have been upheld, furnish adequate information of the specific crime with which charged so as to enable an accused to know what he is charged with and (as supplemented by pre-trial discovery available to...