State v. Mason

• Decision Date: 02 October 1934
• Docket Number: No. 14.,14.
• Citation: 174 A. 702
• Parties: STATE v. MASON.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

174 A. 702

STATE

v. MASON.

No. 14.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Oct. 2, 1934.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In order to review a conviction in a criminal case, under the provisions of sections 136 and 137 of the Criminal Procedure Act (2 Comp. St. 1910, pp. 1863, 1866, §§ 136, 137) plaintiff in error must procure the return, with the writ, of "the entire record of proceedings had upon the trial," authenticated by the certificate of the trial judge.

2. The reviewing court does not review the weight of evidence in a criminal case not taken up under sections 136 and 137 of the Criminal Procedure Act (2 Comp. St. 1910, pp. 1863, 1866, §§ 136, 137).

3. On a writ of error in a criminal case, not prosecuted under the provisions of sections 136 and 137 of the Criminal Procedure Act (2 Comp. St. 1910, pp. 1863, 1866, §§ 136, 137), errors not shown by the record proper must be presented by bill of exceptions; and such exceptions, in a criminal case, must be authenticated by the signature and seal of the trial judge.

Error to Court of Quarter Sessions, Burlington County.

William H. Mason was convicted of a criminal offense, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Argued May term, 1934, before BROGAN, C. J., and PARKER and BODINE, JJ.

William A. Slaughter and Norman W. Harker, both of Mt. Holly, for plaintiff in error.

Howard Eastwood, Prosecutor of the Pleas, of Burlington, for the State.

PARKER, Justice.

The plaintiff in error was convicted on an indictment in four counts, of which the first was withdrawn and the conviction rested on the other three.

The case is submitted on briefs, and as though it were before us on a certificate of the entire record of proceedings at the trial, pursuant to sections 136 and 137 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 2 Comp. St. 1910, 1863, 1866, §§ 136, 137. But we find no such certificate. All that appears is a certificate by the county clerk of the "indictment and proceedings" as on file in his office. This is not sufficient. The practice pointed out in such cases as State v. Clark, 75 N. J. Law, 473, 68 A. 114, State v. Armstrong, 88 N. J. Law, 280, 95 A. 997, State v. Ramage, 91 N. J. Law, 435, 103 A. 1043, and State v. Chiacclo, 131 A. 625, 4 N. J. Misc., 63, has not been followed. Hence the case is before us, if at all, on strict writ of error and bill of exceptions. It follows that the rather extended argument that the verdict is against the weight of evidence, based on chapter 349 of the Laws of 1921 (P. L. p. 951 [Comp. St. Supp. 1924, §§ 53—137a, 53— 137b]), is not available for reversal, as that act applies only to cases brought up under sections 136 and 137. It follows, further, that the assignments of error, to be available, must be supported by exceptions authenticated by the signature and seal of the trial court. State v. Hart, 90 N. J. Law, 261,101 A. 278, L. R. A. 1917P, 985; State v. Fearce, 113 N. J. Law, 155, 172 A. 575; Lowenstein v. Lohman, 109 N. J. Law, 215, 160 A. 817; Lyon v. Fabricant, 113 N. J. Law, 62, 172 A. 567; Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. Law, 463, 511; State v. Morgan, 85 N. J. Law, 387, 91 A. 988.

There are forty-four "reasons or specifications of error" (so entitled in the printed book) which may be assumed to be cognizable as assignments of error. Of these, something over half are argued, currente calamo for the most part, as though exceptions had been duly prayed and sealed. But a careful examination of the transcript discloses...